On Dharmakirtisunderstanding Of Pramanabhuta And His Definition Of Pramana

Here's a comprehensive summary of Helmut Krasser's paper "On Dharmakirti's Understanding of pramāṇabhūta and His Definition of pramāṇa":

The paper delves into the complex interpretation of the term pramāṇabhūta (literally "having become a pramāṇa") as applied to the Buddha in Dharmakirti's philosophical system. Krasser's primary goal is to analyze how Dharmakirti, following Dignāga, establishes the Buddha as the ultimate authority (pramāṇa) and to clarify Dharmakirti's own definitions of pramāṇa.

The Core Problem:

The central question is how the Bhagavat (Buddha) can be considered a pramāṇa, given that pramāṇa is consistently defined as reliable cognition (avisamvadi jñānam). The Buddha, being a person, is not a cognition. This apparent discrepancy has led to various interpretations by scholars and commentators.

Key Interpretations of pramāṇabhūta:

1. Extended Sense/Authority: Some scholars, like Tillemans, interpret pramāṇa in pramāṇabhūta in an extended sense, meaning "authority."
2. Metaphorical Use: Dunne suggests a metaphorical interpretation, where the Buddha is pramāṇa-like.
3. Comparison (Bhūta as "like"): Seyfort Ruegg argues that bhūta in pramāṇabhūta means "like" or "similar to," implying the Buddha is pramāṇa-like. This interpretation is supported by some post-Dharmakirti commentaries.

Krasser's Analysis and Proposed Solution:

Krasser critically examines these interpretations by delving into the commentaries of Jinendrabuddhi, Devendrabuddhi, and Śākyabuddhi. His analysis leads to the following conclusions:

• Jinendrabuddhi's Interpretation: Jinendrabuddhi explains pramāṇabhūta by drawing parallels with praise where epithets are used metaphorically (e.g., "You are the ocean"). He states the Bhagavat is pramāṇa like (pramāṇam iva), meaning similar to a valid cognition. The term bhūta here means "has come into existence" or "has arisen," used to negate eternal pramāṇas like God. This interpretation emphasizes the similarity of the Buddha to a pramāṇa.

• Devendrabuddhi's Commentary: Devendrabuddhi, in his commentary on tadvat pramāṇam bhagavan (PV 2.7a), also explains the Bhagavat's similarity to pramāṇa. He clarifies that this similarity is based on the two defining characteristics of pramāṇa: being reliable (avisamvadin) and illuminating an unknown object (ajñātārthaprakāśa). Crucially, Devendrabuddhi's explanation implies that the metaphorical use of pramāṇa for the Buddha is self-evident, without needing additional linguistic cues.

• Dharmakirti's Definition of Pramāṇa: Krasser re-evaluates Dharmakirti's definitions of pramāṇa presented in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter:

  • Definition 1: pramāṇam avisamvadi jñānam (reliable cognition) (PV 2.1ab).
  • Definition 2: ajñātārthaprakāśaḥ (illumination of an unapprehended object) (PV 2.5c).

• The Role of the Two Definitions: Krasser argues that these two definitions are not necessarily exclusive but rather equivalent in their scope. Both reliable cognition (avisamvadin) and the illumination of an unknown object (ajñātārthaprakāśa) are necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a pramāṇa. This is supported by Dharmakirti's arguments where sometimes one characteristic, and sometimes the other, is used to establish validity. The disjunctive "or" (vā) in PV 2.5c suggests these are alternative, yet equally valid, paths to establishing something as a pramāṇa.

• The Buddha as Pramāṇa:

  • The Buddha is considered pramāṇa primarily in relation to the second definition (ajñātārthaprakāśa). He reveals the Four Noble Truths, liberation, and the means to achieve them, which are essentially unknown states of affairs for most beings.
  • While the Buddha is not explicitly called avisamvadin in this chapter, Krasser suggests that his teaching, by its nature of being true and leading to liberation, implicitly possesses this quality.
  • The term pramāṇabhūta signifies that the Buddha has "come into existence" as a pramāṇa through his practice and attainment, thus contrasting with eternal, unmanifested authorities.

• Revisiting Tadvat: Krasser critiques previous scholarly interpretations of tadvat (meaning "like that" or "similar to that") in PV 2.7a. He suggests that a possessive interpretation, as rendered in some Tibetan translations (de bzhin or de Idan), might be more accurate than a purely comparative one. However, the core idea remains that the Bhagavat's being a pramāṇa is based on his similarity to the defining characteristics of pramāṇa.

• The Mimāṃsakas and the Definition of Pramāṇa: Krasser notes that Dharmakirti's second definition, ajñātārthaprakāśa, likely engages with the Mimāṃsaka definition of pramāṇa as apurvārthavijñānam (cognition of a new object). Dharmakirti's inclusion of the qualification "unapprehended particular" (avijñāte svalakṣaṇe) in his definition aligns with his critique of the Mimāṃsakas, demonstrating that even by their own (properly understood) criteria, the Buddha, not the Vedas, should be considered the ultimate authority.

Conclusion:

Krasser concludes that pramāṇabhūta signifies the Buddha's status as an authority derived from his similarity to the essential characteristics of a pramāṇa (reliability and illuminating the unknown). Dharmakirti's definitions of pramāṇa are presented in a way that allows for this metaphorical application to the Buddha, establishing his unique role as the supreme source of knowledge and salvation, distinct from any eternal or unmanifested authority. The paper emphasizes the nuanced understanding of these concepts within the Buddhist epistemological tradition.