Nyaya Theory Of Knowledge

This document is the Table of Contents and initial chapters of "The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge: A Critical Study of Some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics" by S. C. Chatterjee, published by the University of Calcutta in 1939. It is a detailed examination of Nyāya epistemology, comparing and contrasting it with other Indian philosophical systems (Vedanta, Mimāṁsā, Sāṁkhya, Bauddha, Jaina) and Western philosophical theories.

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Book Overview:

• Title: The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge: A Critical Study of Some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics
• Author: S. C. Chatterjee
• Publisher: University of Calcutta
• Year: 1939
• Core Focus: A comprehensive and critical analysis of the Nyāya school's theory of knowledge (epistemology), examining its concepts, methods, and its place within the broader landscape of Indian and Western philosophy.

Key Themes and Chapters:

The book is structured into several parts, each delving into a crucial aspect of Nyāya epistemology:

Preface: The author emphasizes the importance of the Nyāya system, often overlooked in favor of Vedanta, highlighting its philosophical rigor, its role as a critic of other schools, its realistic outlook, and its parallels with modern Western realism. The theory of knowledge is presented as the foundational element of Nyāya. The book aims for a systematic, critical, and comparative treatment.

Book I: The Method of Valid Knowledge (Pramāṇa)

• Chapter II: The Nature and Forms of Knowledge:

  • Definition of Knowledge (Buddhi): Defines knowledge as awareness or apprehension of objects, a property of the self that manifests objects. It's distinct from feeling and volition, though connected. It's an attribute of the self, not a substance or activity.
  • Classification of Knowledge: Divided into anubhava (presentation) and smṛti (memory). Both are further divided into valid (pramā) and non-valid (apramā). Pramā includes perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. Apramā includes doubt, error, and hypothetical reasoning.
  • Memory and Dream: Memory is defined as knowledge arising from past impressions. Dreams are considered false memorial representations.
  • Doubt (Saṁśaya): Cognition of conflicting notions about the same object, arising from common properties, peculiar properties, conflicting testimony, or irregularities of perception/non-perception. It's considered indecisive but not error.
  • Error (Viparyyaya): Wrong apprehension where an object is cognized as what it is not, a definite assertion that contradicts the object.
  • Theories of Illusion: Discusses anyathākhyāti (Nyāya's view of error as misapprehension), ātmakhyāti (Buddhist idealism), asatkhyāti (Mādhyamika nihilism), anirvacaniyakhyāti (Advaita Vedanta's inexplicable appearance), and akhyāti (Prābhākara Mimāṁsā's non-discrimination). Nyāya's anyathākhyāti is presented as the most satisfactory.
  • Hypothetical Argument (Tarka): A process of testing conclusions by deducing untenable propositions from a contrary hypothesis. It aids pramāṇa but is not a pramāṇa itself.

• Chapter III: Valid Knowledge and its Method (Pramā and Pramāṇa):

  • Definition of Pramā: Defined as true presentational knowledge (yathārthānubhava), characterized by assuredness, truth (correspondence to facts), and presentativeness (not memory).
  • Definition of Pramāṇa: The instrument or cause of valid knowledge (pramā). Defined as the complex of specific physical and psychical conditions that reliably produce valid cognition.
  • Nyāya Criticism of Buddhist Views: Critiques the Buddhist idea that truth is practical utility and their view of perception as pure sensation.
  • Nyāya Criticism of Mimāṁsā and Sāṁkhya Views: Critiques Mimāṁsā's emphasis on novelty in pramā and Sāṁkhya's view of knowledge as a modification of buddhi.

• Chapter IV: The Factors of Valid Knowledge (Pramā):

  • Subject, Object, and Method: Identifies the pramātā (knower/self), prameya (object), and pramāṇa (method) as essential factors of valid knowledge. The self is seen as an intelligent agent, distinct from body and senses.
  • Distinction of Method: Argues that pramāṇa is the unique operative cause (karaṇa) of valid knowledge because it exhibits invariable concomitance with pramā, is the immediate antecedent of knowledge, and distinguishes different types of knowledge. Its validity stems from correspondence to facts, tested by practical utility and coherence.

