Jainmatanusar Abhav Pramey Mimansa - Book Summary

Here is a comprehensive summary in English of the Jain text "Jainmatanusar Abhav Pramey Mimansa" by Sadhvi Nirmalashreeji:

This text, "Jainmatanusar Abhav Pramey Mimansa" (An Inquiry into the Concept of Non-Being according to Jainism), authored by Sadhvi Nirmalashreeji, delves into the Jain philosophical understanding of non-being (Avastha) as a fundamental category of reality (Prameya).

The central argument presented is that all things possess a dual nature: they are both existent (Svat) in their own essence and non-existent (Asat) in their relation to other things. This concept is crucial for understanding the identity and distinctness of any object.

The Necessity of Non-Being for Knowledge:

Distinction and Identification: The text begins by explaining that the knowledge of any object, like a pot, is achieved through its differentiation from similar (Sajatiya) and dissimilar (Vijatiya) things. Without this process of exclusion (Vyavritti), the definite form of the pot cannot be grasped.
The "Sad-Asat" Nature: Therefore, every substance is described as "Sad-Asat" (existent and non-existent). The "Sad" aspect is called "Bhava" (existence, affirmation, or positive aspect), and the "Asat" aspect is called "Pratishedha" (non-existence, negation, or negative aspect).
Consequences of Ignoring Non-Being:
- If an object were considered solely "Bhava" (existent) and not "Asat" in relation to other things, its true nature would remain unknown.
- Conversely, if an object were considered entirely "Asat" (non-existent), its very existence would be disproven.
The Jain Position: The Jain doctrine asserts that an object is existent in its own nature ("Sva-swaroopa") and non-existent in the nature of others ("Para-swaroopa"). This is supported by Acharya Hemchandra's quote in his Pramana Mimansa: "Everything exists in its own form, and does not exist in the form of others. Otherwise, everything would be everything, and even one's own form would be impossible."

Critique of Alternative Philosophies:

The text then addresses and refutes alternative philosophical viewpoints on non-being, particularly concerning the concept of "Anyonyabhav" (mutual non-existence or difference).

Nyaya-Vaisheshika View: The Nyaya-Vaisheshika school posits "Anyonyabhav" as a distinct, independent category that causes the difference between two objects. They believe that where a pot does not exist, it is identified as a pot. The text challenges this by arguing that if the "Anyonyabhav" of a pot from a cloth (Pat) is considered separate, then the cloth should also be identifiable as a pot because it is distinct from the "non-existence of a pot." This leads to the conclusion that the cloth should also be considered a pot, which is illogical.
The Problem of Independent Difference: If "Anyonyabhav" is an independent entity, it would necessitate a chain of dependencies (e.g., for A's difference from B, we need the difference of B from C, and so on), leading to an infinite regress (Anavastha) and making the existence of "Anyonyabhav" itself impossible.
Difference as an Attribute of Being: The text further explores if "Anyonyabhav" is an attribute of a positive entity (Bhava). If it's an attribute of a pot, is it a negation of the pot's own nature, or a negation in relation to something else (like the ground)?
- If "Anyonyabhav" negates the pot within the pot itself, it would nullify the pot's existence, making it impossible for "Anyonyabhav" to be an attribute of the pot.
- If "Anyonyabhav" negates the pot in relation to the ground, this aligns with the Jain view that non-existence (Avastha) is an attribute of the entity itself that denies the presence of another.
The Jain Solution: The Jain perspective avoids these problems by stating that non-being (Avastha) is an aspect of the object itself. The non-existence of a pot on the ground is understood as the pot's own inherent characteristic of not being on that specific ground, rather than a separate entity of non-existence.

The Four Types of Non-Being in Jainism:

The text then outlines the four types of non-being recognized in Jain philosophy, contrasting them with other schools:

Pragabhava (Antecedent Non-existence): This is the non-existence of a thing before its origination. For example, the clay from which a pot is made is the pragabhava of the pot. This is understood as the previous state or modification (Paryaya) of the substance. The text emphasizes that it is not the substance itself that originates, but its modification. Without pragabhava, a thing would be considered eternal.
Dhvamsabhava (Subsequent Non-existence): This is the non-existence of a thing after its destruction. For example, the pot's destruction, which leads to its constituent particles (Kapala), is the dhvamsabhava of the pot. This is also understood as the subsequent modification of the substance. If dhvamsabhava is denied, then things would be considered infinite, and all their modifications would exist simultaneously, which is contrary to experience. The text clarifies that the destruction of the pot is the formation of its constituent particles; the destruction of the pragabhava (previous modification) leads to the dhvamsabhava (subsequent modification). The destruction of a modification is irreversible; once a modification passes, it is gone forever.
Anyonyabhava (Mutual Non-existence / Difference): This refers to the difference between two distinct entities. For instance, a pot is not a cloth, and a cloth is not a pot. This is the non-existence of one thing in the form of another, at the present time. This is crucial for maintaining the unique identity of each modification. Without anyonyabhava, every modification would become all-encompassing.
Atyantabhava (Absolute Non-existence): This is the absolute and eternal non-existence of one thing in another, across all three times (past, present, future). For example, consciousness (Jñana) can never become matter (Pudgala). If atyantabhava were not accepted, then even inanimate things could acquire consciousness. This absolute non-existence preserves the unique and undivided nature of each substance.

The Role of Non-Being (Avastha) in Jainism:

Jainism posits that non-being is not a separate, independent entity but rather an aspect or part of the substance itself that denies the presence of another.
This understanding is essential for the establishment of definite and distinct realities in the world. Without acknowledging the "Asat" aspect, the identity of any object would be lost.

The Epistemology of Non-Being:

The text briefly touches upon how non-being is known:

Other Philosophies:
- Mimamsakas (Kumarila): Knowledge of non-being through "Anupalabdhi" (non-cognition).
- Buddhists: Non-being is inferred through various forms of non-cognition.
- Vedantins: Similar to Mimamsakas, they accept a separate category of non-cognition.
- Naiyayikas & Samkhyas: Knowledge of non-being through direct perception (Pratyaksha), though with different explanations.
Jain Perspective: According to Jainism, non-being is apprehended through direct perception (Pratyaksha), as stated by Vadi Deva Suri in the Syadvada Ratnakara.

In conclusion, "Jainmatanusar Abhav Pramey Mimansa" firmly establishes that non-being (Avastha) is not a void but a fundamental aspect of reality in Jainism. It is indispensable for understanding the distinct identity, classification, and the very possibility of knowledge about the world. The Jain conception of "Sad-Asat" explains how things can be real in their own essence while simultaneously being non-real in relation to others, thereby resolving philosophical paradoxes and providing a coherent framework for understanding existence.