Mahavir Ke Samkalin Vibhinna Atmavad Evam Vaishishtya - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Mahavir ke Samkalin Vibhinna Atmavad evam Vaishishtya" (Various Theories of the Soul in the Time of Mahavir and the Distinctiveness of Jain Soul Theory) by Prof. Sagarmal Jain, in English:

The article emphasizes that religion and ethics are fundamentally based on philosophical beliefs about the soul. Without understanding a religion's concept of the soul, its ethical principles cannot be properly grasped. Therefore, to validate Mahavir's religious and ethical teachings, it's essential to first validate his theory of the soul and to critically study the various contemporary soul theories of his time.

The author notes that while modern scholars like A.C. Mukerji and S.K. Saksena have discussed Indian soul theories, they haven't adequately focused on those prevalent during Mahavir's era. He also acknowledges a brief attempt by Dharmanand Kosambi in his book "Bhagwan Buddha," but calls for a more systematic study.

A common misconception among Western and some modern Indian thinkers is that Mahavir and Buddha's contemporaries lacked defined philosophical doctrines regarding the soul. They believed that all Brahmanical and Shramanic schools of thought at that time merely presented ethical ideas and ritualistic systems. The author suggests this notion might stem from Upanishadic literature, where various soul hypotheses were being compiled, possibly influenced by Shraman traditions. The Upanishads' own internal contradictions regarding the soul are presented as evidence of this interaction, though their attempt to synthesize these ideas into the concept of Brahman is considered their unique contribution.

However, the author strongly refutes the idea that Mahavir and Buddha's contemporaries lacked philosophical theories about the soul. He asserts that diverse ideas about the soul existed, with some considering it subtle (sukshma), others pervasive (vibhu), some eternal, and others momentary. Some saw the soul as an agent (karta), while others viewed it as inert (kutstha) and inactive. The author posits that the inadequacy and moral limitations of these various soul theories led to the emergence of three significant new thought systems: the Upanishadic pan-soul or Brahmanism, Buddha's no-soul (anatmavada) theory, and the Jain soul theory, which sought to synthesize these different perspectives.

To support the existence of these contemporary soul theories, the author points to evidence in Buddhist Pali Agamas (like the Brahmajala Sutta and Culasharopama Sutta) and Jain Agamas, as well as Upanishadic texts. He highlights that while these Buddhist texts might appear to present ethical discussions, a deeper analysis reveals underlying philosophical conclusions about the soul.

The author questions how respected religious teachers described in the Pali Agamas as leaders and revered figures could have preached morality that is depicted as so reprehensible and blameworthy by the opposing side. He suggests that the moral conclusions attributed to these thinkers were likely derived from their soul theories or other philosophical beliefs, and were presented in a distorted manner by their opponents.

The author then proceeds to categorize the prevalent soul theories of Mahavir's time. He proposes a classification that includes:

Eternal or Everlasting Soul Theory (Nitya ya Shāshvat Ātmavād): The soul is eternal.
Momentary Soul Theory (Anitya Ātmavād), Annihilation Theory (Ucchēd Ātmavād), Body-Soul Theory (Dēhātma vād): The soul is impermanent or ceases to exist with the body.
Inert Soul Theory (Kūtasth Ātmavād), Inactive Soul Theory (Akriya Ātmavād), Fatalism (Niyativād): The soul is passive and unchanging.
Transforming Soul Theory (Pariṇamī Ātmavād), Soul as Agent Theory (Ātma Kartr̥tvavād), Self-Effort Theory (Purushārthavād): The soul is active and can effect change.
Subtle Soul Theory (Sūkshma Ātmavād): The soul is minute.
Pervasive Soul Theory (Vibhu Ātmavād): The soul is all-encompassing.
No-Soul Theory (Anātmavād): Rejects the existence of a soul.
Pan-Soul or Brahman Theory (Sarva Ātmavād ya Brahmavād): The soul is identical with Brahman.