• Chapter V: The Test of Truth and Error:

  • Problems and Solutions: Addresses how truth/falsity is constituted and known, exploring theories of intrinsic (svatah) vs. extrinsic (paratah) validity and invalidity. Nyāya favors extrinsic validity and invalidity.
  • Nyāya Theory: Truth and falsity are determined by extrinsic conditions (kāraṇaguṇa for validity, kāraṇadoṣa for invalidity). They are known by inference from successful (pravṛttisāmarthya) or unsuccessful activity.
  • Objections Answered: Addresses criticisms like infinite regress and circular reasoning, arguing that validity isn't always self-evident and is known through inference from successful action or logical coherence, especially for familiar knowledge.
  • Criticism of Rival Theories: Critiques Sāṁkhya (intrinsic validity/invalidity), Bauddha (intrinsic invalidity, extrinsic validity), and Mimāṁsā (intrinsic validity, extrinsic invalidity).
  • Indian and Western Theories of Truth: Compares Indian theories (correspondence, coherence, pragmatism) with Western counterparts.

Book II: Perception as a Method of Knowledge (Pratyakṣapramāṇa)

• Chapter VI: The Definition of Perception:

  • Primacy of Perception: Argues perception is fundamental because it's the ultimate ground and final test of all other knowledge.
  • Buddhist Definition: Pure sensation, isolated from ideation (kalpanā).
  • Jaina, Prābhākara, Vedanta Definitions: Emphasize direct cognition, immediacy (sākṣāttvam), and often see the mind (manas or antahkaraṇa) as crucial.
  • Nyāya Definitions: Old school: knowledge from sense-object contact (indriyārthasannikarṣa). Modern school: immediate knowledge (sākṣātkāritva) or knowledge not caused by prior knowledge.

• Chapter VII: The Psychology of Perception:

  • The Senses (Indriya): Discusses the Nyāya view of senses as supersensible physical organs associated with particular elements (earth for smell, water for taste, light for sight, air for touch, ether for hearing). Critiques Buddhist and Sāṁkhya views. Compares with modern psychology regarding the number and nature of senses.
  • Function of the Senses: Explores the prāpyakārī (requiring contact) view of Nyāya vs. aprāpyakārī (distance receptors) of Buddhists. Details the six kinds of sense-object contact (sannikarṣa).
  • Nature and Function of Mind (Manas): Views manas as an internal, atomic, non-physical sense crucial for all knowledge, distinct from external senses and the self. Critiques Vedanta's view of mind.
  • The Self and its Function: Defines the self (ātman) as an eternal, intelligent substance, the substratum of qualities like consciousness. Critiques materialistic and idealistic views of the self.

• Chapter VIII: Ordinary Perception and its Objects:

  • Categories of Reality: Outlines Nyāya's seven categories: substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), action (karma), universal (sāmānya), particularity (viśeṣa), inherence (samavāya), and non-existence (abhāva).
  • Perception of Substances: Discusses which substances are perceptible (earth, water, light, air, soul) and the role of limited dimension and manifest qualities.
  • Perception of Attributes and Actions: Details which attributes (color, taste, sound, etc.) are perceptible by which senses and the associated sense-object contacts.
  • Perception of Universal, Particularity, Inherence: Explains how these abstract categories are perceived (or inferred) and their relation to sense-object contact.
  • Perception of Non-existence: Discusses how non-existence (abhāva) is perceived, often through viseṣaṇatā (adjectival contact), and the debate with other schools.
  • Internal Perception: Focuses on the perception of mental states (pleasure, pain, desire, knowledge) by the mind (manas), and the perception of the self.

• Chapter IX: Three Modes of Ordinary Perception:

  • Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka: Explains indeterminate (bare apprehension) and determinate (predicative) perception. Nyāya holds both are valid, with nirvikalpaka being the initial apprehension of the object's universal and particular aspects, and savikalpaka analysing and relating them. Critiques Buddhist (only nirvikalpaka valid) and Vedānta (only nirvikalpaka true reality) views.
  • Recognition (Pratyabhijñā): Analyzed as a mode of determinate perception, involving the conscious reference of past and present cognitions to the same object. It's seen as a single, valid psychosis.

