Naitik Mulyo Ki Parivartanshilta - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary in English of the provided Jain text, "Naitik Mulyo ki Parivartanshilta" by Sagarmal Jain, focusing on the concept of the changeability of moral values:

The book, "Naitik Mulyo ki Parivartanshilta" (The Changeability of Moral Values) by Sagarmal Jain, delves into the complex and often debated topic of whether moral values are constant or subject to change. The author argues that the plurality and inherent changeability of moral values are natural due to factors like the intellectual development of individuals, their upbringing, and the diverse and evolving cultural, social, and physical environments.

Key arguments and themes discussed in the text include:

Diversity of Moral Standards: The text asserts that moral standards will naturally differ based on perspectives, such as individual good versus social good, or desires versus reason. Similarly, a nationalist's moral criteria will differ from an internationalist's, and capitalist versus communist ethical norms will be distinct. The author emphasizes the need to accept this multiplicity of moral standards. While some might claim a single, ultimate moral standard, this ultimate good would either encompass or be separate from these various individual goods, with the latter rendering it irrelevant to ethics, which is fundamentally human-centric.
The Question of Value Validity: The author addresses the contemporary challenge where changeability is sometimes interpreted as a rejection of the validity of morality itself. When moral concepts are seen as mere emotional expressions or tied to personal and social approval, changeability can indeed mean negation. If moral concepts are deemed meaningless or pseudo-concepts, their changeability loses significance. If moral values lack objective existence and are mere mental constructs, their change has no concrete basis. Furthermore, equating good/bad or right/wrong with personal or social approval reduces their changeability to mere fashion.
Distinguishing Moral Change from Value Nihilism: A crucial distinction is made between genuine moral transformation (value transition) and the denial of value (value negation). The text argues that while moral values and ethical notions have changed and will continue to change, there has never been a period in human history where the very validity of morality was rejected. What remains constant, even amidst change, is the inherent validity of morality itself. The subject matter of moral values may change, but their form persists. Some values retain their validity, with only their interpretation and context shifting.
Critique of Materialist and Analytical Philosophies: The author examines how some materialistic and communist philosophies, and analytical philosophers, are perceived to question the validity of morality. However, drawing on Lenin's statement, the text argues that even communism, while re-evaluating moral values, does not negate morality's validity. It supports a morality that opposes injustice and exploitation and promotes social equality. Similarly, materialistic philosophies that support social and associative values cannot deny morality's validity if humans are considered rational social beings.
The Essence of Morality and Human Nature: Morality is defined as the acceptance of ideals and restraints in individual and social life for the attainment of rational ends, without which humanity and human society would be in peril. Only a purely hedonistic and materialistic view that sees humans as mere animals would reject morality's validity. However, humans are not simply animals; they transcend natural laws through intellect and consciousness, making them creators and destroyers of societal norms. This inherent complexity makes a purely animalistic view inadequate.
Moral Values as Creators of Interests: Moral values are not solely subjective or dictated by taste. They are also creators of interests. The changeability of moral values is not akin to the rapid shifts of fashion. While values are influenced by time, place, and circumstances, a stable element persists. Values like non-violence, justice, self-sacrifice, and restraint have remained universally accepted, with exceptions indicating personal inability rather than negation of the core value.
The Nature of Value Change: The text identifies two primary forms of value change:
1. Expansion or Contraction of Meaning: Fundamental concepts retain their validity, but their scope of meaning can expand or contract. For instance, the concept of non-violence has evolved from preventing violence against family to encompassing all sentient beings, and in Jainism, even plant life. Similarly, concepts like "pararth" (acting for others) have expanded from kin to all of humanity.
2. Shift in Hierarchy or Emphasis: Certain values may shift in prominence due to changing circumstances. For example, in certain contexts, justice might take precedence over non-violence, or vice-versa. This is a change in the relative importance of values, not their outright negation. Communal values like "bread" may be prioritized over "freedom" in some ideologies, but this doesn't render freedom valueless.
Circumstantial Ethics (Apaddharma): The text discusses "apaddharma" (ethics in times of distress) as a specific situation where actions normally considered unethical (like violence or theft) might be permissible for the sake of survival or a higher good. However, this is a situational allowance and does not invalidate the general moral principles. The underlying moral values remain intact, even if their application is temporarily suspended or modified.
Invariance of Intent vs. Variance of Action: The moral value of intention or resolve is considered immutable. For example, the intention to commit violence is always unethical. However, the action of violence itself is not always unethical, as it can be a means to a higher end in specific circumstances. The mental and intellectual aspect of an action (intent) is absolute, while the behavioral and practical aspect (action) is relative and changeable.
Immutable Ideals, Mutable Means: Moral ideals or ends are considered immutable, but the means to achieve them are mutable. The highest good is unchanging, but the paths to it can be diverse and subject to change. It's also noted that what is a means in one context can become an end in another, leading to potential shifts in value.
Fundamental vs. Subsidiary Rules: Within moral laws, fundamental rules are generally immutable, while subsidiary rules can be changeable. However, exceptions to fundamental rules do not negate their inherent value.
The Interplay of Change and Permanence: The author concludes that moral values possess both changeable and unchangeable aspects. Acceptance of absolute changeability would lead to a lack of regularity, while absolute immutability would make values irrelevant to societal contexts. Moral values are neither so rigid as to be inflexible nor so pliable as to be distorted.
Changeability vs. Progress/Regress: The text questions whether changeability inherently signifies progress. It suggests that change can be either progressive or regressive. While material advancements have occurred, human dissatisfaction and vice have also increased, raising doubts about overall progress. The author emphasizes that mere rejection of traditional values is not progress; rather, it requires re-evaluation based on human reason to establish values that foster human development and welfare.

In essence, the book argues for a nuanced understanding of moral values, acknowledging their inherent complexity, their capacity for change in meaning and emphasis, and the crucial distinction between genuine ethical evolution and a nihilistic rejection of morality. It advocates for a dynamic yet principled approach to ethics, grounded in human reason and well-being.