Jaina Theory Of Knowledge

Here's a comprehensive summary of Dr. Mohanlal Mehta's "Jaina Theory of Knowledge," based on the provided text:

Overview:

"Jaina Theory of Knowledge" by Dr. Mohanlal Mehta, published by Gujarat Vidyapith, Ahmedabad, is a foundational text that meticulously outlines the Jaina epistemological framework. The book, an output of the International Centre for Jaina Studies, aims to provide an authentic and detailed exposition of how Jainism understands the nature and acquisition of knowledge. It emphasizes that knowledge is the essence of the soul and explores its various forms and processes.

Core Concepts:

The book's central thesis revolves around the Jaina understanding of knowledge as an attribute of the soul (Upayoga). The soul is inherently conscious and possesses infinite apprehension and comprehension, which are obscured by karmas in worldly existence but fully realized in liberation.

The primary division within Jaina epistemology is between Apprehension (Darśana) and Comprehension (Jñāna).

Chapter I: Jaina Theory of Apprehension

• Consciousness as the Essential Attribute of Soul: The text argues against the Vaisheshika and Nyaya views that consciousness is an adventitious quality. Jainism asserts that consciousness is the fundamental and inseparable attribute of the soul. Without this inherent consciousness, the soul's existence and experience would be inexplicable.
• Differentiation of Apprehension and Comprehension:
  • Apprehension (Darśana) is described as indeterminate, indefinite, indistinct, or detail-less knowledge (nirākāra upayoga). It is a general awareness of an object, grasping its existence rather than its specific attributes. It is considered the primitive stage of cognition.
  • Comprehension (Jñāna) is described as determinate, definite, distinct, or detailed knowledge (sākāra upayoga). It grasps the object with its specific individual attributes.
• Views on Indeterminate Cognition: The book surveys various Indian philosophical schools' perspectives on indeterminate cognition, including Buddhist, Sankhya, Vaisheshika, Nyaya, Mimamsa, and Vedanta, highlighting similarities and differences with the Jaina view.
• Jaina Concept of Indeterminate Cognition: The Jaina perspective, particularly the prevalent one, states that indeterminate cognition apprehends merely the existence (sattā mātra) of an object, not its other attributes. This is likened to pure sensation. However, there are differing interpretations:
  • Some Jaina thinkers, like Virasena and Brahmadeva, view apprehension as the introspection of the self or the cognition of general qualities, while comprehension is the observation of external objects or the cognition of specific qualities.
  • Others, like Vadideva, align with the view that apprehension apprehends only the unqualified being, similar to the Sankaraite position.
  • Hemachandra presents a realistic account where apprehension is the initial stage that gets transformed into comprehension, grasping the object as "this" rather than "like this" or "unlike this."
• Temporal Relation between Apprehension and Comprehension: A significant discussion within this chapter is the temporal relationship between apprehension and comprehension, especially concerning the omniscient being.
  • For imperfect beings: Apprehension and comprehension occur successively, never simultaneously.
  • For perfect beings (omniscient): There are three views:
    1. Simultaneity: Apprehension and comprehension occur simultaneously (e.g., Umasvati, Kundakunda, Pujyapada, Akalanka, Vidyananda).
    2. Succession: They occur successively (e.g., Jinabhadra).
    3. Identity: They are identical (e.g., Siddhasena). Siddhasena argues that in omniscience, the distinction between determinate and indeterminate knowledge dissolves, and both apprehension and comprehension are indistinguishable.
  • The text concludes by attempting to reconcile these views, suggesting that the differences might stem from empirical, analytic, and synthetic standpoints.

Chapter II: Jaina Theory of Comprehension

This chapter delves into the various types and stages of determinate knowledge (Comprehension).

• Sensory and Extra-Sensory Comprehension: Comprehension is broadly categorized into sensory (conditioned by senses and mind) and extra-sensory (direct cognition from the soul).
• Non-Verbal Comprehension (Mati-jñāna): This is the comprehension derived from sensory and mental faculties. It is further broken down into stages:
  • Sensation (Avagraha): The implicit awareness of objects by the senses. There's a debate on whether it's indeterminate (apprehension) or determinate (comprehension). The more accepted view is that it's the first stage of comprehension, following apprehension, and involves a determinate cognition of the object's distinctive nature.
  • Speculation (Ihā): The stage of inquiry that follows sensation, striving for a more distinct awareness of the object's specific characters, approximating the truth.
  • Perception (Avāya): The stage where the inquiry from speculation is completed, leading to the ascertainment of the right and exclusion of the wrong. It is a determinate cognition of specific features.
  • Retention (Dhāraṇā): The process of retaining the judgment made in perception, either as an absence of lapse or as a condition for future recollection. It involves consolidating the perceived information.
  • Recollection (Smaraṇa): The retrieval of past experiences, stimulated by latent mental traces and aided by internal and external conditions.
  • Recognition (Pratyabhijñā): A synthetic judgment that combines perception and recollection, leading to judgments of identity, similarity, or dissimilarity.
  • Reasoning (Anumāna): The process of drawing new conclusions from given judgments (premises). It can be inductive (particular to general) or deductive (general to particular).
• Verbal Comprehension (Śruta-jñāna): Knowledge derived from words of trustworthy persons, including scriptures. It is necessarily preceded by non-verbal comprehension and is fundamentally based on verbal assertion and its understanding.
• Extra-Sensory Perception: These are types of knowledge independent of the senses and mind, transcending time and space.
  • Clairvoyance (Avadhi-jñāna): Limited direct perception of objects with form (shape, color, etc.) over a certain range of space and time. Its scope and durability vary.
  • Telepathy (Manahparyaya-jñāna): Direct cognition of the mental states (thoughts) of others. It's generally understood to be limited to human beings and requires strict mental and physical discipline. There's a debate on whether it perceives external objects directly or inferentially.
  • Omniscience (Kevala-jñāna): Perfect, complete, and direct knowledge of all substances and their modes, past, present, and future. It is the ultimate realization of the soul's inherent cognitive capacity, achieved upon the complete annihilation of obscuring karmas.

Conclusion:

Dr. Mehta's "Jaina Theory of Knowledge" provides a thorough and scholarly exploration of the Jaina epistemological system. It systematically presents the foundational concepts of apprehension and comprehension, detailing their various forms and the intricate processes involved in acquiring knowledge, from basic sensation to ultimate omniscience. The book also engages with debates within Jaina philosophy, particularly regarding the temporal relationship between apprehension and comprehension, offering nuanced analyses of different viewpoints. It serves as a crucial resource for understanding the sophisticated Jaina approach to epistemology.