• Chapter X: Extraordinary Perception (Alaukika Pratyakṣa):

  • Sāmānyalakṣaṇa: Perception of a class through the universal (sāmānya) perceived in an individual member. Argues this is necessary for general propositions and critiques Vedānta's rejection.
  • Jñānalakṣaṇa: Acquired perception where past knowledge mediates sense-object contact (e.g., seeing sandalwood and perceiving its fragrance). Critiques Vedanta's reduction of this to inference. Compares with Western concepts like "complication."
  • Yogaja: Intuitive perception arising from yogic powers (briefly mentioned as a third type).

Book III: The Theory of Inference (Anumāna Pramāṇa)

• Chapter XI: The Nature of Inference:

  • Definition: Knowledge of an object through a sign (linga) and its universal relation (vyāpti) with the inferred object.
  • Distinction from Perception: Perception is immediate and independent; inference is mediate, dependent on prior knowledge (perception of linga and vyāpti).
  • Constituents: Discusses the three terms (pakṣa, sādhya, hetu) and the three propositions (minor premise, major premise, conclusion) involved in inference.

• Chapter XII: The Grounds of Inference:

  • Vyāpti (Universal Relation): Defines vyāpti as an invariable and unconditional relation, classified as samavyāpti (equipollent) and viṣamavyāpti (non-equipollent). Discusses how vyāpti is established through observation (bhūyodarśana), elimination of conditions (upādhi), and tarka (hypothetical reasoning). Critiques Buddhist reliance on causality/identity and highlights the Nyāya reliance on induction supported by tarka.
  • Pakṣatā (Psychological Ground): The condition for inference's possibility – doubt or absence of certainty about the subject (pakṣa). Discusses modern Nyāya's view including the 'will to infer'.
  • Lingaparāmarśa (Contemplation of the Middle Term): The immediate cause of the conclusion, involving the synthetic consideration of the middle term in relation to both major and minor terms.

• Chapter XIII: Classification and Logical Forms of Inference:

  • Svārtha and Parārtha: Inference for oneself vs. inference for others (demonstration).
  • Pūrvavat, Seṣavat, Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa: Classification based on the nature of vyāpti (causal vs. non-causal relations).
  • Kevalānvayi, Kevala-vyatireki, Anvaya-vyatireki: Classification based on the inductive method used to establish vyāpti (positive agreement, negative agreement, or both).
  • Logical Forms: Details the five-membered syllogism (pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya, nigamana) and contrasts it with simpler forms proposed by Mimāṁsā and Vedānta.

• Chapter XIV: The Fallacies of Inference:

  • Distinction between Valid/Invalid Reason: Defines fallacies (hetvābhāsa) as middle terms that appear valid but fail the conditions of inference.
  • Fallacies Listed: Savyabhicāra (irregular middle - sādhāraṇa, asādhāraṇa, anupasaṁhāri), viruddha (contradictory middle), prakaraṇasama (counteracted middle / satpratipakṣa), asiddha (unproved middle - āśrayāsiddha, svarūpāsiddha, vyāpyatvāsiddha), kālātīta (mistimed middle), and bādhita (contradicted middle). Also mentions chala, jāti, and nigrahasthāna as fallacies in debate.

Book IV: Upamāna or Comparison

• Chapter XV: The Nature and Forms of Upamāna:

  • Nyāya Definition: Knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation, based on similarity or dissimilarity to known objects, guided by authoritative statements.
  • Jaina, Mimāṁsā, Vedanta Views: Compared and contrasted, with Mimāṁsā/Vedanta seeing it as distinct from perception and inference, while Jainas reduce it to recognition. Nyāya's critique of their attempts at reduction.
  • Classification: Sādharmyopamāna (similarity), vaidharmyopamāna (dissimilarity), and dharmamāropamāna (peculiar properties).

• Chapter XVI: Upamāna as an Independent Source of Knowledge:

  • Validity: Argues that upamāna provides valid knowledge and defends it against Cārvāka criticisms about reliance on mere resemblance.
  • Independence: Argues against reducing upamāna to perception, testimony, or inference, emphasizing its unique function in knowing word denotation through comparison, which involves a selective activity of the mind distinct from other pramāņas.

