Karikavali Muktavali Vivaran Part 02
Added to library: September 2, 2025

Summary
Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Karikavali Muktavali Vivaran Part 02" by Chandraguptasuri, based on the pages you've shared:
Overall Context:
This text is a commentary (Vivaran) on the "Karikavali Muktavali," a work likely dealing with logic, epistemology (pramana), and metaphysics within the Jain philosophical tradition. The commentary is by Muni Chandraguptavijay, a disciple of Acharya Amaraguptasurishvarji. The text focuses on explaining and elaborating on the concepts presented in the original work, often engaging with different philosophical viewpoints, particularly those of the Mimamsakas and Naiyayikas.
Key Concepts and Sections Covered:
The provided pages primarily cover the Anumana (Inference) and Upamana (Analogy) chapters, as well as sections on Shabdapramana (Testimony), Lakshana (Definition/Figurative Meaning), and Mana (Mind).
1. Anumana (Inference):
- Nature of Inference: The text delves into the core components of inference.
- Karana (Instrument/Cause): Vyapti-jnana (knowledge of invariable concomitance) is identified as the karana or the direct cause.
- Vyapara (Process/Activity): Paramarsha (inferential cognition) is described as the vyapara, the process through which inference occurs. The commentary explains this by detailing how someone who has grasped the concomitance between smoke and fire might later see smoke on a mountain, recall the concomitance, and then infer the presence of fire.
- Critique of Previous Views: The commentary refutes the view that the linga (middle term, e.g., smoke) itself is the karana. It argues that if the linga were the cause, then inferences based on future or past lingas would be impossible due to their absence.
- Paramarsha as the Core of Inference: The discussion elaborates on what constitutes paramarsha, defining it as the knowledge of the vyapya (the pervaded, e.g., smoke) residing in the paksha (the subject of inference, e.g., mountain). This knowledge can be in the form of "the paksha has the vyapya" or "the paksha is pervaded by the vyapya."
- Debates on the Nature of Causation: There's a detailed discussion and refutation of the Mimamsaka view that knowledge of the vyapyatavacchhedaka-prakaraka-pakshadharmata (knowledge of the minor term having the characteristic of the pervading term in the subject) is the cause. The commentator argues for the sufficiency and superiority of simpler explanations based on vyapti-prakaraka-pakshadharmata-jnana (knowledge of the concomitance-qualified minor term in the subject), highlighting issues like infinite causal chains and complexity in the Mimamsaka position.
- Vyapti (Invariable Concomitance): The text provides a precise definition of vyapti: "non-residence in that which is devoid of the sadhya (major term)." It further refines this by discussing necessary qualifications like the relation, the qualifier of the predicate, and avoiding over-extension (ativyapti) and under-extension (avyapti). Various complex formulations of the definition are analyzed to ensure accuracy and avoid logical fallacies.
- Hetvabhasas (Fallacies of Inference): The text systematically introduces and defines the five hetvabhasas:
- Anaikantika (Indeterminate): Further divided into Sadharana (common to both the paksha and vipaksha), Asadharana (residing only in the paksha, but not in the vipaksha, and often failing to establish concomitance), and Anupasamhari (inconclusive, not covering all instances). The commentary debates the precise definitions, especially for asadharana and anupasamhari.
- Viruddha (Contradictory): A reason that establishes the opposite of what is intended.
- Asiddha (Unestablished): A reason that is itself unproven or fallacious in its premise. This is further broken down into AshrayAsiddhi (the locus is unestablished), SwarupAsiddhi (the essential nature of the reason is unestablished), and Vyapyatvasiddhi (the concomitance is unestablished).
- Satpratipaksha (Counteracted by a stronger reason): Where another reason proving the opposite of the sadhya is available.
- Badhita (Refuted): Where the existence of the sadhya is directly contradicted by a known fact or pramana.
2. Upamana (Analogy):
- Process of Analogy: The text explains Upamana as the process of knowing something unknown through its similarity to something known.
- Karana: The direct cause is the perception of similarity (sadrisya-dhi). Vyapara: The recollection of the statement of analogy (e.g., "Gavay is like a cow") serves as the vyapara.
- Phala: The ultimate result is the knowledge of the meaning of the word for the unknown object (upamana-phala or shakti-dhi of the word Gavay).
3. Shabda Pramana (Testimony):
- Nature of Verbal Testimony: The text explains the process of understanding meaning from words.
- Karana: Knowledge of the word (pada-jnana).
- Vyapara: The recollection of the meaning of the word (padartha-jnana or padartha-smriti).
- Phala: The resulting verbal understanding (shabdabodha).
- Role of Shaktigraha (Understanding of Word-Meaning Convention): The commentary emphasizes the crucial role of understanding the convention or "power" (shakti) associating a word with its meaning. It discusses various ways shaktigraha is acquired: through grammar, analogy, dictionaries, reliable statements (aptavakya), usage, analysis of sentence parts (vakya-shesha), explanatory statements (vivarana), and proximity to well-known words.
- Debates on Shaktigraha: There's a discussion about whether shakti resides in the genus (jati) or the individual instance (vyakti), ultimately favoring the view that shakti relates to the genus qualified by specific characteristics of the individual.
4. Lakshana (Definition/Figurative Meaning):
- Necessity of Lakshana: The text explains that lakshana (figurative meaning) is employed when the literal meaning (shakyartha) cannot be applied due to impossibility of application (anvayAnupapatti) or contradiction of intention (tatparyanupapatti).
- Types of Lakshana:
- Jahatsvartha: Where the literal meaning is abandoned (e.g., "Ganga" referring to the riverbank, not the river itself).
- Ajahatsvartha: Where the literal meaning is retained in conjunction with the figurative meaning (e.g., "Chhatrino Yanti" - those with umbrellas go, implying the group of people led by those with umbrellas).
- Application in Samasas (Compound Words): The text extensively discusses how lakshana is applied in different types of compound words (Bahuvrihi, Tatpurusha, Karmadharaya, Dvanda) to explain the meaning, often highlighting the intention of the speaker (tatprakaha) as a guiding factor.
5. Mana (Mind):
- Mind as the Instrument of Direct Perception: The mind (manas) is presented as the instrument (karana) for the direct perception of internal states like happiness and sorrow.
- The Minutiae of Mind: The text argues that the mind is atomic (anu) rather than all-pervading (vibhu) based on the inability of multiple senses to simultaneously produce knowledge even when in contact with their objects. The atomic nature explains the sequential perception of different sensory inputs.
Key Methodological Aspects:
- Commentary Style: The text follows a pattern of presenting the original Karikavali verse, followed by the Muktavali explanation, and then the detailed commentary (Vivaran) by Chandraguptavijay.
- Engagement with Opposing Views: The commentator frequently addresses and refutes the views of other schools of thought, particularly Mimamsa, to establish the validity of the Jain perspective.
- Logical Rigor: The explanations are marked by logical arguments, analyses of definitions, and the identification of potential fallacies (hetvabhasas, ativyapti, avyapti).
- Emphasis on Clarity: The commentator strives to clarify complex concepts, sometimes pointing out ambiguities in the original text or suggesting alternative interpretations based on logical inference.
In essence, this part of the "Karikavali Muktavali Vivaran" is a rigorous exposition of key concepts in Jain epistemology and logic, meticulously explaining the nature of inference, analogy, testimony, definitions, and the internal sense organ (mind), while engaging in critical analysis of various philosophical positions.