On Pramana Samuccaya Vrtti 6ab Again

Added to library: September 2, 2025

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Summary

Here is a comprehensive summary of Eli Franco's article "On Pramanasamuccayavrtti 6ab Again" in English:

This article by Eli Franco is a response to a previous paper by Dr. Zhihua Yao concerning Dignāga's views on perception, specifically self-awareness (svasamvedana). Franco aims to clarify several points and address a specific textual emendation suggested by Yao.

Key Points of Franco's Argument:

  • Clarification of Franco's Own Views: Franco begins by correcting misattributions made by Yao regarding his own research.

    • Franco did not claim Alex Wayman was the only person holding the view that Dignāga accepted four types of perception; his arguments were directed at Wayman due to their ongoing debate.
    • Franco clarifies that his argument was against reading a strict "typology" of perception into Dignāga's work, not necessarily arguing for three types against four. He points to Dignāga's own statement indicating his distinctions were in response to others.
    • Franco denies confusing mental perception with mental consciousness, as Yao suggested.
  • The Core Textual Issue: Pramānasamuccayavrtti 6ab: The central focus of the article is a specific passage in Dignāga's Pramānasamuccayavrtti (PSV) 6ab.

    • Franco's previous argument was that Dignāga refers to svasamvedana (self-awareness) of emotions like desire, anger, and ignorance as a subtype of manasa pratyaksa (mental perception) because it doesn't depend on sense organs. This is based on the Sanskrit fragment: "ragadisu ca svasamvedanam indriyanapeksatvan manasam pratyaksam."
    • Yao agrees with the translation of this Sanskrit fragment but argues that Hattori's reconstruction of the Sanskrit text is incorrect. Yao's reasoning is that the Tibetan translation of this sentence lacks an equivalent for the word manasam (mental).
  • Franco's Rebuttal to Yao's Emendation: Franco disagrees with Yao's conclusion that the absence of manasam in the Tibetan translation invalidates the Sanskrit fragment.

    • Franco accepts Yao's point that the Tibetan translation shouldn't be emended to fit the Sanskrit fragment.
    • However, he argues that the Sanskrit fragment, which includes manasam, represents the lectio difficilior (the more difficult reading), and as such, it should be preferred.
    • Franco poses a rhetorical question: Is it more likely that manasam was present in Dignāga's original text and was lost (accidentally or intentionally) in transmission or translation, or that it was added erroneously?
    • He dismisses the idea that manasam was added intentionally to create a contradiction between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. He also finds a simple scribal error (like aberratio oculi) unlikely to explain its addition.
    • Conversely, Franco finds it highly plausible that a scribe might have omitted a word like manasam. He further suggests that the word manasam was likely intentionally deleted or not copied/translated by a careful reader or translator who recognized its incompatibility with Dharmakīrti's views on perception and sought to create harmony between the two thinkers.
  • Confirmation of Franco's Reading: Franco presents new evidence to support his interpretation.

    • A newly discovered Sanskrit manuscript of the Pramanasamuccayatika (commentary on PSV) confirms the reading of manasam.
    • This manuscript includes the passage: "...yasya mana evasrayo na rupindriyam, tan manasam abhisamhitam," which further elaborates on what constitutes mental perception.
    • Immediately following this, the manuscript presents a question and answer: "Why is the self-awareness of (desire, etc.) a mental perception? Because it belongs to that species (i.e., the species of mental perception) owing to the general property of [being] self-awareness." This directly supports Franco's interpretation of svasamvedana as a form of manasa pratyaksa.
  • Conclusion: Based on this textual evidence, Franco concludes that if one does not alter Dignāga's text to suit Yao's hypothesis, then Yao's interpretation of Dignāga's four types of perception is unfounded.