Nyayavatara And Buddhist Logical Works

Here's a comprehensive summary of Alex Wayman's "The Nyāyāvatāra and Buddhist Logical Works" based on the provided text:

This essay by Alex Wayman examines the Jaina work Nyāyāvatāra (N.A.), not to resolve authorship debates (though he mentions M.A. Dhaky's argument for Siddharshi over Siddhasena Divākara), but to analyze its engagement with the Buddhist logician Dignāga and its own theory of antarvyāpti (inner pervasion) in relation to Ratnākaraśānti.

Relationship with Dignāga:

Wayman identifies key areas where the N.A. aligns with or diverges from Dignāga's logic:

• Two Types of Inference: The N.A., like Dignāga, distinguishes between inference for oneself (svartha) and inference for others (parārtha), with svartha necessarily preceding parārtha. The N.A. verse 10 reflects this order, though Wayman finds its metaphorical attribution of parārtha to be a "failed attempt to appear 'sparkling'."
• Definition of Inference for Others: N.A. verse 13 defines parārtha anumāna (inference for others) as a statement of a reason that applies to the thesis and first mentions the pakṣa (locus). Wayman sees this as an improvement over Dignāga by avoiding explicit mention of an external example, aligning with "inner pervasion." He notes the N.A.'s emphasis on the pakṣa in subsequent verses (14-15).
• Result of Pramāṇa: A significant point of contention is N.A. verse 28, which states the result of pramāṇa (in the direct vision sense, pratyakṣa) is the warding off of ignorance, an otherworldly aim. This contrasts with Dignāga, who uses pramāṇa in a resultative sense related to prameya (sanction), while N.A. uses it instrumentally. Wayman argues this leads to "talking at cross-purposes," as different Indian philosophical systems use key terms with different meanings. He notes that Dignāga's use of pramāṇa is not necessarily defiant of standard usage, as medieval lexicons offer both instrumental and resultative definitions. Wayman critiques N.A. 28 for its sermon-like quality, unlike Dignāga's reasoned verses.
• Fallacies of the Locus and Reason: Wayman finds fault with N.A. verses 21 and 22, which discuss fallacies of the locus (pakṣābhāsa) and fallacies of the reason (hetvābhāsa). He criticizes N.A. 21 for its unclear beginning, stating that if the sādhya is already proved, discussing fallacies of the locus becomes inconsequential. He also points out a clumsiness in N.A. 22's classification of fallacies of the reason, arguing that the fallacy often lies with the pakṣa (locus) itself rather than the reason's statement. This inconsistency undermines his earlier praise of the N.A.'s emphasis on the pakṣa.

The Antarvyāpti Theory:

The essay delves into the N.A.'s concept of "inner pervasion" (antarvyāpti):

• N.A.'s Stance: N.A. verse 20 states that an external example (bahirudāhṛtiḥ) is "useless" (vyartha) for establishing the sādhya because proof can be achieved by antarvyāpti alone, even in its absence. Wayman suggests "unnecessary" would be a more accurate term, as external examples can be useful for teaching. He highlights that the N.A. itself provides external examples (concordant in v. 18, discordant in v. 19), demonstrating their pedagogical value.
• Ratnākaraśānti's Position: Wayman dates Ratnākaraśānti (Śāntipā) to around 978 CE, making him later than the author of the N.A. He explains that Śāntipā's defense of antarvyāpti is not directly dependent on the N.A., though the N.A. might be the earliest use of the term. Śāntipā's theory, based on his Antarvyāptisamarthana treatise, argues that in certain cases of sattvahetu (reason for a real or existent thing), an example is not part of the pervasion. For instance, proving "What exists is momentary" doesn't benefit from an example like "a pot," as momentariness isn't a quality added by the pot. Buddhism provides doctrinal reasons for such assertions that appeal to its followers. Wayman posits that for these "reasons for an existent thing," the pervasion is solely between the thesis and reason, not extending to an example. While examples might be provided, they serve a teaching purpose, separate from the inferential process itself.
• Comparison: Wayman concludes that the N.A.'s antarvyāpti theory might share similarities with Śāntipā's but extends its scope to all syllogisms, not just those where popular examples are difficult to apply. He acknowledges that subsequent centuries saw more subtle elaborations of these theories by various schools. The fact that a Buddhist scholar like Ratnākaraśānti defends antarvyāpti suggests a greater degree of agreement between rival Indian philosophical schools than is often recognized.

In essence, Wayman's essay provides a critical analysis of the N.A., highlighting its engagement with Buddhist logic, particularly Dignāga, and its contribution to the concept of antarvyāpti, ultimately demonstrating inter-school dialogue and philosophical development within Indian thought. He also subtly critiques the translation and interpretation practices of earlier scholars, emphasizing the importance of understanding Indian logic on its own terms.