Book V: Śabda or Testimony

• Chapter XVII: The Nature and Classification of Śabda:

  • Nyāya Definition: Valid verbal testimony (āptopadeśa) from a trustworthy person, understood through words and sentences conforming to four conditions (ākānkṣā, yogyatā, sannidhi, tātparyya).
  • Classification: Dṛṣṭārtha (perceptible objects) vs. adṛṣṭārtha (imperceptible objects); vaidika (scriptural, divine) vs. laukika (secular, human).
  • Other Systems: Contrasts Nyāya's view of scriptural testimony with Cārvāka (rejected), Buddhist (reduced to inference/perception), Vaiśeṣika (reduced to inference), Jaina (from perfected self), Sāṁkhya (impersonal, self-valid), Mimāṁsā (Vedas impersonal, eternal), and Vedānta (Vedas revealed by God, eternal).

• Chapter XVIII: Of Words (Pada):

  • Sounds and Words: Distinguishes dhvani (inarticulate sound) from varṇa (articulate letters). Discusses words as groups of varṇas with fixed order and meaning.
  • Words and their Meanings: Defines meaning (abhidhā, paribhāṣā, lakṣaṇā). Discusses saṁketa (conventional relation) vs. sakti (eternal potency, God-willed) vs. paribhāṣā (conventional usage). Critiques ryañjana (suggested meaning).
  • Import of Words: Debates whether words denote individuals (vyakti), forms (ākṛti), or universals (jāti). Nyāya holds words denote all three combined.
  • Unity of Words & Sphota: Discusses how successive letters form a word (Nyāya: memory; Vedanta: intellect synthesis). Critiques the sphoṭa theory of grammarians.

• Chapter XIX: Of Sentences (Vākya):

  • Construction of Sentences: Outlines the four conditions: ākānkṣā (expectancy), yogyatā (compatibility), sannidhi (proximity), tātparyya (intention).
  • Meaning of a Sentence: Compares abhihitānvaya-vāda (meaning of sentence is synthesis of word meanings) with anvitābhidhāna-vāda (meaning of sentence is primary, words derive meaning from it). Nyāya favors abhihitānvaya.
  • Import of Sentences: Discusses whether sentences express subject-predicate relations, identities, or actions. Nyāya emphasizes subject-predicate relations for determinate knowledge.
  • Śabda as Independent Source: Reasserts testimony's distinctness from other pramāņas, despite shared psychological elements, due to its unique logical conditions (syntactic rules like ākānkṣā, etc.).

Book VI: Other Sources of Knowledge

• Chapter XX: Other Sources of Knowledge:
  • Different Views: Surveys various schools on ultimate sources (perception, inference, testimony, comparison, memory, etc.).
  • Arthāpatti (Postulation): Defines it as supposing an unperceived fact to explain a given fact. Critiques its reduction to inference by Nyāya/Sāṁkhya, defending it as distinct by Mimāṁsā/Vedanta.
  • Abhāva and Anupalabdhi: Discusses non-existence (abhāva) as a category and how it's known (Nyāya: special perception; Vedanta: non-perception). Discusses non-perception (anupalabdhi) as a potential source, critiqued by Nyāya who sees it as a case of perception.
  • Smṛti (Memory): Re-examines memory's validity, refuting Nyāya's exclusion and supporting its status as a distinct pramāṇa based on its knowledge of the past as past, supported by Western views.
  • Summary and General Estimate: Concludes that Nyāya has a robust realistic epistemology, though with some limitations (e.g., view of self, potential infinite regress in truth-testing). Praises Nyāya's logical analysis and realism, offering valuable contributions comparable to modern Western theories. It acknowledges that some sources like memory, non-perception, and postulation might be considered independent by other systems, even if Nyāya integrates them.

In essence, Chatterjee's book provides a thorough and critical exposition of the Nyāya theory of knowledge, showcasing its logical structure, its debates with rival schools, and its relevance to broader philosophical discussions. The provided text covers the foundational elements of Nyāya epistemology, leading into detailed analyses of perception, inference, comparison, and testimony, and concluding with a discussion of other potential sources of knowledge and a final evaluation of the system.