Langage Of Realite Sur Un Episode De La Pensee Indinee

Here's a comprehensive summary of Johannes Bronkhorst's "Langage de réalité sur un épisode de la pensée indienne," based on the provided text:

The book "Langage de réalité sur un épisode de la pensée indienne" by Johannes Bronkhorst explores a significant, yet often overlooked, intuition that underpinned classical Indian thought: the "principle of correspondence." This principle posits that the words in a sentence closely and accurately correspond to the things that constitute the situation described by that sentence. Bronkhorst argues that this conviction was so pervasive that it influenced, and even determined, the expressions of Brahmanical thought during a specific period.

The core of Bronkhorst's argument focuses on the first half of the first millennium CE, when this principle of correspondence reigned largely unimpeded. While a belief in a link between words and things is evident in older Vedic and post-Vedic literature, the "principle of correspondence" goes further. Earlier texts suggest an initial state where names and forms were not separate, and the attribution of names was done by ancient sages. The Veda itself was sometimes considered the source of creation.

However, the principle of correspondence became more pronounced and led to significant philosophical discussions starting in the early centuries CE. Bronkhorst highlights its impact across various Indian philosophical schools:

• Buddhism: A key development in Buddhism was the idea that phenomenal objects are not truly real and exist only by denomination. This influenced Brahmanical thinkers, particularly the Vaishēshika school, which adopted similar ideas about the nominal existence of objects.

• Nāgārjuna (Mādhyamika Buddhism): Nāgārjuna used the principle of correspondence to critique those who affirmed the reality of phenomenal objects. He pointed out its problematic consequences, such as when a sentence describes a situation where the elements do not co-exist simultaneously. For example, in the sentence "the potter makes a jug," the jug doesn't yet exist at the moment of production. Nāgārjuna used these logical challenges to support his own philosophical stance.

• Śarvāstivāda Buddhism: To address these issues, the Śarvāstivāda Buddhists proposed that past and future things exist. This allowed them to reconcile the principle of correspondence with sentences describing future events, as the future entity would already exist.

• Sāṁkhya: Bronkhorst suggests that the Sāṁkhya school introduced its doctrine of "satkāryavāda" (the effect pre-exists in the cause) as a response to the problems raised by the principle of correspondence regarding the production of things. The absence of this doctrine in earlier Sāṁkhya sources supports this view.

• Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara (Vedanta): Gauḍapāda, in the Āgamaśāstra (attributed to him and having Buddhist parallels), advocated for non-production as a solution. In contrast, Śaṅkara, a prominent Advaita Vedāntin, favored satkāryavāda, arguing that production is an activity that requires a pre-existing agent and cause.

• Jainism: Jain philosophical discussions, particularly concerning the early schismatic Jamāli, also grappled with the principle of correspondence. Jinabhadra's Vipēśkāśyaka Bhāṣya presents the orthodox Jaina position: a thing is "being made" only in its final moment of production, at which point it is already "made." This unique Jaina approach salvages the principle of correspondence by limiting the duration of "production" to a single moment.

• Early Vaishēshika: This school considered produced things as "existing" through a connection with the universal "existence" at the moment of their completion. Before this connection, things were not completely non-existent but possessed an essence that allowed them to produce themselves.

• Nyāya: The Nyāya school offered a different solution by focusing on denotation. They argued that words refer not just to the individual item being made but also to its form and the eternal universal. This ensured that there was always something existing to which the word referred, thus satisfying the principle of correspondence. Cabara of the Mīmāṁsā school appears to have accepted a similar solution.

• Bhartṛhari (Grammarian): Bhartṛhari, a philosopher of grammar, proposed multiple solutions to the problems associated with the principle of correspondence, including identifying meaning with the eternal universal, substance, or a metaphorical existence.

• Dignāga (Buddhism): Dignāga's theory of "apoha" (exclusion) marked a definitive break from the principle of correspondence. He argued that words do not refer to things but rather exclude their opposites. This fundamentally dissolved the idea of a direct correspondence between words and reality.

Bronkhorst concludes by suggesting that the principle of correspondence was more of a deeply held intuition for Indian thinkers of that era than an explicitly debated logical position. While some passages clearly articulate it, its pervasive, almost self-evident nature explains the relative scarcity of explicit discussions about it and the resistance to its abandonment. The shift away from this principle, particularly with Dignāga's apoha, fundamentally altered the landscape of Indian philosophical discourse.