Last Reason For Satkaryavada

Here is a comprehensive summary of Johannes Bronkhorst's "The Last Reason for Satkāryavāda," focusing on the analysis of the fifth argument for satkāryavāda (the theory that the effect pre-exists in the cause) in Sāmkhya philosophy.

Central Thesis: Bronkhorst examines the fifth argument for satkāryavāda as presented in Sāmkhyakārikā 9, specifically the phrase karanabhāvāt sat kāryam ("Because [the cause] is a cause, the product exists"). He argues that while most surviving Sāmkhya commentaries interpret this in terms of the product being identical with the cause (interpretation 2), the original and more widely prevalent interpretation, particularly in other Indian philosophical traditions, was that the cause implies the existence of a product (interpretation 1). He further suggests that the latter interpretation is rooted in a linguistic principle called the "correspondence principle."

The Ambiguity of the Fifth Argument: The core of the article revolves around the ambiguity of the phrase karanabhāvāt sat kāryam. Bronkhorst identifies at least three possible interpretations:

1. "Because the cause] is a cause, the product exists." (Interpretation 1)
2. "Because the product) is [identical with] the cause, the product exists." (Interpretation 2)
3. "Because of the existence of the cause, the product exists." (Interpretation 3)

Divergent Interpretations in Sāmkhya Commentaries:

• Traditional Commentaries (Gaudapadabhāsya, Matharavrtti, Matharavrtti, Tattvakaumudi, etc.): These commentaries predominantly favour interpretation 2, asserting the identity between the cause and the effect. They argue that whatever the nature of the cause is, that is also the nature of the effect. This implies that the product is not distinct from its cause.
• Yuktidipikā: This significant commentary, however, adopts interpretation 1. It argues that a cause is a cause only if there is a product. For instance, a barren woman is not a cause because there is no product. The thread is a cause because there is a product (the cloth). Therefore, if there is a cause, there must be a product.
• Jaina and Buddhist Texts (Tattvasamgraha, Pañjikā, Abhayadeva's Tattvabodhavidhayini, Prabhācandra's Prameyakamalamartanda): Bronkhorst highlights that Phyllis Granoff's research shows these texts, influenced by the Buddhist Tattvasamgraha, also align with interpretation 1. They argue that for something to be a cause, there must be a product. A non-existent entity cannot be part of a causal relationship. If a seed were not a cause, it would be like "hare's horns" which are non-existent and thus cannot be causes.

The Original Interpretation and its Basis:

• Prevalence of Interpretation 1: Bronkhorst argues that interpretation 1 is more likely the original intent because it is widely found in other Indian philosophical traditions and is a common type of reasoning.
• The Correspondence Principle: He proposes that interpretation 1 is rooted in a fundamental assumption he calls the "correspondence principle." This principle posits that "the words of a sentence must correspond, one by one, to the things that constitute the situation described by that sentence."
  • Example: When we say "He produces a pot," there must be a "pot" in the situation corresponding to the word "pot." If the pot did not exist in some form (e.g., as a potentiality), there would be nothing to correspond to the word "pot" in the sentence, and therefore no production or causality.
  • Nagarjuna's Argument: Bronkhorst cites Nagarjuna's Mulasamyakārikā to illustrate this principle, where Nagarjuna argues that neither a non-existent nor an existent thing can be a cause, due to the impossibility of establishing a relationship.
  • Shankara's Argument: He also uses Shankara's commentary on the Brahmasutra to demonstrate how this principle leads to the conclusion that causality requires an agent and that the description of an event must match the actual situation.

Why the Majority Favored Interpretation 2 in Sāmkhya:

Bronkhorst speculates on why the majority of Sāmkhya commentaries shifted to interpretation 2:

• Avoiding Redundancy: The first argument in Sāmkhyakārikā 9 is asadakaranāt sat kāryam ("The product exists because one does not produce something that does not exist"). Interpretation 1 of the fifth argument would make it very similar, if not identical, to the first argument.
• Engagement with Other Schools (Vaiśeṣika): Interpretation 2 allowed Sāmkhya to engage with a significant debate initiated by the Vaiśeṣikas, particularly regarding the relationship between composite objects and their constituent parts. The Vaiśeṣikas argued that composite objects are different from their parts. By asserting that the product is identical with its cause (e.g., cloth is identical with threads), Sāmkhya could simultaneously support satkāryavāda and their own position that parts and wholes are not different.

Conclusion:

Bronkhorst concludes that while the majority of surviving Sāmkhya commentaries on the Sāmkhyakārikā explain the fifth argument for satkāryavāda as the identity of cause and effect (interpretation 2), evidence from other Indian philosophical traditions (Jainism, Buddhism, and Mādhyamika) strongly suggests that the original interpretation was that the existence of a cause implies the existence of a product (interpretation 1). This original interpretation is underpinned by the "correspondence principle," a fundamental assumption about the relationship between language and reality that influenced various Indian philosophical systems, leading to counterintuitive conclusions like satkāryavāda. The shift in Sāmkhya commentaries likely served to avoid redundancy and to engage with contemporaneous philosophical debates.