Pariksha Mukha

This document is a Jain text titled "Pariksha Mukha" (परीक्षामुख), authored by Manikyanandiswami and edited by Pandit Mohanlal Shastri. Published by Bharat Varshiya Anekant Vidwat Parishad, it is described as "Jain Education International For Private and Personal Use Only".

The text appears to be a comprehensive treatise on Jain logic and epistemology, covering the nature of knowledge, valid means of knowledge (pramana), and fallacious means of knowledge (pramanabhas). It is structured into several chapters or "Samuddeshas" (समुद्देश), each dealing with a specific aspect of the subject.

Here's a breakdown of the key themes and content based on the provided pages:

Overall Purpose: The book aims to explain the principles of Jain logic and knowledge acquisition in a concise manner, intended for students. It defines and differentiates between valid knowledge (pramana) and invalid knowledge (pramanabhas).

Key Concepts and Chapters:

• Prameya (Subject Matter): The fundamental subject of knowledge is identified as the entity that possesses both general (samanya) and specific (vishesha) characteristics, encompassing substance (dravya) and mode (paryaya).
• Pramana (Valid Means of Knowledge):
  • Definition: Valid knowledge is defined as knowledge that is certain (nishchayatmak) and discriminates between one's own self and the object, as well as between the object and other objects. It's also described as knowledge that enables the attainment of beneficial and the avoidance of harmful.
  • Types: The text distinguishes between two main types of pramana:
    • Pratyaksha (Direct Perception): This is described as clear and distinct knowledge that arises without the mediation of other means of knowledge. It is further categorized into:
      • Savyaavaharika Pratyaksha (Empirical/Conventional Direct Perception): Knowledge gained through the senses and mind, which is somewhat clear.
      • Mukhya/Paramarthika Pratyaksha (Principal/Ultimate Direct Perception): Clear and distinct knowledge free from all obscurations and not dependent on senses.
    • Paroksha (Indirect Inference/Knowledge): This encompasses all forms of knowledge other than direct perception. Its types include:
      • Smriti (Memory): Knowledge based on recollection of past experiences.
      • Pratyabhijñana (Recognition): Knowledge that combines perception of the present with memory of the past, leading to recognition (e.g., "This is that same Devadatta").
      • Tarka (Reasoning/Hypothetical Reasoning): Knowledge derived from understanding the invariable concomitance (vyapti) between a probans (hetu) and a probandum (sadhyam), often involving hypothetical reasoning.
      • Anumana (Inference): Knowledge gained through inferring something from a sign or probans. It is distinguished into:
        • Svarthanumana (Inference for oneself): Direct inferential knowledge gained independently.
        • Pararthanumana (Inference for others): Knowledge conveyed through structured arguments (like the five-membered syllogism).
      • Agama (Testimony/Scriptural Authority): Knowledge derived from the reliable words of trustworthy beings (aptavachana).
  • Pradnyavada (Theory of Knowledge): The text discusses the fruits of pramana, which include the removal of ignorance and, consequently, the acts of abandoning, accepting, or being indifferent towards objects.
• Pramanabhas (Fallacious Means of Knowledge): These are distorted or incorrect forms of knowledge that resemble valid knowledge but do not lead to correct understanding. The text lists various types, including:
  • Swarupabhasa (Fallacy of Form): Including knowledge of the non-existent, misunderstood objects, mere sensory presentations, doubt, error, and indecision.
  • Pramanabhasa (Fallacies of Pramana): Including fallacies related to the nature of pramana itself.
  • Vishayabhasa (Fallacies of Subject Matter): Such as erroneously identifying only generalities or only particulars as the sole subject of knowledge.
  • Phalabhasa (Fallacies of the Fruit of Knowledge): Misunderstanding the outcome of knowledge.
  • Hetvabhasas (Fallacies of the Inferential Reason): These are crucial and extensively discussed, covering errors in the probans (hetu) used in inference. They include fallacies like:
    • Asiddha (Unproven): The reason itself is not established.
    • Viruddha (Contradictory): The reason contradicts the conclusion.
    • Anaikantika (Irregular/Fallacy of the Undefined): The reason is not invariably connected to the conclusion, often occurring in the presence of the opposite.
    • Akinchitkara (Ineffective): The reason is irrelevant or proves something already known or disproven.
  • Drishtantabhasas (Fallacies of the Example): Errors in the illustrative examples used in reasoning.
  • Balaprayogabhasa (Fallacies of Childish Application): Incomplete or improperly structured arguments.
  • Agamabhasa (Fallacies of Testimony): False or unreliable testimony.
  • Sankhyabhas (Fallacies of Number): Incorrectly limiting the number of valid means of knowledge.
• Hetu (Reason/Probans): The text defines a valid reason as something whose invariable concomitance (avinabhavatva) with the conclusion (sadhyam) is certain. It discusses various types of valid reasons (e.g., based on cause, effect, inherent nature, presence, absence) and their fallacious counterparts.
• Vyapti (Invariable Concomitance): The concept of vyapti is central to inference, and the text elaborates on its nature and how it is established (often through Tarka).
• Sapaksha (Affirmative Example) and Vipaksha (Negative Example): The text explains these as crucial components for establishing the validity of inference and identifying fallacies.
• Syadvada (Anekantavada's Principle of Conditionality): While not explicitly a chapter title, the underlying philosophy of anekantavada (multi-sidedness of reality) and its practical application in understanding reality through conditional statements (syad-vada) appears to inform the logical framework. The seven-fold predication (saptabhangi) is mentioned as a method for describing the complex nature of reality.

Structure: The book is organized into "Parichhedas" (परिच्छेद) or "Samuddeshas" (समुद्देश). The provided pages show the beginning of the first chapter and extensive lists of sutras (aphorisms) and their elaborations, covering a wide range of logical concepts.

Key Argumentative Points: The text engages with different philosophical schools (e.g., Bauddha, Mimamsaka, Sankhya, Nyaya, Vaisheshika) and refutes their views where they differ from the Jain perspective. For instance, it argues against the necessity of external senses (sannikarsa) for direct perception and critiques the limitations of other schools' theories of knowledge.

Language and Style: The text is written in Sanskrit with a commentary or explanation likely in Hindi (judging by the explanatory sections like "विशेषार्थ"). The language is precise and technical, befitting a work on logic.

In essence, "Pariksha Mukha" is a foundational text in Jain epistemology and logic, systematically explaining the Jain understanding of valid knowledge, inference, and the fallacies that can arise in the process of knowing. It aims to provide a clear and structured understanding of these complex philosophical concepts.