Nyaya Dipika

Here's a comprehensive summary of the Jain text "Nyaya Dipika" by Bansidhar Shastri, based on the provided pages:

Title: Nyaya Dipika (न्यायदीपिका) Author: Shri Dharmabhushan Yati (श्रीधर्मभूषण यति) Commentary/Translation: Hindi commentary by Pandit Khubchandji (पं० खूबचन्द्रजी) Revision: Revised by Pandit Vanshidharji Shastri (पं० वंशीधरजी शास्त्री) Publisher: Shri Jain Granth Ratnakar Karyalay (श्रीजैनग्रन्थरत्नाकर कार्यालय) Publication Date: April 1913 (Shri Veer Nirvana Samvat 2439)

Overall Purpose:

The "Nyaya Dipika," as presented in this edition, is a foundational text on Jain logic (Nyaya) originally authored by Shri Dharmabhushan Yati. The Hindi commentary and revision aim to make this complex subject accessible to students and scholars who may not be proficient in Sanskrit. The publisher expresses a belief in the importance of translating and adapting ancient scriptures into contemporary Hindi for broader dissemination and national integration.

Author's Background and Context:

Shri Dharmabhushan Yati was a Digambara Jain scholar. While his exact period is not definitively known, Mahamahopadhyay P. Satish Chandra Vidyabhushan estimates him to be from around the 16th century CE. The text references and critiques various philosophical schools and their proponents, including Buddhists (Sugata, Saumata, Buddha, Tathagata, Dingnaga), Mimamsakas (Bhatta, Prabhakara), Yoga philosophers, Naiyayikas, Shalikanatha, Syadvada Vidyapati, Bhattarak Manikyanandi, Bhattarak Kumarnandi, and Udayana. The author of the commentary notes that Shri Dharmabhushan Yati's work predates Upadhyaya Yashovijaya Gani, who mentions him in his "Tarka Bhasha."

Structure and Content:

The "Nyaya Dipika" is divided into three "Prakash" (sections or chapters):

First Prakash (प्रथम् प्रकाश) - General Characteristics of Pramana (Proof/Valid Knowledge):

• Introduction: Begins with the purpose of Mangalacharan (auspicious invocation), citing four reasons: removal of obstacles, adherence to custom, avoidance of disbelief, and remembrance of virtues. The text then formally starts with a salutation to Lord Mahavir.
• Core Tenets: Introduces the fundamental Jain principle from the Tattvartha Sutra: "Adhigama is through Pramana and Naya" (प्रमाणनयैरधिगमः). It emphasizes that understanding Jiva (soul) and other substances is achieved through Pramana and Naya, which are essential for attaining the ultimate goal of Moksha (liberation).
• Methodology: Explains that the discussion of Pramana and Naya will follow a three-step process: Uddesha (statement of the subject), Lakshana (definition), and Pariksha (examination/analysis).
• Definitions: Defines Uddesha as merely naming the subject and Lakshana as the means to distinguish a particular object from a mixed set of items. It further categorizes Lakshana into two types: Atmabhuta (inherent, part of the object's essence, e.g., heat of fire) and Anatmabhuta (non-inherent, externally associated, e.g., a staff for a person).
• Critique of Definitions: Critiques the idea that only an uncommon characteristic (Asadharana Dharma) constitutes a definition, showing how this leads to fallacies like Avyapti (under-extension), Ativyapti (over-extension), and Asambhavi (impossibility).
• The Definition of Pramana: The text settles on the definition of Pramana as "Samyagjnana" (सम्यग्ज्ञान), meaning correct or valid knowledge.
  • Analysis of "Samyag": Explains that "Samyag" (correct) is crucial to exclude incorrect cognitions like Sanshaya (doubt), Viparyaya (misconception), and Anadhyavasaya (indecision).
  • Analysis of "Jnana": Clarifies that "Jnana" (knowledge) refers to the instrumental cause (Karana) of apprehension, distinguishing it from the knower (Pramata) and the apprehended object (Prameya).
• Rejection of Other Schools' Definitions of Pramana: The text systematically refutes the definitions of Pramana proposed by other schools:
  • Buddhists: "Avipratipativijnana" (non-contradictory knowledge) is rejected because their accepted Pramanas (Pratyaksha and Anumana) are not truly non-contradictory.
  • Bhattas: "Anadhigata-tathabhuta-arthanischayaka" (knowledge that ascertains previously unknown reality) is rejected due to Avyapti, as even stream-like cognitions (Dharavahika) are considered Pramana by them but don't always ascertain new truths.
  • Prabhakaras: "Anubhuti" (experience) is rejected for being ambiguous, as they accept both instrumental (Karana) and substantial (Bhava) forms of experience as Pramana, leading to mutual over-extension.
  • Naiyayikas: "Pramakaranam Pramanam" (the instrument of valid cognition is Pramana) is rejected because their accepted instrumental cause, Ishvara (God), is argued to be the object of knowledge (Adhikaran) rather than the instrument itself. The text also argues against the idea of instruments (like senses) being "the most effective instrument" (Sadha-katama).
• Nature of Pramanya (Validity): Discusses the origin and apprehension of validity. It refutes the Mimamsaka view that validity is self-originated (Satah) and the Yoga view that it is dependent on something else (Paratah). The text asserts that while the generation of validity might be inferred, its apprehension can be both self-originated (for familiar objects) and dependent (for unfamiliar ones).

