Logical And Historical Significance Of Jaina Philosophical Tradition

This document is an excerpt from "The Logical and Historical Significance of the Jaina Philosophical Tradition" by K. K. Dixit, published by Mahavir Jain Vidyalay. The author argues for the necessity of understanding the broader Indian philosophical context to properly evaluate Jainism.

The text begins by defining philosophy as a reasoned and systematic exploration of reality. It traces the origins of Indian philosophy from the Vedas, noting the transition from pre-philosophical ritualistic texts to the more speculative Upanishads. The Brahmasūtras are identified as the first attempt at systematization, though their influence was limited until Shankara's commentary. The author divides Indian philosophical traditions into two main streams:

• Transcendentalist: This group rejects the reality of empirical phenomena, relying on mystic intuition to grasp a transempirical reality. Examples include the Buddhist schools of Sūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda.
• Empiricist: This group considers empirical phenomena as the sole reality and seeks to understand them through rational means. Examples include the Brahmanical schools of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṁsā, as well as the Buddhist Sautrāntika school.

The author then situates Jainism within this framework, stating that it unequivocally belongs to the empiricist tradition. Jainism's distinct approach is characterized by two key tendencies:

1. Engagement with Transcendentalists: Jainism actively challenged the transcendentalist view that "real" reality is indescribable by language and reason. This led to the development of the doctrine of "seven forms of assertion" (sapta-bhaṅgī). The transcendentalist argument was that empirical phenomena are indescribable because they cannot be definitively classified as existent, non-existent, both, or neither. The Jaina countered that an empirical phenomenon is describable in seven ways, essentially arguing that it can be described as existent, non-existent, or both, depending on the perspective. The author notes the technical nature of the Jaina's description of "non-existent" and "indescribable" in this context.

2. Synthesis of One-Sided Theses: Jainism aimed to synthesize opposing philosophical viewpoints, avoiding the defects of each. This is particularly evident in its engagement with other empiricist schools, primarily Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhism, on four key issues:

   • Permanence and Transience: Buddhists argued for constant flux (momentariness), while Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika posited some permanent elements alongside momentary ones. Jainism proposed a dual aspect: phenomena are permanent in their substance (dravya) but momentary in their modes (paryāya).
   • Composite Bodies and Component Parts: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argued for the existence of a composite body as an independent entity beyond its parts, linked by samavāya. Buddhism considered this a mere conventional designation. Jainism explained this by stating that the component parts, as substances, assume a particular mode when forming a composite body.
   • Substance-Attribute Relationship: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika distinguished substances and attributes as separate real entities linked by samavāya. Buddhism viewed this as a conventional distinction. Jainism saw substance as the substance-aspect and attributes as the quality- or mode-aspect of a phenomenon.
   • Universals: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika considered universals as independent entities residing in particulars. Buddhism again viewed this as conventional. Jainism understood a universal feature as a mode called "similarity in relation to the rest."

The author concludes that while the differences between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhism on the last three questions were relatively minor and largely reducible to different modes of speech, the distinction regarding permanence and transience was significant. The Jaina's position on this crucial issue aligns more closely with the Buddhist emphasis on constant change, distinguishing between substance-aspect and mode-aspect. The text suggests that this closer alignment with Buddhism on the issue of change also leads to a greater convergence with Buddhist thought on the other three questions, despite the earlier noted minor differences.