Paksh Vichar

This Jain text, "Paksh Vichar" by Sukhlal Sanghavi, is a scholarly analysis of the concept of 'Paksha' (proposition or thesis) in Jain logic, drawing comparisons with Buddhist and other Indian philosophical traditions. The book delves into four key aspects of 'Paksha':

1. The Nature and Definition of Paksha: The text notes that the definition of 'Paksha' was largely established early on. Prasastapada's definition, and later the precise linguistic formulation in Nyaya Pravesha and Nyaya Bindu, set the standard. Subsequent Digambara and Shvetambara Jain logicians largely adopted these definitions, either directly translating or using synonyms.

2. Clarification of Qualifiers within the Definition: The text discusses the importance of qualifiers like "desired" (ishta), "well-known" (prasiddha), and "uncontradicted" (abadhita). While Prasastapada and Nyaya Pravesha primarily focus on the negation of the "contradicted" (badhita) aspect, Nyaya Bindu elaborates on all three. Jain texts also clearly explain the variations of these qualifiers. The author points out subtle differences in how various Jain scholars, like Manikyanandi, Devsurisur, and Acharya Hemchandra, incorporated these clarifications into their works, with Hemchandra notably relegating some explanations to commentary rather than the main sutras. The text also details how various traditions define "contradicted Paksha," highlighting divergences in the specific types of contradictions identified (e.g., contradicting perception, inference, scripture, custom, or one's own statement).

3. The Forms (Akara) of Paksha: Acharya Hemchandra, following Manikyanandi and Devsurisur, identifies two forms of 'Paksha': the subject qualified by the predicate, and the predicate itself. Dharmakirti's work is also mentioned, where Dharmottara describes three forms: the subject alone, the predicate alone, and the combination of both. The text notes that the usage of these different forms, particularly as explained by Dharmottara, is a unique contribution. Vatsyayana's Nyaya Bhashya is cited for a two-fold classification.

4. The Types of Paksha: Similar to other Jain logicians, Acharya Hemchandra classifies 'Paksha' into three types: proven by valid cognition (pramana-siddha), proven by conceptualization (vikalpa-siddha), and proven by both (ubhay-siddha). While the 'pramana-siddha' category is universally accepted, there's debate regarding the acceptance of 'vikalpa-siddha' and 'ubhay-siddha' propositions. The text highlights Dharmakirti as an early critic of these latter types, and emphasizes that Jain logical texts provide detailed refutations to such criticisms.

The latter part of the excerpt also touches upon 'Drishtanta Vichar' (Consideration of the Example), which is presented as having three aspects:

1. The Question of Being a Part of Inference: The text discusses Dharmakirti's view that the example (drishtanta) is a component of inference, particularly for less knowledgeable individuals, as it supports the reason (hetu). However, for the learned, only the reason is sufficient, and the example is not an integral part of inference. Jain logicians like Manikyanandi, Devsurisur, and Hemchandra also generally deny the status of 'drishtanta' as a direct limb of inference, though they acknowledge its utility in 'parartha anumana' (inference for others) for the less intelligent, as a reminder of the concomitance (vyapti). The text clarifies that this denial is from the perspective of inference in general, not a complete rejection of its role.

2. Definition of Drishtanta: The general definition of a 'drishtanta' is found in the Nyaya Sutras, but not explicitly in Buddhist texts. Jain scholars like Manikyanandi also did not offer a general definition initially, but Devsurisur and Hemchandra later provided one. The Jain definition is noted as being specifically for inferential use, unlike the broader application of the Nyaya Sutra definition. The text mentions the two types of 'drishtanta'—'sadharmya' (similarity) and 'vaidharmya' (dissimilarity)—and their definitions as found in various Jain logical works.

3. The Use of Drishtanta: Jain logical thought on the use of 'drishtanta' is not absolute. They consider it valuable in 'parartha anumana' when the listener is uninitiated. In 'swartha anumana' (inference for oneself), it serves to remind the reasoner of the 'vyapti' if it has been forgotten.

In essence, "Paksh Vichar" provides a detailed comparative analysis of the concept of 'Paksha' within Jain logic, examining its definition, constituents, forms, and types, and situating it within the broader landscape of Indian philosophical thought, particularly in relation to Buddhist logic. The excerpt also briefly introduces the discussion on 'drishtanta' (example) as an important element in Indian logical reasoning.