On Upadhi

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided text "On Upādhi" by Hidenori Kitagawa, focusing on the refinement of the definition of upādhi and its application:

The article "On Upādhi" by Hidenori Kitagawa, building on a previous publication, delves into the precise definition and function of upādhi within Indian logic, specifically within the Jain philosophical tradition. Upādhi is presented as a concept that helps identify the invalidity of an argument.

Evolution of the Definition of Upādhi

Kitagawa begins by highlighting the preference for a generous definition of upādhi to make it easier to find examples and demonstrate logical fallacies. He then introduces a key definition from the Siddhāntamuktāvali:

• Initial Definition: "That which is a pervader of the sādhya (the predicate to be proved) and a non-pervader of the hetu (the reason or middle term) is the upādhi."

This can be rephrased as: "That which pervades the sādhya while not pervading the hetu is the upādhi."

However, the Siddhāntamuktāvali provides a more refined definition, incorporating the concept of "limitation" (avacchinna):

• Refined Definition: "That which is a pervader of the sādhya limited by dharma X, and a non-pervader of the hetu limited by the same dharma X, is the upādhi."

The author explains that this refinement is crucial for correctly identifying upādhis in complex logical arguments.

Example: The Perceptibility of Wind

To illustrate the necessity of the refined definition, Kitagawa uses an example debated by Naiyāyikas and other schools of thought concerning the perceptibility of wind.

• The Argument: "Wind is perceptible, because it is a substratum of a perceptible touch. (Example:) Like water etc."
  • Sādhya (what is to be proved): Perceptibility (of wind).
  • Hetu (the reason): Being a substratum of a perceptible touch.

The Naiyāyikas, who believe wind is imperceptible, need to find an upādhi to invalidate this argument. They propose "having a manifested color" (udbhūta-rūpavattva) as the upādhi.

Why the Initial Definition Fails:

Kitagawa explains why "having a manifested color" doesn't fit the initial definition of upādhi.

• Naiyāyika Doctrine: For the Naiyāyikas, external substances are perceptible only if they possess a manifested color. Since wind is an external substance without color, it's considered imperceptible.
• The Flaw: While "having a manifested color" is a non-pervader of the hetu (as not everything with a perceptible touch has a manifested color, e.g., wind itself), it is not a pervader of the sādhya (perceptibility). The sādhya (perceptibility) itself does not always require "having a manifested color." For instance, the soul is perceptible but lacks manifested color. Therefore, "having a manifested color" fails the first part of the definition: it doesn't pervade perceptibility.

Why the Refined Definition Succeeds:

The refined definition, with the addition of "limited by dharma X," resolves this issue. The key is understanding avacchinna (limited) and avacchedaka (limitor). A dharma F limited by dharma G means F existing in a locus that also possesses G.

• Choosing Dharma X: In this case, "external-substance-ness" (bahir-dravyatva) is chosen as dharma X.
• Applying the Refined Definition: The upādhi is "that which pervades perceptibility limited by external-substance-ness and non-pervades the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch limited by external-substance-ness."
  • First Part: "Pervades perceptibility limited by external-substance-ness." This means that any perceptible external substance possesses the property of perceptibility qualified by being an external substance. All perceptible external substances, according to the Naiyāyikas, have a manifested color. Therefore, "having a manifested color" satisfies this condition.
  • Second Part: "Non-pervades the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch limited by external-substance-ness." This means that not all external substances that have a perceptible touch necessarily have a manifested color. Wind is the prime example: it's an external substance with a perceptible touch but lacks manifested color. Thus, "having a manifested color" fits this condition.

The Role of Diagrams and Logical Areas:

The article uses diagrams (Figures V, VI, VII, VIII, IX) to visually represent the logical relationships between the sādhya, hetu, and upādhi.

• Figure V shows that "having a manifested color" (D) doesn't always pervade perceptibility (C) and doesn't always pervade the nature of being a substratum of a perceptible touch (B).
• The problem with the initial definition is that it might allow for scenarios (like Figure VI) where the hetu (B) is entirely contained within the sādhya (C), making it difficult to prove the invalidity of the argument.
• The refined definition, by introducing "limitation by dharma X" (Figure VII onwards, specifically focusing on "external-substance-ness"), ensures that the hetu limited by X (BX) and the sādhya limited by X (CX) are properly analyzed.
• Figure IX is presented as the definitive representation of the refined definition. It shows that the sādhya limited by X (CX) is entirely contained within the upādhi (D), while a part of the hetu limited by X (BX) lies outside the upādhi (D).
• This exclusion of a part of BX from D guarantees that a part of the original hetu (B) is outside the original sādhya (C), thus conclusively demonstrating the invalidity of the argument.

Conclusion:

The article emphasizes that the refined definition of upādhi, incorporating limitation by a specific dharma (X), is essential for accurately identifying logical fallacies. By making the definition more specific, it allows for the identification of upādhis that might be missed by a simpler definition, thus strengthening the tools of logical analysis in Jain philosophy. The example of wind and manifested color demonstrates how this precise definition helps to invalidate flawed arguments by highlighting the presence of a relevant upādhi.