The author decides not to delve deeply into Anatmavada (Buddha's philosophy) and Sarva Atmavada/Brahmanism (Vedanta) as they are well-known and extensive. He also omits Pariṇamī Ātmavād as its independent origin is unclear.

Detailed discussion of specific contemporary theories:

Momentary Soul Theory (Anitya Ātmavād): Represented by Ajita Kesakambali. His theory posits that consciousness arises with the body and perishes with it. The Buddhist Agamas depict him as denying the efficacy of rituals, the results of good and bad deeds, the afterlife, parents, and gods, stating that humans are made of the four elements and are annihilated upon death. Externally, this might seem like hedonism and materialism. However, the author questions why Ajita himself practiced austerities and founded a monastic order if his ethics were purely materialistic and focused on self-pleasure. The author suggests Ajita was a philosophical impermanentist, emphasizing the impermanence of all things, including the soul. He might have advocated momentary existence to free humanity from the violence of rituals and wars, and to escape worldly suffering caused by craving and attachment by renouncing worldly life and practicing self-mortification. The author believes Buddha's anatmavada adopted Ajita's momentary soul theory, but removed the practice of self-mortification. The Jain text Uttaradhyayana Sūtra also discusses this theory, comparing the soul's presence in the body to oil in sesame seeds or fire in wood. Nachiketa in the Kathopanishad also questions the truth of momentary versus eternal soul theories. The author concludes that Ajita's theory was a philosophical impermanentism, not materialistic hedonism, and that its proponents sought self-peace and the eradication of attachment. He suggests Ajita's philosophy was a precursor to Buddhist philosophy, and the Buddhist critique of Ajita's denial of karma's efficacy was later echoed by Hemachandra in his criticism of Buddhist thought. The author finds momentary soul theory ethically flawed because it cannot explain the principle of karma and its fruits, and it renders moral injunctions like accumulating merit and charity meaningless.
Eternal Inert Soul Theory (Nitya Kūtasth Ātmavād): This theory, which views the soul as both eternal and inactive, is supported by schools like Samkhya and Vedanta. The representative of this theory in Mahavir's time was Purna Kashyapa. Buddhist literature describes him as stating that there is no sin in performing actions, causing actions, cutting, causing to be cut, inflicting pain, or causing pain, nor in killing beings, stealing, or speaking lies. Even if one were to decimate all beings with a sharp wheel, there would be no sin or fault, and speaking truth yields no merit. The author again questions how such a view could be held by a respected figure, suggesting that these depicted moral conclusions are distortions of his theory of an inactive soul presented by opponents. He believes Kashyapa considered the soul to be inactive, and his opponents distorted this to present an immoral stance. The author suggests that Kashyapa's inactive soul theory likely influenced Kapila's Samkhya philosophy and the Bhagavad Gita, given their approximate dates. He points to the absence of God in Samkhya as evidence of influence from non-Vedic Shraman traditions like Kashyapa's, which also didn't accommodate a divine creator. Samkhya considers the soul distinct from the gunas of nature and that all actions are modifications of nature, not affecting the soul. The author also finds echoes of Kashyapa's inactive soul theory in the Gita, likely transmitted through Samkhya. While philosophically the theory of an inactive soul might explain liberation (moksha/nirvana) without soul transformation, it is ethically problematic. If the soul is inactive, it cannot be held responsible for actions, rendering morality, duty, and religion meaningless.
Inactive Soul Development and Fatalism (Nishkriya Ātmavikasvād evam Niyativād): A branch of the inactive soul theory led to Fatalism. If the soul is inactive and unchanging, then self-development and the attainment of liberation cannot be explained through self-effort. Makkhaliputra Gosala, the leader of the Ajivika sect, supported Purna Kashyapa's inactive soul theory but found it limiting for explaining spiritual development from lower births to the ultimate state of liberation. Therefore, he established the theory of "inactive soul development," often called fatalism or fate-ism. The author believes "inactive soul development" is a more fitting description. Gosala, described as clever, possibly incorporated Purna Kashyapa's followers into his Ajivika sect. He initially practiced with Mahavir but diverged due to philosophical differences. The author suggests that while Gosala's philosophy was influenced by Kashyapa's ideas, his spiritual path was influenced by Mahavir's practices. Both Buddhist and Jain Agamas contain references to Gosala's thought, albeit presented by opponents. Gosala's view is summarized as beings becoming pure or impure without a cause, human effort being ineffective, and all creatures being governed by destiny, association, and nature. His moral doctrines are also depicted as corrupt by his opponents. The author interprets Gosala's thought as the soul being inactive and powerless, its development occurring naturally through various births to achieve liberation. However, ethically, he suggests Gosala might have advocated performing duties according to one's station, similar to the Gita's teachings and modern ethical principles. He likely taught that by fulfilling the duties of one's 'six classes' (spiritual stages), the soul naturally progresses. While fatalism might have some philosophical value, it is ethically unsuccessful because it negates free will, which is essential for ethical reasoning.
Subtle Soul Theory (Sūkshma Ātmavād): A contemporary of Buddha, Pakudha Katyayana, believed the soul was eternal, inert, and subtle. According to the Brahmajala Sutta, he asserted that seven substances are not created, are unchanging, immobile, and that severing a head with a sharp weapon merely creates an interval between these seven substances, not destroying life. This theory considered the soul eternal, inert, subtle, and indivisible, with elements found in Upanishads and the Gita (where the soul is described as subtler than a mustard seed or rice grain and as indivisible and unburnable). The author finds the subtle soul theory philosophically flawed, though it later underwent refinement.

