Lecture On Jainism

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This collection presents two lectures delivered by Professor G.C. Pande under the Shri R.K. Jain Memorial Lectures at the University of Delhi in 1977. The lectures, organized by the Department of Buddhist Studies, explore key aspects of Jainism, aiming to provide an objective and scientific study of the religion.

Foreword by R.C. Mehrotra (Vice-Chancellor, University of Delhi): The foreword highlights the establishment of these annual lectures by the Shri Raj Krishen Jain Charitable Trust. It praises Professor Pande's expertise in history, philosophy, and literature, noting that his lectures covered Jain ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, and ontology. The Vice-Chancellor emphasizes the importance of objectively studying all religions for social development and removing superstitions. He also points out the unique historical development of Jainism, remaining rooted in India, unlike Buddhism's international spread.

Preface by Dr. Sanghasen Singh (Head, Department of Buddhist Studies): Dr. Singh expresses his privilege in arranging the lectures, which were well-received by the Indological community. He thanks Shri Prem Chandra Jain for his benevolence in instituting these lectures. The preface details the titles of the two lectures: "The Jain Ethical Tradition and Its Relevance" and "The Jain Conception of Knowledge and Reality and Its Relevance To Scientific Thought." He emphasizes the comprehensive nature of the lectures, covering major aspects of Jainism, and predicts their significance for understanding Lord Mahavira's teachings.

Lecture I: The Jaina Ethical Tradition and Its Relevance

Professor Pande begins by establishing the foundation of any ethical tradition, which stems from beliefs, practices, values, and social experiences. He notes the dialectical relationship between individual moral freedom and social obligations, highlighting how Indian reformers often created new sects rather than directly changing existing social structures, finding expression in individual spiritual life or symbolic ritual.

He then places Jainism within the Indian cultural milieu, noting its initial contrast with the Vedic tradition but eventual integration into the Indian socio-ethical framework. He argues that Jainism's survival, unlike Buddhism's, is partly due to its conservatism and limited proselytism.

Origins and the Śramanic Tradition: Pande discusses the scholarly debate about Jainism's origins, possibly as a reform movement within the Vedic tradition or stemming from an independent pre-6th century BCE ascetic tradition. He cautions against definitive historical claims about figures prior to Pārśva. He contrasts the gradual acceptance of asceticism in the Vedic tradition with the immediate emphasis on renunciation in Sramanism. The Vedic tradition balanced worldly action with renunciation, while Sramanism, rooted in the doctrine of Karman and Saṃsāra, viewed worldly obligations as potential temptations. Pande argues that Jainism represents the earliest and most authentic version of this Sramanic stream.

The Jain Ethical Framework: Jainism's emergence in the 6th century BCE involved a challenge to the absoluteness of social obligations, which were seen as linked to lower, egoistical nature. Instead, Jainism championed the obligation to follow one's spiritual nature, emphasizing the curbing of passions and the pursuit of spiritual perfection. Pande counters the objection that renouncing social obligations is unethical, arguing that ethical endeavor is about autonomously discovered regulatory principles.

The Analysis of Action (Kriya): The Jaina view affirms the soul, action, and the world. Action (Kriya) originates from the soul's innate power (virya). This spiritual power directs mental activity, which in turn causes physical motion, leading to the inflow of karmic particles that obscure the soul. This process, Yoga and Bandha, leads to Saṃsāra. Right conduct reverses this, moving from bondage to freedom. Action is seen as a complex of spiritual, mental, and physical elements with a degree of freedom. When the soul acts with passion, it accumulates matter, leading to suffering. Right action involves shedding this burden.

Rival Views Denying Action or Freedom: Pande contrasts the Jaina affirmation of action with various schools that denied it, including:

• Naturalism (Śrabhāvavāda): Nature as a non-rational, deterministic system.
• Materialism: Consciousness as epiphenomenal, action driven by pleasure/pain.
• Fatalism (e.g., Ājīvikas): Karman as a pre-determined force.
• Schools denying action's reality (e.g., Sānkhya, Advaita Vedānta): The soul being inherently inactive or the world being illusory.

