Nigrahasthana - Book Summary | JainGPT

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, focusing on the concept of Nigrahasthāna (grounds for defeat/stalemate in a debate):

Book Title: Nigrahasthāna Author: Sukhlal Sanghavi Publisher: Z_Darshan_aur_Chintan_Part_1_2_002661.pdf Catalog Link: https://jainqq.org/explore/229042/1

This text delves into the history and evolution of the concept of Nigrahasthāna within Indian logical and philosophical traditions, with a particular focus on its development in Jainism.

1. Origins and Brahmanical Tradition:

The ancient idea of Nigrahasthāna originates in the Brahmanical tradition, specifically within the Nyaya (logic) and Vaidyaka (medicine) literature.
Akshapada Gautama, the proponent of the Nyaya school, established a two-fold classification of Nigrahasthāna as Vipratipatti (disagreement) and Apratipatti (non-comprehension), further detailing 22 specific types. This classification has remained largely undisputed for centuries.
Charaka's description of Nigrahasthāna, while not identical in wording, shares the same fundamental basis as Akshapada's.

2. Buddhist Tradition:

The Buddhist tradition has two main approaches to Nigrahasthāna:
- Adherence to Brahmanical Tradition: Early Buddhist logic texts often adopted the Nigrahasthāna concepts from the Brahmanical tradition, closely aligning in terms of characteristics, numbers, and examples, sometimes even with Charaka's descriptions.
- Independent Approach: The origin of an independent Buddhist classification of Nigrahasthāna, which opposed the Brahmanical view, is not definitively known. However, the prominent work Vādan'yāya by Dharmakīrti is considered the most significant and complete independent treatise on the subject. It's possible that the great logician Dignāga also laid some groundwork for this independent approach.

3. Jain Tradition:

The introduction of Nigrahasthāna in Jainism is likely attributed to Swami Patrakesari, though no surviving works by him are available.
Based on existing literature, Bhattāraka Akalanka is considered the pioneer of Nigrahasthāna in Jainism. Subsequent Jain logicians consistently cited Akalanka's pronouncements, supporting this view.
Jain logicians faced the challenge of establishing their own independent framework for Nigrahasthāna, rather than adopting either the Brahmanical or the independent Buddhist traditions.
Bhattāraka Akalanka formulated an independent definition and system for Nigrahasthāna, which has been meticulously followed by all subsequent Digambara and Śvetāmbara Jain logicians.
Following Akalanka, logicians like Vidyananda and Prabhāchandra actively engaged in refuting the Nigrahasthāna concepts of the opposing Brahmanical and Buddhist traditions. Their works demonstrate a systematic refutation, first of the Nyaya tradition's Nigrahasthānas, and then of the independent Buddhist descriptions.
Akalanka is credited with the first concise independent refutation of Dharmakīrti's definition, while Vidyananda and Prabhāchandra provided more detailed refutations.

4. Hemachandra's Contribution:

Acharya Hemachandra, in his exposition of Nigrahasthāna, outlines three main points in five sutras.
He defines victory (Jaya) and defeat (Parajaya) and establishes the system of Nigraha, which aligns with Akalanka's formulation and is accepted by all Jain schools.
Hemachandra critically refutes the Nigrahasthāna definitions of the Nyaya tradition, largely mirroring Prabhāchandra's Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa.
He then refutes Dharmakīrti's independent Nigrahasthāna definition, also directly quoting from Prabhāchandra's Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa.
In essence, Hemachandra, by refuting the Brahmanical and Buddhist traditions, firmly establishes the Jain perspective on Nigrahasthāna.

5. Refinement of Victory and Defeat (Jaya-Parajaya):

Brahmanical Tradition: In this tradition, the use of deceptive tactics like Chala (trickery) and Jāti (fallacies) was somewhat accepted. Victory could be achieved merely by defeating the opponent through such means, even without proving one's own thesis. Proving one's own thesis was not an absolute prerequisite for victory.
Dharmakīrti's Modification: Dharmakīrti challenged the Brahmanical view by introducing a rule of truthfulness. He argued that victory could not be achieved through deceptive means like Chala, as these are inherently flawed. He also stated that the defeat of one party does not automatically mean the victory of the other. For instance, if a debater uses faulty logic, but the opponent points out fabricated flaws instead of genuine ones, the opponent is defeated. However, even if the first debater's faulty logic is exposed, they are not considered victorious because their initial premise was flawed. Victory requires the use of sound, correct logic. Dharmakīrti thus refined the Brahmanical understanding of victory and defeat but introduced complexity and difficulty in determining what constituted a flawed or unrefuted argument.
Akalanka's Refinement: To address the complexity and difficulty in Dharmakīrti's system, Bhattāraka Akalanka further refined the concept. He retained Dharmakīrti's emphasis on truth but also incorporated the Jain principle of non-violence (Ahimsa) and equanimity (Samabhāva).
Akalanka's seminal contribution is the definition of victory as the establishment of one's own thesis and defeat as the non-establishment of the opponent's thesis. He firmly believed that the establishment of one's own thesis is intrinsically linked to the non-establishment of the opponent's. Therefore, where one's thesis is established, the opponent's is necessarily not established, making victory and defeat correlative.
Akalanka's understanding of Ahimsa seems to have identified a flaw in Dharmakīrti's system: if the opponent is deemed defeated for failing to perform their duty (e.g., not pointing out true flaws), then the first debater should also be considered defeated for failing to perform their duty (using proper logic). Akalanka viewed this one-sided defeat as partial and unjust.
Akalanka's refined system, emphasizing the simple act of establishing one's own thesis (which implicitly involves refuting the opponent's), is presented as the final and most comprehensive understanding. This view is supported by its lack of objection from subsequent Buddhist or other scholars and has been universally accepted by all Jain schools.

Conclusion:

The text meticulously traces the development of the concept of Nigrahasthāna from its Brahmanical origins through its adaptation and independent development in Buddhism, culminating in its sophisticated and unique formulation within Jain logic. Bhattāraka Akalanka's contribution is highlighted as pivotal, establishing a framework that emphasizes truthfulness, non-violence, and a clear definition of victory as the establishment of one's own thesis, a system that has been consistently upheld by subsequent Jain logicians.