Pariksha Mukham - Book Summary

This document is a comprehensive summary and translation of the Jain text "Pariksha Mukham" (परीक्षामुखं), authored by Manikyanandisuri and translated into Hindi by Nyaytirtha Gajadharalal Jain and into Bengali by Brahmacharisaankhyatirtha Surendrakumar. It was published by Bharatiya Jain Siddhant Prakashini Samstha in Veer Nirvana Samvat 2442 (1916 CE).

The text is a foundational treatise on Jain logic and epistemology, aiming to introduce students unfamiliar with the principles of Nyaya (logic) to the concepts of Pramana (valid cognition) and Pramana-abhasas (fallacious cognition).

Here's a breakdown of the key concepts and discussions covered in the provided pages:

1. Introduction and Scope:

The book begins with a Mangalacharan (auspicious invocation) stating that true knowledge of reality (artha-samsiddhi) is obtained through Pramana, while false knowledge arises from Pramana-abhasas. The author intends to present the essential characteristics of both for the benefit of beginners.

2. Definition of Pramana (Valid Cognition):

Pramana is defined as knowledge that establishes the truth of one's own and previously unknown (apurva) objects.
It is described as knowledge that enables the attainment of the beneficial (hita) and avoidance of the harmful (ahit). Thus, knowledge itself is Pramana; sensory contact and other non-cognitive elements are not.
Pramana is characterized as definitive (nischayatmak) and opposed to doubt (samsaya), error (viparyaya), and indecision (anadhyavasaya). It is likened to inference in its certainty, contrasting with the uncertain nature of these errors.
Apurva-artha refers to an object not previously determined by any Pramana. Even if an object is known, if subsequent doubt, error, or indecision arises regarding it, it is also considered apurva-artha.

3. Self-Consciousness (Knowledge of Knowledge):

The text emphasizes the concept of Sva-vyavasaya or self-consciousness, where knowledge becomes aware of itself. Just as an object is known when one turns towards it, knowledge also becomes aware of itself when it turns inward.
This is illustrated by the statement, "I know the pot through myself." In this, the pot (object) and the knowing process itself (subject/instrument) are both objects of cognition.
This self-awareness of knowledge is compared to a lamp that illuminates both external objects and itself. Therefore, knowledge, which illuminates both external objects and itself, is also considered self-illuminating.

4. Pramana's Validity (Pramanya):

The validity of Pramana is established either inherently (svatah) in a state of practice (familiarity with an object) or extrinsically (paratah) through another source in unfamiliar situations.

5. Types of Pramana:

Pramana is primarily divided into two types:
- Pratyaksha (Direct Perception): This is defined as clear (vishadam) knowledge.
  - Vaishadya (Clarity): Clarity is characterized as knowledge that is independent of other cognitive processes and possesses distinctive qualities like color (green, yellow) and form (straight, bent).
  - Samvyavaharika Pratyaksha (Empirical Direct Perception): This is clear knowledge that arises through the senses (touch, taste, smell) and the mind, being specific to a particular place.
  - The text argues against external objects and light being causes of knowledge, likening darkness to objects of knowledge which do not cause knowledge. It refutes the idea that objects or light are causes of knowledge by pointing out that knowledge does not always have a direct causal relationship (concordance and discordance) with them, using examples like the knowledge of mosquitoes in hair and the vision of cats in darkness.
  - It further clarifies that knowledge illuminates objects, not because it is produced by them (like a lamp is not produced by objects), but because it is capable of illuminating them through the process of shedding karmic obstructions (avarana-kshaya-upashama).
- Paroksha (Inferential/Indirect Perception): This includes all forms of knowledge other than Pratyaksha, such as memory, recognition, inference, etc.
  - Smriti (Memory): Recollection of past experiences based on residual impressions (samskara).
  - Pratyabhijnana (Recognition): The cognition of "this is that" or "this is like that," "this is different from that," etc., which arises from both direct perception and memory.
  - Tarka (Reasoning/Logic): The knowledge of vyapti (invariable concomitance) based on the presence or absence of something, e.g., "Where there is smoke, there is fire; where there is no fire, there is no smoke."
  - Anumana (Inference): Knowledge of the sadhya (probandum) from the sadhuana (probans or reason), where the hetu (reason) is necessarily connected to the sadhya.
    - Hetu (Reason): A factor that is invariably connected with the sadhya.
    - Avinabhava (Invariable Concomitance/Vyapti): The rule of co-presence (sahabhava) or sequence (kramabhava).
    - Sadhyam (Probandum): The thing to be proven, which is desired, not contradicted by other means of knowledge, and not already proven.
    - Paksha (Minor Term/Subject): The term in which the sadhya is to be established.
    - The text discusses the components of inference, arguing against the inclusion of Udaharana (example) as a necessary limb of inference, stating that Paksha (minor term) and Hetu (reason) are sufficient.
  - Agama (Testimony/Scriptural Authority): Knowledge derived from the words of a reliable authority (apta).
General and Particular (Samanya and Vishesha):
- Samanya (generality) is further divided into Tiryaksamanya (horizontal generality, like "cow-ness" seen in different cows) and Urdhvasamanya (vertical generality, like "substance-ness" that persists through different transformations of the same substance, like clay in a pot, bowl, etc.).
- Vishesha (particularity) is divided into Paryaya (modes or transformations of a substance, like happiness and sadness in the soul) and Vyatireka (difference between distinct substances, like a cow and a buffalo).

6. Fruits of Pramana (Phala):

The fruits of Pramana are the removal of ignorance (ajnana-nivrutti), acceptance (adana), rejection (jahana), and equanimity (upeksha). The primary fruit is the removal of ignorance, while the others are secondary.

7. Pramana-abhasas (Fallacious Cognitions):

These are cognitions that resemble Pramana but do not lead to true knowledge. They are characterized by lacking certainty, being contrary to reality, or being irrelevant.
Examples include:
- Smriti-abhasas: Mistaken recollection.
- Pratyabhijnana-abhasas: Mistaken recognition.
- Tarka-abhasas: Invalid reasoning.
- Anumana-abhasas: Fallacious inferences, characterized by flawed reasons (hetu). These include Asiddha (unproven), Viruddha (contradictory), Anaikantika (inconclusive), and Akincitkara (ineffective).
- Agama-abhasas: False testimony from unreliable sources.
- Sankhya-abhasas: Incorrect enumeration of pramāṇas (e.g., claiming only one or three pramāṇas).
- Vishaya-abhasas: Misconceptions about the object of knowledge (e.g., claiming only generality or particularity is the object of knowledge).
- Phala-abhasas: Misconceptions about the fruits of knowledge.

8. Refutation of Opponent Views:

The text engages in refuting various philosophical positions, particularly those of the Buddhists (Saugata), Samkhyas, Mimamsakas, and Naiyayikas, on the nature of perception, inference, and causality.

Overall Purpose: "Pariksha Mukham" serves as a logical and epistemological handbook within the Jain tradition. It systematically introduces the framework for understanding reality through valid means of knowledge, distinguishing them from their fallacious counterparts, and grounding this understanding in Jain philosophical principles. The text emphasizes clarity, certainty, and the ultimate goal of dispelling ignorance for spiritual progress.