Nature Of Time

This document, "Nature of Time" by Nagin J. Shah, explores various philosophical and scientific perspectives on time, with a particular focus on the Jaina view.

The author begins by quoting Sir James Jeans, who suggests that understanding time is crucial for resolving fundamental philosophical questions like determinism versus free will and the problem of causation. Shah states his aim is to present what various thinkers have said about time, emphasizing the Jaina perspective.

Western Views on Time:

• Aristotle: Views time as intrinsically linked to continuous movement, measuring it as a "number of movement." He sees time as comprising a formal element (number) and a material element (movement).
• Descartes: Identifies external reality with extension. He considers motion real, a mode of matter due to motion's action on it. Since motion implies change and time, he accepts time's reality but views it as an "infinite atomistic series of moments," necessitating God's continuous creative intervention to sustain the world.
• Spinoza: Believes in a single, eternal substance ("God or Nature") with extension as an attribute. Motion is a mode of extension. He considers temporal aspects of things as modifications of finite subjectivity, and reaching truth means seeing things "sub specie aeternitatis" (under the aspect of eternity), rendering time unreal.
• Leibniz: Rejects extension as a single attribute, proposing numerous atomic substances (monads). He views space and time as confused ideas abstracted from experience.
• Newton: Considers sensuous time and space unreal, positing absolute, independent space and time. He highlights time's irreversibility and its role in absolute simultaneity.
• Kant: Argues that space and time are not external realities or abstractions but necessary, a priori forms of perception. They are preconditions for our experience of the phenomenal world. However, he also identifies "antinomies" within space and time, suggesting paradoxes arise when assuming their reality.
• Bradley: Traces paradoxes to the "term" and "relation," considering all relations unreal. He views space and time as mere appearances and products of nescience.
• A. E. Taylor: Differentiates between perceptual (referring to "here and now") and conceptual space and time, finding both unreal.
• Bergson: Emphasizes "duration" (durée) as real time, contrasting it with spatialized time. Real time is continuous, heterogeneous, and involves interpenetration of moments, which the intellect wrongly divides into discrete instants.
• Alexander: Sees space and time as intimately interrelated, forming the "stuff" of which things are fashioned, identical with "Pure Motion."
• A. N. Whitehead: Agrees with Bergson on the experiential reality of duration but differs by not dismissing instants as entirely fictional, seeking to connect experience and science.
• Einstein: Through the theory of relativity, posits no absolute magnitude or duration. Space and time are "variants." Simultaneity is relative, and measurable physical duration depends on the frame of reference. The finite velocity of light limits the paradoxes of relative simultaneity.

Indian Views (Except Jaina):

• Samkhya-Yoga: Presents various views, including time being non-existent, an evolute of Prakṛti, identical with Prakṛti, or simply action. Some see time as eternal and fractional, others as inseparable from past, present, and future. The Yogasūtra view, explained by commentaries, posits that only moments are real, and duration is a mental construction. This is likened to the Buddhist view of moments being real and the continuum unreal.
• Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika: Considers Time a single, eternal, all-pervading substance that causes movement and change. Its existence is inferred from the consecution and simultaneity of phenomena. Time is a proper name, not a general term, and divisions like minutes or hours are metaphorical, due to conditions. Raghunatha Siromani views time's essence as Divinity.
• Mīmāṁsā (Bhațțas and Prābhākaras): Largely aligns with the Vaiseṣikas, viewing time as a perceptible substance, though the Bhațțas believe it's perceptible by all six senses by being a qualification of perceived objects.
• Advaita Vedānta: Regards Time as mere nescience (avidyā).
• Buddhist View: Early Buddhism may have accepted an immutable time alongside conditioned empirical time. Later, views emerged that time is a receptacle for impermanent "skandhas" (elements), or that only moments are real, with the continuum being a mental construction. Some Buddhist schools debate the objective reality of past, present, and future, with others denying the objective existence of past and future, and reducing the present to mere moments or elements. Nagaśēna links time to ignorance, and for the enlightened, time doesn't exist. Madhyamikas argue time is unsubstantial, an objectification of concepts, neither a permanent cause nor an existent. They deconstruct the concept of temporal order, prioritizing causality and rejecting time as an independent entity. Grammarians (Patañjali, Bhartṛhari) view Time as an eternal, indivisible, ruling principle that is the substratum of the world and the cause of change. Bhartṛhari sees Time as a Power of the Absolute (Eternal Verbum/Logos), with aspects of prevention and permission that create temporal sequence. This power (kālasakti) is the efficient cause of the phenomenal world. The distinctions of past, present, and future are superimposed on time from actions and movements.
• Astronomers' View: Some associate astronomers with the view that time is nothing but action. The Sūryasiddhānta describes two kinds of time: one indivisible and inflexible, the cause of change, and another measurable, perceptible, and further divided into tangible and intangible.