He critiques these views for either denying moral responsibility or leading to self-stultification.

The Doctrine of Karman: The doctrine of Karman extends causality to the moral realm, linking good and evil deeds to happiness and unhappiness. Unlike Brahmanical systems that postulate God, Jainism (like Buddhism) attributes an inherent power to Karman to produce results. This implies the objectivity of good and evil and the creation of an unseen force connected to the agent. Jainism's distinctive materialistic interpretation of Karman involves the soul absorbing subtle karmic particles. This explanation, while criticized, is seen as plausible for linking psychic and physical processes in moral life.

Rival Views on Karman and Freedom: Pande discusses the Ājīvikas' rejection of will and freedom, turning Karman into a mystery. He then addresses the paradox of free will and determinism, noting that Jainism balances autonomy with heteronomy through the interplay of the soul and matter. The Jaina dialectic of Vyavahāra-naya (empirical viewpoint) and Niścaya-naya (ultimate viewpoint) acknowledges both bondage and liberation.

Source and Nature of Moral Knowledge: Moral knowledge stems from wisdom (dhi), not sensation, as it leads to misery. Jainism, like other Sramanic schools, views sensuous pleasure as a disvalue (dukkha). Desire and aversion depend on bodily structures and mislead the psyche. Sensuous pursuits are seen as a snare, and the rational pursuit of pleasure means ordering life to gain freedom from craving.

The Good and the Evil: The distinction between good and evil lies in restraining impulses, reason over passion, and spiritual freedom over bodily slavery. The first characteristic of moral conduct is restraint (Saṃvara), achieved through control of body, mind, and speech (Gupti), care in actions (Samiti), ten duties (Dharma), reflections (Bhāvanā), endurance (Parīṣaha), and conduct (Caritra). Beyond asceticism, Nirjarā (destruction of Karman) is pursued through external asceticism.

Ethico-Spiritual Development and Guṇasthānas: Jainism maps ethical-spiritual development into fourteen stages (Guṇasthānas), where bondage factors like false belief, lack of self-control, passion, and activity are shed. Self-control, dispassion, and freedom from psychophysical activity are key stages. The ultimate good is the spirit, and evil is the spirit's contact with matter, leading to passions, delusion, and violence. Virtues include non-violence, restraint, equanimity, and dispassion.

Morality and Spirituality: Pande argues that the distinction between morality (social behavior) and spirituality (inner life) is not tenable. Jainism extends moral rules to interactions with subhuman and superhuman beings and oneself. Moral consciousness arises from the tension between the actual and ideal self. Acting by a higher law and seeking to become higher are inseparable.

The Universal Law and Dharma: The universal law is comprehensible to reason or intuition, not mere inclination. It is self-imposed. The orthodox Mimāmsā school saw Dharma as Vedic prescription. Jainism rejects revelation, sensation, and calculation as sources of moral knowledge, grounding it in the soul's natural powers of knowledge and faith, obscured by Karman.

Jaina Metaphysics and Ethics: Jaina ethics is grounded in its metaphysics, rejecting sensuous values and common opinion. It's not an abstraction of social ethics nor theologically based. Unlike Buddhism, which has a psychological basis for ethics (dispositions of the will), Jainism sees the soul realizing its true nature. The Jaina philosophical outlook is realistic and dialectical, emphasizing being and change.

The Concept of Himsa and Ahimsā: Himsa is defined as destruction of life through Pramāda (heedlessness), with internal states like raga and dvesa also considered Himsa. Forgetting one's spiritual nature is the root of Himsa. Ahimsā is the chief vow (Mahāvrata), meaning withdrawal from all violence at mental, vocal, or physical levels. The Jaina emphasis on Ahimsā is due to the doctrine that souls are encountered everywhere. Ahimsā implies vegetarianism.