Second Prakash (द्वितीय प्रकाश) - Pratyaksha Pramana (Direct Perception):

• Definition: Defines Pratyaksha as "Vishada Pratibhasa" (विशद प्रतिभास), meaning clear or luminous apprehension.
• Distinction: Differentiates between Savyavaharika Pratyaksha (conventional direct perception) and Paramarthika Pratyaksha (absolute direct perception).
  • Savyavaharika Pratyaksha: This is described as partially clear knowledge, arising from the senses (Indriya) and mind (Anindriya). It is further divided into four types:
    1. Avagraha: Initial apprehension of the general aspect of an object.
    2. Iha: Deliberation or investigation to resolve doubts about the apprehended object.
    3. Araya: Ascertainment or firm conclusion about the object.
    4. Dharana: Retention or memory of the ascertained object.
    • Critique of Buddhist Pratyaksha: Rejects the Buddhist definition of Pratyaksha as "Kalpanapodham" (free from conceptualization, i.e., Nirvikalpa) as Nirvikalpa knowledge is not firm and cannot be the basis for valid apprehension.
    • Rejection of Yoga's Indriya-Artha Sannikarsa: Refutes the Yoga school's emphasis on the contact of senses with objects, arguing that senses are not the only source of direct perception and that the clarity of knowledge is the true characteristic.
  • Paramarthika Pratyaksha: This is described as perfectly clear knowledge, arising solely from the self, without dependence on external senses. It is further divided into:
    • Vikal (Limited):
      • Avadhi Jnana: Knowledge of forms, limited by scope and duration.
      • Manahparyaya Jnana: Knowledge of the mental states of others.
    • Sakala (All-comprehensive):
      • Kevala Jnana: Omniscient knowledge, characterized by the complete destruction of obscuring karmas.
• Proof of Omniscience: Argues for the existence of omniscience (Sarvajnatva) through inferential reasoning (Anumana), particularly by establishing that subtle, distant, or hidden objects are known to someone, and this "someone" must be omniscient.
• Infallibility of Arhats: Argues that Arhats are infallible and omniscient due to their freedom from defects and their teachings aligning with logic and scripture, which are themselves validated by direct perception and inference.

Third Prakash (तृतीय प्रकाश) - Paroksha Pramana (Indirect Perception/Inference):

• Definition: Defines Paroksha as "Avishada Pratibhasa" (अविशद प्रतिभास), meaning unclear or non-luminous apprehension.
• Rejection of "General Object": Rejects the definition that Paroksha only pertains to generalities, asserting that it, like Pratyaksha, apprehends both general and specific aspects of reality.
• Five Types of Paroksha: Identifies five types of Paroksha:
  1. Smriti (Memory): Re-collection of previously experienced objects.
  2. Pratyabhijnana (Recognition): Knowledge that combines past experience (Smriti) and present perception, recognizing similarity or identity. Critiques the view that it's not a separate Pramana.
  3. Tarka (Reasoning/Logic): Knowledge of Vyapti (invariable concomitance) between the probans (hetu) and the probandum (sadhy). Argues that Tarka is distinct from direct perception and inference.
  4. Anumana (Inference): Knowledge of the probandum derived from the probans.
     • Definition of Hetu (Probans): Defines a valid probans as one characterized by "Anyathanupapatti" (impossibility otherwise), meaning it's the necessary cause or condition of the probandum.
     • Critique of Naiyayika and Buddhist Definitions of Hetu: Rejects the Naiyayika five-fold characteristic (Panchrupa) and the Buddhist three-fold characteristic (Tirupa) of a valid probans, arguing that Anyathanupapatti is the sole essential characteristic.
     • Types of Hetu: Discusses various classifications of Hetu based on their relationship with the probandum (e.g., cause-effect, antecedent, consequent, co-present).
     • Hetvabhasas (Fallacies of Inference): Analyzes various logical fallacies like Asiddha (unproven), Viruddha (contradictory), Anaikantika (undetermined), Kalatyayapdishta (time-barred), and Prakarana-sama (irrelevant).
  5. Agama (Testimony/Scripture): Knowledge derived from the reliable words of an Aptavachana (an infallible authority).
     • Definition of Aptavachana: Defines an Aptavachana as the word of someone who knows all reality through direct perception and conveys the highest good.
     • Critique of Other Schools' Testimony: Rejects testimony from non-omniscient sources and highlights the validity of Jain scriptures based on the omniscience and infallibility of the Arhats.
• Naya (Standpoints/Modes of Knowledge):
  • Definition: Defines Naya as a specific viewpoint or emphasis of the knower's intention while apprehending a particular aspect of reality, derived from Pramana.
  • Two Main Types:
    1. Dravyarthika Naya: Focuses on the substance or essence, emphasizing unity and permanence.
    2. Paryayarthika Naya: Focuses on the modes, qualities, or changes, emphasizing difference and impermanence.
  • Saptabhangi (The Doctrine of Seven-fold Predication): Explains how the interplay of these Nayas, along with the principle of Syadvada (conditional predication), leads to the seven-fold predication (Syadasti, Syannasti, Syadasti-nasti, Syadavaktavyam, Syadasti-navaktavyam, Syannasti-navaktavyam, Syadasti-nasti-navaktavyam).
  • Critique of Extreme Views: Criticizes views that focus solely on unity (Dravya) or solely on difference (Paryaya), advocating for the synthesis of both through Naya. Also refutes the Buddhist concept of momentary existence (Kshanikavada) and extreme monism or pluralism.
• Purpose of Nayas: Highlights that Nayas help in understanding the multi-faceted nature of reality (Anekanta) as apprehended by Pramana.

Contribution of the Commentary and Publication:

The Hindi commentary and revision are praised for their clarity and effort in making the intricate subject of Jain logic accessible. The publisher's commitment to making Jain scriptures available in modern Hindi reflects a desire to promote Jain teachings to a wider audience. The inclusion of detailed subject matter (Vishaya Suchi) with page and line numbers further enhances the usability of the text.