Jaina View:

The text then delves into the Jaina perspective, presenting three views mentioned in the Āvasyaka Cūrni: time as a quality, time as modes of substances, and time as an independent substance. While the first is less elaborated, the latter two are discussed.

• Śvetāmbara Philosophers: Refer to both views but favor one or the other.
• Digambara Thinkers: Primarily uphold time as an independent substance.

Arguments for Time as an Independent Substance (Jaina Perspective):

1. Auxiliary Cause of Change: Time is an auxiliary cause for the incessant, minute, imperceptible changes in the five substances.
2. Analogy to Dharma and Adharma: Just as Dharma and Adharma are posited as independent auxiliary causes for motion and inertia, Time is needed as an auxiliary cause for transformations of substances.
3. Fruition of Effects: The staggered fruiting of mango trees, despite all causal conditions being present, suggests a time substance with varying capacities.
4. Controlling Principle: Time is a controlling principle essential for temporal order; without it, serial effects would be simultaneous, leading to chaos.
5. Basis for Divisions: Divisions of time (minute, hour) imply something divided; thus, time must be an independent entity.
6. Simple Word "Time": The word "time" itself presupposes an independent entity.
7. Conventional vs. Real Time: Conventional usages like "cooking time" involve superimposition; real time is the underlying basis.
8. Movement of Luminaries: Movements of celestial bodies are insufficient to explain changes; they themselves require time.
9. Rejection of Space as Substitute: Space merely contains; it cannot be a causal condition for changes like fire for cooking rice.
10. Rejection of "Existence" as Time: "Existence" (Sattā) itself cannot be an auxiliary cause of minute changes.
11. Rejection of Time as Activity: Akalanka refutes the idea that time is mere activity, arguing that activities don't ground our concept of time independently and that momentary activities cannot measure other momentary activities. He also points out that if time were activity, the present would cease to exist.

Digambara vs. Śvetāmbara Differences:

While scholars often find differences, the author suggests that if Hemacandra's view is taken as representative of the concerned Śvetāmbaras, there is no fundamental difference.

• Digambara: Time is atomic, innumerable, occupies a unit of universe space, and is amūrta (without physical qualities) but has temporal extension. Time-atoms are motionless and eternal. Their origination/decay is explained by external factors or the "agurulaghu" guna.
• Śvetāmbara (concerned thinkers): Time substance is confined to human regions for its manifestation, depending on the motion of heavenly bodies. However, if interpreted as pervading the whole universe but manifesting divisions only in the human region, it aligns with the Digambara view. The text suggests the Digambara view of time atoms is a metaphor.

Two Kinds of Time in Jaina Philosophy:

The discussion clarifies two kinds of time:

1. Absolute Time (mukhya kāla): The auxiliary cause of minute, imperceptible changes in substances. It is atomic according to Digambaras.
2. Relative or Conventional Time (vyāvahārika kāla): The auxiliary cause of gross perceptible changes, movement, and temporal order. Divisions like samaya, avalikā, past, present, future are applicable primarily to relative time. Manifestations dependent on solar motion are relative.

The author concludes that the Jaina view of Absolute Time as an atomic substance, while distinct from the Vaiseṣika view of non-atomic Absolute Time, faces challenges. The argument that time is superfluous when changes are eternal (without beginning or end) is strong. The idea of time-atoms is questioned, and the necessity of positing time as an independent substance is debated, suggesting that modes of substances might suffice to explain temporal phenomena. The author finds the view of an independent atomic time substance weak and unsound.