Relevance to Politics and Society: While Jaina political writings accept the principles of Arthasāstra, they emphasize the king's duty to the Jaina faith and avoiding war. The state, however, requires punitive measures. The practice of Ahimsā requires moral and spiritual education, with the ideal of equality being distributively realized in society. Pande highlights the relevance of Jaina ethics to the contemporary situation, blending concrete empirical content with the necessity of principles, and uniting phenomenology with ontology. The Jaina lay life, with its Anuvratas, serves as a practical path towards the Mahāvratas.

Lecture II: Jaina Conception of Knowledge and Reality and Its Relevance to Scientific Thought

This lecture builds upon the ethical discussion, emphasizing that Jaina ethics is based on its distinctive theories of knowledge and being. The Jaina epistemology is characterized by a realism that accepts both reason and experience as sources of valid knowledge. Perfect knowledge is seen as attainable, while actual knowledge is limited and corrigible. This blend of rationalism and empiricism makes Jaina epistemology suitable for scientific thought.

Realism vs. Idealism: Jainism defends its realism against Buddhist idealism, which arose from the perceived instability and illusionary nature of experienced objects. Buddhist thought emphasizes Pratītyasamutpāda (contingent origination) and momentariness, leading to the idea that perceived objects are not ultimately real. Pande argues that common experience, though potentially containing illusions, is regular and universally repeated, and thus a warrant for believing in external reality. He critiques the Buddhist argument of Sahopalambha (mutual dependence of knowledge and object) as fallacious.

Critique of Buddhist Idealism: Pande dissects the Buddhist arguments for idealism, particularly the Sautrāntika and Vijñānavāda schools. He refutes the idea that momentary objects cannot be known by later cognitions and that knowledge is removed from reality. He also contests the Vijñānavādin assertion that appearance implies unreality, arguing that illusions are only such due to misrepresentation.

Jaina Response to Buddhist Arguments: The Jainas reject the Buddhist notion of Pramāṇavyavasthā (separate domains for different means of knowledge) and embrace Pramāṇa-samplava (cooperation of means of knowledge). Experience and reason are seen as distinct but cooperating sources. Perception (Matijñāna) is not merely passive but an active process involving apperception and implicit judgment. Jaina perception is classified into four stages: Avagraha (general apprehension), Ihā (seeking more information), Avāya (definite determination), and Dhāraṇā (retention).

Nature of Perception and Memory: Jaina perception is seen as a direct apprehension of reality, where psychic capacities and physical senses cooperate when obscuring karma subsides. Senses are like windows for the soul's perception, not mere instruments. Memory (Smrti) is considered valid cognition, a contrast to the Buddhist view that rejects it as a source of knowledge. Jaina Pratyabhijñāna (synthetic judgment) allows for judgments of identity, similarity, and relation.

Reasoning (Tarka) and Vyāpti: Uha or reasoning is seen as crucial for establishing Vyāpti (universal concomitance), the basis of inference (Anumāna). Pande argues that Tarka establishes and reveals truth and is an independent source of knowledge, distinct from mere empirical observation. He discusses Vyāpti's forms, including Antarvyāpti (internal realization) and Bahirvyāpti (external generalization).

Jaina Logic and Scientific Thought: Jaina logic emphasizes that Vyāpti is a necessary relationship, not merely accidental. It critiques the Nyaya emphasis on Sahacarya (concurrence) and the Buddhist reliance on causality and identity alone. Jaina logicians propose Anyathānupapannatva (untenability in the absence of the sādhya) as the single necessary and sufficient characteristic for a valid inference.

The lecture concludes by reiterating that the Jaina conception of knowledge, with its dialectical approach and the doctrine of Syādvāda (manifold predication), offers a rich framework for understanding reality. Syādvāda reconciles conflicting viewpoints by recognizing the partiality of each perspective, allowing for an infinite richness of reality and an infinite progression of knowledge, where common sense and conceptual rigor work together. This philosophical ethos, with its emphasis on ananta-dharmātmakam vastu (reality having infinite attributes), is seen as a cornerstone of Jaina thought.