Karan Aur Karyaling

Added to library: September 2, 2025

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First page of Karan Aur Karyaling

Summary

Here is a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Karan aur Karyaling" by Sukhlal Sanghavi, in English:

Book Title: Karan aur Karyaling (Cause and Effect Signifier) Author: Sukhlal Sanghavi Publisher: Z_Darshan_aur_Chintan_Part_1_2_002661.pdf Catalog Link: https://jainqq.org/explore/229037/1

This excerpt from Sukhlal Sanghavi's work delves into a fundamental debate within Indian logic concerning the nature and validity of inference, specifically focusing on the distinction between inferring from a cause (Karanling) and inferring from an effect (Karyaling).

Core Debate: Cause-based vs. Effect-based Inference

  • Karyaling (Effect-based Inference): The text begins by stating that all schools of thought universally accept inference based on an effect. This means inferring the presence of a cause from its observable effect.
  • Karanling (Cause-based Inference): However, there is significant disagreement on the validity of inference based on a cause. The Buddhist logicians, particularly Dharmakirti, are highlighted as staunch opponents of cause-based inference. In contrast, the Vaigeshika and Nyaya schools have always accepted it from the beginning.

Jain Stance and आचार्य हेमचन्द्र (Acharya Hemchandra)

  • The Jain tradition, like the Vaigeshika and Nyaya schools, has consistently advocated for cause-based inference. The renowned Jain logician Acharya Hemchandra is presented as a strong proponent of this view.
  • Acharya Hemchandra, while refuting Dharmakirti's stance, shows great respect for him, as evidenced by his use of the phrase "Sudamdarshinapi" (even to the subtle observer).

Disagreement on Examples of Effect-based Inference

Even where there is agreement on the principle of effect-based inference, specific examples can be contentious.

  • The Example of a Living Body Inferring the Soul: The inference "A living body is ensouled, because it possesses life and other vital functions (Pranaadi)" is rejected by Buddhist logicians, who deem it a fallacious inference and classify the 'Pranaadi' (life force) as a type of fallacious reason (Hetvabhas).
  • The Underlying Reason for Disagreement: The core of this disagreement stems from the fundamental metaphysical differences between Buddhist and other Indian philosophical schools. Buddhists do not believe in a permanent, distinct soul (Atman) residing in the body. Therefore, they cannot accept the inference of a soul based on bodily functions, as other schools (Vaigeshika, Nyaya, Jain) do. These latter schools, being "Atmavadi" (soul-affirming), consider the inference of a soul from life-functions to be valid.

The Importance of "Anvay" (Inclusion/Affirmation) and "Vyatirek" (Exclusion/Negation) in Jain Logic

The text then elaborates on the technical aspects of logical inference, specifically the concepts of Anvay (the presence of the middle term in the positive instance) and Vyatirek (the absence of the middle term in the negative instance).

  • Rejection of "Anvay" as Essential: The Jain tradition, as explained, argues that the principle of Anvay (the middle term being present in the positive instance, known as "Sapakshavrittitva") is not an indispensable characteristic of a valid reason (Sadhetu). This is crucial for soul-affirming philosophies.
  • Emphasis on "Vyatirek": Instead, Jain logic emphasizes Vyatirek (the absence of the middle term in the negative instance, or "Vipakshavyavritti"). They consider reasons that possess only Vyatirek (and lack Anvay) to be capable of producing valid inference. This is how they justify the inference of the soul from life-functions.
  • Acharya Hemchandra's Argument: Acharya Hemchandra supports this view and argues that Anvay is not a necessary characteristic of a valid reason. He refutes Dharmakirti's notion of "Anvayasandeh" (doubt about the presence of Anvay) as a cause for fallacious reasoning (Anekantik).
  • Dharmakirti's View and Hemchandra's Interpretation: Hemchandra asserts that the absence of Vyatirek alone should be considered the cause of both "Viruddha" (contradictory) and "Anekantika" (inconclusive) fallacies. He notes that Dharmakirti, in his "Nyayabindu," also considers doubt about Anvay to be a cause of Anekantika. Hemchandra disputes this, stating that Dharmakirti's writings do not explicitly link the absence of Vyatirek to both types of Anekantika. The text then attempts to interpret Hemchandra's potentially contradictory statement by suggesting that when Nyaya logicians speak of two types of fallacies, they might implicitly consider the absence of Vyatirek as the primary cause, not doubt about Anvay.

Buddhist Justification for "Anvay"

The text clarifies the Buddhist logicians' rationale for demanding Anvay.

  • Interdependence of Anvay and Vyatirek: Buddhist logicians argue that Vyatirek (exclusion) is only possible if Anvay (inclusion) is present. They believe that Anvay necessarily implies Vyatirek, whether it's observed in an existing entity or not. Without Anvay, Vyatirek is not possible.
  • Equal Weightage: Although Anvay and Vyatirek are interdependent, Buddhist logicians attribute equal importance to both in the definition of a reason.

Jain Perspective on "Anvay" and "Vyatirek"

The Jain tradition holds a different view.

  • Vyatirek as the Primary Characteristic: For Jain logicians, Vyatirek (the absence of the middle term in the negative instance, also termed "Anyathanupapatti" or "inconceivability otherwise") is the primary characteristic of a valid reason.
  • Anvay as Merely a Name: They view Anvay as simply another name for the same principle of Vyatirek.
  • Acharya Hemchandra's Conclusion: Following this principle, Acharya Hemchandra concludes that if "Sapakshavrittitva" (presence in the positive instance) is called Anvay, then it is essentially the same as the Vyatirek ("Anyathanupapatti") that the Jain tradition advocates.

Summary of the Philosophical Divide

In essence, the Buddhist logicians divide the reality of logical inference into two interdependent aspects, Anvay and Vyatirek, and incorporate both into their definition of a valid reason. The Jain logicians, on the other hand, accept this same underlying reality but focus solely on Vyatirek (or Anyathanupapatti), considering the "positive" aspect (Anvay) to be implicitly covered and not requiring separate emphasis.