Logic Of Svabhavahetu In Dhharmakirtis Vadanyaya

Here's a comprehensive summary of Ernst Steinkellner's "The Logic of the Svabhāvahetu in Dharmakīrti's Vādanyāya," based on the provided text:

Overall Goal:

The paper aims to analyze and understand the logic of the svabhāvahetu (reason based on essential property) in Dharmakīrti's late work, the Vādanyāya. Steinkellner's approach is an "experiment in interpretation," focusing on the internal consistency of Dharmakīrti's final formulations in the Hetubindu and Vādanyāya, rather than solely on their development from earlier works.

Dharmakīrti's Significance and the Problem of Interpretation:

• Dharmakīrti is recognized as a highly creative and influential figure in Buddhist epistemology and logic, establishing Dignāga's tradition.
• However, his work, particularly its "intrinsic fascination," has often been overlooked or "petrified" in subsequent traditions.
• To understand Dharmakīrti's true achievements, it's crucial to read him on his own terms, within his own philosophical context.

The Central Problem: Ascertaining Logical Nexus (Vyāpti):

• Steinkellner's working hypothesis is that a key development in Dharmakīrti's logic concerns the ascertainment of the logical nexus (vyāpti), especially in the case of the svabhāvahetu.
• This development is framed against the backdrop of a problem inherited from Dharmakīrti's teacher, Iśvarasena.
• Iśvarasena's Problem: Dignāga's three characteristics of a logical reason (trairūpya) were considered necessary but not sufficient for certainty, particularly regarding the second characteristic (vipakse 'sattvam – absence in cases where the argued property is absent). The inability to ascertain this absence reliably led to "demons of doubt."
• Iśvarasena attempted to solve this by introducing a theory of non-perception (anupalambha) and a fourth characteristic of a reason (abadhitaviṣayatva – absence of the untenable object). Dharmakīrti, while acknowledging the problem, rejected Iśvarasena's solutions.

Dharmakīrti's Solution in the Vādanyāya:

• Dharmakīrti's Vādanyāya, a work on "points of defeat" in disputations, contains a complete formulation of his logic.
• A "point of defeat" for a propounder occurs when a logical reason is used deficiently, specifically through non-justification (asamarthana).
• Non-justification means the propounder fails to demonstrate a definite ascertainment (niścaya) of the reason through all its three aspects.
• Therefore, the Vādanyāya elaborates on what constitutes a justified (samarthita) logical reason.

The Core of the Logic: The Proof of Pervasion (Vyāptisādhana) for Svabhāvahetu:

• The paper focuses specifically on the method for proving pervasion (vyāptisādhana) in the case of a svabhāvahetu.
• Dharmakīrti's Definition: In the case of a svabhāvahetu, the proof of pervasion is the demonstration of a valid cognition which negates (badhaka) the logical reason in the contradictory opposite (viparyaya) of the argued property (sādhya).
• This definition is summarized as viparyaye bādhakapramāṇopadarśana.

Key Terms and Their Meanings:

• Sādhyaviparyaya: This is not simply the absence (abhāva) of the argued property. It is the property that is in contradiction to the argued property or a locus where such a contradictory property occurs. This strict definition ensures the required stringency. The use of viparyaya (reverse, contradictory) instead of abhāva highlights this crucial conceptual shift.
• Badhaka: This term signifies a "negating" cognition.
• Badhakapramāṇa: This is a "negating valid cognition." Its function is twofold:
  • Cognitional Function: It conceptually establishes (pratyupasthāpana) the contradictory of the logical reason.
  • Logical Function: It is identified as non-perception of the pervading property (vyāpakadharmānupalabdhi). This non-perception serves as the reason for negating the pervaded property (the original logical reason).

The Mechanism of Proof:

1. Problematic Locus: The reason must be shown to exist in the subject (dharmin).
2. Pervasion: The reason must be proven to pervade the argued property.
3. Proof of Pervasion (Vyāptisādhana): This is achieved through the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇopadarśana.
   • This involves inferring the absence of the logical reason in the sādhyaviparyaya (contradictory of the argued property).
   • This inference is based on the non-perception of the pervading property (vyāpakānupalabdhi) of the logical reason.
   • The non-perception of the pervading property negates the reason by conceptually establishing its contradictory.

Testing the Method with Examples:

• Sattvānumāna (Inference concerning existence): Dharmakīrti uses the example "What is existent or produced, all that is impermanent; sound is existent or produced."
  • The logical reason is "existence" (sattva).
  • The argued property is "momentariness" (kṣaṇikatva).
  • The sādhyaviparyaya is "non-momentariness" (akṣaṇikatva).
  • The pervading property of "existence" is "capability for causal efficiency" (arthakriyāsāmarthya).
  • The proof of pervasion involves the non-perception of this capability in the case of "non-momentariness." This non-perception negates "existence" by establishing its contradictory: "non-existence" (asattva).
• Śimśapātvānumāna (Inference concerning the "śimśapā" tree): Steinkellner constructs a model for this inference, as Dharmakīrti doesn't explicitly provide one in these late works.
  • The logical reason is "capability for the designation 'śimśapā'" (śimśapāvyavahārayogyatva).
  • The argued property is "capability for the designation 'tree'" (vṛkṣavyavahārayogyatva).
  • The sādhyaviparyaya is "non-capability for the designation 'tree'" (vṛkṣavyavahārāyogyatva).
  • The pervading property of "śimśapāness" is "possessing branches etc." (śākhādimattva).
  • The proof of pervasion involves the non-perception of "possessing branches etc." in the case of "non-capability for the designation 'tree'." This negates "śimśapāness" by establishing its contradictory.

Conclusion and Significance:

• The method of viparyaye bādhakapramāṇopadarśana, based on vyāpakānupalabdhi, is presented as a new and generally valid method for ascertaining the logical nexus in the case of svabhāvahetu.
• This method addresses the shortcomings of earlier formulations and demonstrates Dharmakīrti's effort to create a homogeneous logical system.
• Steinkellner argues that this theory, particularly the concept of "internal concomitance" (antarvyāpti), is the culmination of Dharmakīrti's lifelong engagement with the problem of logical certainty, making him its creator, even if his own tradition later emphasized his earlier work.
• The experiment successfully shows that Dharmakīrti's logical framework is consistent and applicable across different types of svabhāvahetu.