Mahavir's Soul Theory and its Distinctiveness:

The author then summarizes that Mahavir's soul theory is a beautiful synthesis of the contemporary theories discussed. He classifies these theories into six categories:

Momentary or Annihilation Soul Theory
Eternal or Everlasting Soul Theory
Inert Soul Theory, Inactive Soul Theory, and Fatalism
Transforming Soul Theory, Agent Soul Theory, or Self-Effort Theory
Subtle Soul Theory
Pervasive Soul Theory (which later became the Upanishadic Pan-Soul or Brahman Theory)

Mahavir, being an exponent of Anekantavada (non-absolutism), recognized the philosophical and ethical weaknesses of each individual theory. He did not bind his soul theory to any single doctrine but rather synthesized them.

Acharya Hemachandra, in his Vitraag Stotra, illustrates the defects of both absolute eternalism and absolute momentaryism, stating that the Vitraag's philosophy is free from these flaws. The author explains how Mahavir harmonized these theories:

Eternity (Nityatā): The soul is eternal in its existence.
Momentariness (Anityatā): The soul is momentary in its modes or transformations. This is a practical impermanence, residing in the evolved soul (badhatma).
Inertness (Kūtasthtā): In its pure nature, the soul is neither an agent nor a enjoyer, nor is it undergoing transformation.
Transforming/Agent (Pariṇamīpan/Kartr̥tva): Evolved souls are agents and enjoyers of karma. This is an accidental quality arising from the combination with karmic matter.
Subtlety and Pervasiveness (Sūkshmatā and Vibhutā): The soul is capable of contraction and expansion. Its soul-matter (pradesha) can become so subtle that countless souls can reside on the tip of a needle. Conversely, if the soul's pradesha expand, they can pervade the entire universe.

The author concludes that Mahavir's soul theory is a beautiful synthesis of the contemporary soul theories. This synthesis resolves the ethical and philosophical flaws inherent in each individual theory. He uses the analogy of jaggery (producing phlegm) and dry ginger (producing bile), which, when combined in medicine, do not exhibit their individual defects, to illustrate how Mahavir's synthesized soul theory overcomes the limitations of the individual theories, thus highlighting its unique distinctiveness.