Note On Development Of Vaisesika Theory Of Anumana

Here is a comprehensive summary of Masaaki Hattori's "Note On Development Of Vaisesika Theory Of Anumana":

This paper by Masaaki Hattori explores the development of the Vaiseṣika theory of anumāna (inference), focusing on the influence of the Buddhist logician Dignāga on the Vaiseṣika philosopher Prasastapāda. Hattori argues that Prasastapāda significantly modified the earlier Vaiseṣika theories of syllogism and fallacies, largely in response to Dignāga's critiques.

Key Arguments and Observations:

• Early Vaiseṣika Syllogism: Hattori begins by noting that Dignāga quotes definitions of syllogistic terms (reason, example) from a Vaiseṣika treatise predating his own work. These early Vaiseṣika definitions are simpler than those found in the Nyāyasūtra. However, Hattori suggests that this simplicity doesn't necessarily imply an older age; rather, the Vaiseṣika school maintained its tradition up to Dignāga's time, and Dignāga likely engaged with the theories of his contemporaries.

• Prasastapāda's Innovations and Dignāga's Influence: The core of the paper examines the changes Prasastapāda introduced in his Padārthadharmasamgraha.

  • Proposition (Pratijñā): Prasastapāda replaces the older Vaiseṣika/Nyāya term sādhya (that which is to be proved) with anumeya (object of inference). This change is directly linked to Dignāga's critique of the ambiguity of sādhya. Dignāga argued that sādhya could refer to the subject, the property, or the combination, leading to absurdities. Prasastapāda's anumeya is explained as dharmavisistadharmin (a subject qualified by the property to be proved), aligning with Dignāga's preferred definition.
  • Fallacies of Proposition (Avidha/Avirodhin): Prasastapāda's inclusion of avirodhin (non-contradictory) in his definition of a proposition, which aims to remove five types of fallacies, is shown to be parallel to Dignāga's concept of viruddhārthānirākrtaḥ (not negated by contradictory meanings). Hattori traces the development of the term ista (desired) in definitions of proposition, from Vasubandhu to Dignāga, and argues that Prasastapāda's pratipipādayiṣita (desired to be proved) likely reflects an awareness of Dignāga's usage.

• Theories of Fallacious Reasons (Anapadesa): This section is crucial for demonstrating Prasastapāda's indebtedness to Dignāga.

  • Aprasiddha (Unknown): Dignāga interprets the Vaiseṣika sūtra mentioning aprasiddha as referring to the unknown relation between the inferential mark and its subject. He argues that the fallacy lies not in the reason itself but in the example. Prasastapāda, however, reinterprets the sūtras and associates aprasiddha with asiddha (unreal) or viruddha (contradictory), often leading to forced interpretations by his commentators. Hattori contends that Dignāga's critique likely pushed Prasastapāda to shift the meaning of aprasiddha away from its traditional Vaiseṣika understanding.
  • Asat (Absent) and Samdigdha (Doubtful): Dignāga critically examines the Vaiseṣika examples for asat and samdigdha. He argues that the example of "hornedness" for a horse is not an instance of asat (absence) but rather viruddha (contradictory) because it proves the opposite. Prasastapāda, in turn, uses the term viruddha with a definition remarkably similar to Dignāga's. Hattori points out that the older Vaiseṣikas likely only knew viruddha (implicitly) and samdigdha, and Dignāga's analysis clarified the nature of viruddha. Prasastapāda's adoption of viruddha with this definition suggests direct influence.
  • New Category: Anadhyavasita (Inconclusive): Prasastapāda introduces anadhyavasita as a distinct fallacy, encompassing what Dignāga classified as asādhāraṇa (uncommon) and viruddhavyabhicārin (contradictory variable). Hattori argues that Prasastapāda created this new category to defend older Vaiseṣika positions against Dignāga's criticisms, particularly concerning the explanation of doubtful reasons.

• Theories of Example (Dṛṣṭānta):

  • Prasastapāda's definition of nidarsana (exemplification) as showing the anuvidhana (invariable conformity) of the inferential mark to the object of inference, or its absence in the opposite, mirrors Dignāga's emphasis on the invariable relation (pervader and pervaded) between the reason and the sādhya. Hattori notes that while the Nyāyasūtra mentioned similarity and dissimilarity, it didn't fully grasp this crucial relationship, which Dignāga highlighted. Prasastapāda's concise statement of this concept suggests he adopted it from Dignāga.

Conclusion:

Hattori concludes that the evidence strongly suggests that Prasastapāda's significant innovations in Vaiseṣika logic, particularly in the theories of anumāna (inference), proposition, and fallacies, were largely motivated by Dignāga's critical engagement with earlier Vaiseṣika thought. Prasastapāda did not merely modify existing theories but, in many instances, adopted or adapted concepts and terminology directly from Dignāga, sometimes to defend older Vaiseṣika doctrines against Dignāga's critique by creating new categories. This analysis highlights a crucial phase in the development of Indian logic, where Buddhist analytical rigor significantly shaped the traditions of other philosophical schools.