Jaina Theory Of Paroksha Jnana - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided text on the Jaina theory of Paroksha Jnana (mediate knowledge) by Gour Hajra:

The book "Jaina Theory of Paroksha Jnana" by Gour Hajra, published by the USA Federation of JAINA, delves into the Jaina understanding of mediate knowledge, contrasting it with other Indian philosophical schools.

The Distinction Between Pratyaksha and Paroksha:

Early Jaina View: The text begins by highlighting the foundational Jaina distinction between pratyaksha (immediate knowledge) and paroksha (mediate knowledge). Early Jaina philosophers, like Umāsvāti, defined pratyaksha as knowledge that depends solely on the ātman (self). In contrast, paroksha knowledge was considered to be that which relies on the sense organs and the manas (mind), although the ātman's instrumentality is still acknowledged.
Contrast with Other Schools: This Jaina definition was a significant departure from other Indian philosophical schools. Most other traditions held that knowledge derived through sense organs was pratyaksha (immediate), while other sources led to only mediate knowledge.
Later Jaina Evolution: The text notes an evolution within Jaina canons. Later Jaina philosophers came to accept sensory knowledge as a form of pratyaksha, influenced by the general Indian philosophical tendency. In this later view, sensory knowledge could be considered direct in a practical or secondary sense.
Definition of Paroksha: According to later Jaina logicians, paroksha knowledge is defined as that which is not clear or indistinct (avisadam paroksham), lacking perceptual vividness and depending on external factors.

The Five Types of Paroksha Jnana:

The book then details the five types of paroksha knowledge as classified by the Jaina logician Akalarka:

Smṛti (Memory):
- Definition: Memory is the knowledge of a past-perceived object, revived through the disposition (saṁskāra) of the self. The remembered object must have been known previously.
- Jaina Stance: Jainas consider memory a valid pramāṇa (means of knowledge). They argue that saṁskāras recall past experiences for specific purposes, and this memory is a true fact (saṁvādin), just like perception. This is a point of departure from many other schools, which often viewed memory as dependent on prior valid knowledge and therefore not an independent pramāṇa.
- Argument Against Dependency: Jainas counter the argument that memory's validity is undermined by its dependence on earlier experience, stating that even inference (anumāna) depends on prior perception.
Pratyabhijñā (Recognition):
- Definition: Recognition is a synthetic cognition resulting from experience and recollection, identifying similarities. It apprehends objects in forms like "this is that," "this is like that," or "this is different from that." It establishes relations, identity, similarity, dissimilarity, and correlations between present perceived objects and previously remembered ones.
- Jaina Stance: Jainas, along with Vedic philosophers, treat recognition as a valid pramāṇa. This contrasts with Buddhist tradition, which denies its validity due to their belief in the constant flux of things, asserting that "Devadatta today is not the same Devadatta as yesterday."
- "Change in Permanence": Jaina philosophers support recognition based on their doctrine of "change in permanence," where an object undergoes partial change but retains its identity, making recognition possible.
Tarka (Inductive Reasoning):
- Definition: Inductive reasoning is the knowledge of universal concomitance between a probandum and a probans, arising from observing their co-presence and co-absence across time.
- Jaina Stance: Akalarka first provided a logical definition of reasoning and established it as an independent organ of knowledge for grasping universal concomitance.
- Opposition: Other schools like Mimāṁsakas and Buddhists did not accept tarka as a separate pramāṇa. Naiyāyikas believed it only helped remove doubts about concomitance, not providing independent knowledge.
- Jaina Justification: Jainas argue that concomitance cannot be known without reasoning, making tarka essential and independent.
Anumāna (Inference):
- Definition: Anumāna is cognition that follows another cognition, particularly perception. It involves knowing an unperceived object through the perception of a sign (hetu) and the recollection of its invariable concomitance (vyāpti) with that object.
- Jaina View: Jainas, influenced by Vedic thinkers, define anumāna as the cognition of the probandum (sādhya) produced by the probans (sādhana) after the apprehension of the sign (liṅga-grahaṇa) and recollection of concomitance (vyāpti-smaraṇa).
- Types of Anumāna:
  - Svārthānumāna (inference for oneself): Knowledge of the probandum ascertained by oneself, based on its necessary concomitance with the probans. Its organs are sādhya, sādhana, and pakṣa.
  - Parārthānumāna (inference for others/syllogistic inference): Knowledge of the probandum derived from a statement of the probans having necessary concomitance.
- Syllogism: The text discusses varying views on syllogistic structure: Sankhya and Buddhists (3 parts: thesis, reason, example); Mimāṁsakas (4 parts, adding application); Naiyāyikas (5 parts, adding conclusion). Jainas consider thesis and reason sufficient for intelligent persons but accept a ten-limbed syllogism for less intelligent individuals, going beyond the Nyāya framework.
- Valid Hetu: Jainas criticize the Buddhist and Naiyāyika views on the characteristics of a valid hetu, asserting that only anyathānupapannatva (non-alternation), also called avinābhāva or vyāpti, is the essential characteristic.
Āgama (Verbal Testimony):
- Definition: Āgama is knowledge derived from the words of a reliable person (Āpta). An Āpta is someone who knows an object as it is, is free from attachment and aversion, and whose words are truthful and in harmony with reality.
- Jaina Stance: Jainas consider their prophets as Āptas, thus accepting Āgamas (scriptural testimony) as an independent pramāṇa. They extend the definition of Āpta to include any authority on a subject, secular or spiritual.
- Independent Pramāṇa: All Indian philosophers except Cārvākas recognize it as a valid source of knowledge. However, a debate exists whether it is independent or a form of inference. Jainas argue it's independent because it doesn't require perceived signs or their concomitance, unlike inference.
- Types of Agama: Jaina logicians classify it into Secular (Laukika) and Non-Secular (Lokottara) testimony.

Conclusion:

The book concludes by summarizing the key points:

Early Jaina literature divided knowledge into pratyaksha and paroksha with specific meanings.
Later Jaina logicians, while maintaining this division, expanded the understanding. Pratyaksha was further categorized, and paroksha encompassed the five types: Smṛti, Pratyabhijñā, Tarka, Anumāna, and Āgama.
The novelty of Jainism lies in its unanimous acceptance of Smṛti and Tarka as independent pramāņas, a stance distinct from many other Indian philosophical schools like the Naiyāyikas.