Medhatithi On Samanyato Drstam

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Summary

This document is an academic article by Albrecht Wezler titled "Medhatithi On Sāmānyato Drstam (Anumānam)". It delves into the commentary of the influential philosopher Medhātithi on the Manusmṛti, specifically focusing on his interpretation of the epistemological concept sāmānyato dṛṣṭa, a type of inference.

Here's a comprehensive summary of the article's key points:

1. Medhātithi's Defense of Manu's First Chapter:

  • The article begins by examining Medhātithi's response to an objection against the first chapter of the Manusmṛti. The objector argued that this chapter, which describes the undifferentiated state of the world, is irrelevant to the goals of human life (puruṣārthas) and lacks any valid means of cognition (pramāṇa). The objector even cited a proverb comparing this to being asked about mangoes and getting information about kovidāra trees.
  • Medhātithi refutes the first two arguments (irrelevancy and lack of purpose) by asserting that the first chapter's purpose is to establish the supreme importance of understanding dharma (righteousness) and adharma (unrighteousness), which cause the cycle of rebirths from the highest beings down to the vegetable kingdom.
  • He then addresses the third argument – the alleged lack of pramāṇa – by stating that the basis for this chapter's assertions lies in mantras, arthavādas (declaratory passages in the Śruti), and sāmānyato dṛṣṭa (inference based on similarity).
  • Medhātithi illustrates sāmānyato dṛṣṭa with an argument for the universal dissolution (mahāpralaya). This inference states:
    1. What is found to be destroyed in part is also found to be destroyed entirely (e.g., a burning house vs. a burning village).
    2. Things produced by an agent are liable to destruction (e.g., houses, palaces).
    3. The world, with its rivers, oceans, mountains, etc., is the work of an agent.
    4. Therefore, the world will be destroyed, like a house.
  • Medhātithi emphasizes that the world being the work of an agent is also provable by its having a particular shape, similar to a house.

2. Medhātithi's Justification for His Explanatory Style:

  • Medhātithi explicitly justifies his concise explanation of the epistemological foundations. He states that he is not undertaking to prove the validity of these pramāṇas or to criticize them because the śāstra (Manu's text and his own commentary) does not aim to be a tarkaśāstra (treatise on logic) but a dharmaśāstra. Doing so would make the work too lengthy and complex.
  • The author, Wezler, finds this explanation persuasive and notes that Medhātithi likely possessed the capacity for such critical examination himself, expressing regret that he did not elaborate on his own views.

3. Further Insights into Anumāna from Medhātithi's Commentary:

  • The article highlights other instances where Medhātithi discusses anumāna (inference) in his commentary on Manu.
  • On Manu 1.5 (continued): Medhātithi explains the term avijñeyam (incognizable) by stating that it denies the use of any kind of inference (anumāna) to understand the world's form at a cosmogonical moment. He specifically mentions that neither sāmānyato dṛṣṭa nor viśeṣato dṛṣṭa (inference based on specific observed similarities) can ascertain this form. He clarifies that the world in this state is known only through āgama (scriptural testimony).
  • On Manu 8.44: Medhātithi explains that inference is used by the king to determine the cause of a lawsuit, especially when matters are beyond direct perception. He also states that anumāna is repeated for emphasis. Wezler suggests this refers to Manu 8.25, where subtle signs (liṅga) are used to discern truthfulness, indicating Medhātithi's practical understanding of inference in legal contexts.
  • On Manu 12.105: This verse lists pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna, and śāstra as necessary knowledge for determining dharma. Medhātithi's commentary here is noted as being somewhat corrupt. However, it suggests that one who has not carefully examined inference might wrongly attribute authorship to the Veda, whereas a keen intellect, by properly reflecting on logical reasons, correctly concludes the Veda's authorless nature.
  • On Manu 12.106: Medhātithi explains tarkena (by reasoning) as anumānāntarena yuktyā (by a kind of inference, by reasoning). He elaborates on ūha and apoha (processes of reasoning) with a ritualistic example, suggesting a connection between ritualistic adaptation of mantras and philosophical reasoning. He emphasizes that valid reasoning (tarka) requires careful examination to avoid fallacies.
  • On Manu 2.11: Medhātithi interprets hetuśāstra (science of reasons) negatively, equating it with heterodox philosophical systems (like Buddhism and Cārvāka) that reject the authority of the Veda. He distinguishes these from heterodox systems that do not deny Vedic authority (like Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika, and Nyāya), stating that while tarka can be applied to all, only those consistent with the Veda are to be studied.

4. The Origin of Medhātithi's Dichotomy:

  • Wezler explores the possible origins of Medhātithi's distinction between viśeṣato dṛṣṭa and sāmānyato dṛṣṭa. He notes that these terms first appear in Vārṣagaṇya's Śāṣṭitantra, a Sāṅkhya text. However, Vārṣagaṇya's distinction differs from Medhātithi's.
  • Wezler speculates that viśeṣato dṛṣṭa might refer to inductive conclusions, while sāmānyato dṛṣṭa is clearly explained by Medhātithi. He considers whether Medhātithi's classification aligns with that of Prasastapāda (a Vaiśeṣika philosopher) but finds the terminological correspondence incomplete.
  • He suggests that Medhātithi's primary philosophical allegiance lies with Pūrva Mīmāṁsā, which might also influence his understanding of inference.

In essence, Albrecht Wezler's article meticulously analyzes Medhātithi's engagement with the concept of sāmānyato dṛṣṭa and broader epistemological issues within the Manusmṛti. It reveals Medhātithi as a defender of scriptural authority who, while acknowledging the role of inference, carefully scrutinizes its application and validity, particularly in relation to the ultimate goal of spiritual knowledge and righteous living.