Jayarasi Criticism Of Verbal Testimony

Here is a comprehensive summary in English of the provided Jain text, "Jayarasi's Criticism of Verbal Testimony":

This article, authored by J. M. Shukla, delves into the critical analysis of verbal testimony (śabdapramāna) by Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, a significant philosopher of the Lokāyata tradition who lived in the early eighth century CE. Jayarāśi's seminal work, Tattvopaplavasimha, is highlighted as a unique text, offering a distinct perspective, particularly in its rigorous refutation of established philosophical concepts.

The author notes that Jayarāśi, likely a Brahmin, displayed strong critical language towards Buddhists and Jains, and even Brahmins, especially the Naiyāyikas. This aggressive rhetorical style is contextualized within the broader Indian philosophical landscape, where debates between Mimāṁsakas and Buddhists, and later between Mimāṁsakas and Naiyāyikas, were characterized by sharp exchanges. The article traces the evolution of philosophical argumentation in ancient India, categorizing it into four traditions: those that summarize previous views, those that logically refute opposing arguments, those that subtly twist and then refute, and finally, those, like Jayarāśi, that diligently collect and refute arguments using various devices.

Jayarāśi is presented as a master dialectician who employed a method of exhaustively outlining all possible alternatives related to a problem and then demonstrating the inherent absurdities in each. He operated with a form of philosophical skepticism, neither asserting nor denying anything definitively but rather dissecting and refuting the tenets of others, finding them to be self-contradictory, meaningless, or untrue. He famously stated that "all principles being upset, all the propositions will be charming so long as they are not investigated into." Notably, Jayarāśi is presented as a radical Carvaka, going beyond the traditional acceptance of perception as a means of knowledge or the four material elements, rejecting them as having ultimate validity.

The core of the article focuses on Jayarāśi's five-point critique of verbal testimony:

1. No Relation Between Words and Meaning: Jayarāśi argues that words cannot express meaning because there is no inherent or universally accepted relation between them. He dismisses claims of relation based on identity, causality, convention, or naturalness, finding fault with each proposed connection. This leads him to conclude that words, whether from common people, trusted individuals, or ancient texts, lack validity.
2. Invalidity of Trustworthy Sources: Even if words are uttered by an authoritative or infallible person, Jayarāśi contends that this does not automatically validate their testimony. He questions how such authority is established and argues that even "authentic" statements can be misunderstood due to auxiliary causes, individual limitations, or malicious intent.
3. Critique of Vedic Authority: Jayarāśi challenges the Mimāṁsaka view that the Vedas are authoritative because they are not composed by any human agency and are eternal. He argues that the absence of a remembered creator does not prove eternality, citing examples of forgotten builders of wells and shelters. He also contends that even if the Vedas were unauthored, the potential for errors in their transmission or interpretation renders them unreliable.
4. Words Fulfill Speaker's Desire: Jayarāśi briefly refutes the idea that words are valid because they fulfill a speaker's desire to communicate. He reiterates his rejection of a causal relationship between words and the speaker's intention.
5. Critique of Grammatical Correctness: Jayarāśi challenges the grammarians' assertion that meaning is derived solely from grammatically correct words. He questions the nature of words – whether they are individual syllables or an abstract concept like sphota. He dismantles arguments for the eternality and unity of syllables and groups of syllables, arguing that even if a single syllable were to carry meaning, the grammatical concept of inflection would be rendered meaningless. He further criticizes the idea of sphota, the "word essence," as lacking a valid basis for conveying meaning.

The article concludes by examining Jayarāśi's defense of "corrupt" words (apabhraṁśa), asserting that they also convey meaning effectively and without distortion, citing Patañjali's view that both correct and corrupt words express the same meaning, with restrictions on the former primarily occurring in ritualistic contexts. Jayarāśi's overall approach is characterized by a relentless deconstruction of established epistemological frameworks, particularly the validity of verbal testimony. The author notes that while some of Jayarāśi's arguments might seem weak or confused, his primary targets were the Mimāṁsakas and Naiyāyikas, with his discussion of grammar and sphota being more of an incidental engagement.