Jaina Theories Of Reality And Knowledge

Here's a comprehensive summary of Y. J. Padmarajiah's "A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge," based on the provided text:

Overview:

"A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge" by Y. J. Padmarajiah is a detailed philosophical thesis, originally submitted for a D. Phil. degree at Oxford University in 1954. Published posthumously, it offers a rigorous analysis of Jaina ontology (the nature of reality) and epistemology (the nature of knowledge) in comparison with other major Indian philosophical systems, as well as relevant Western philosophical theories. The author's aim is to present Jainism not as a dogmatic or isolated system, but as a sophisticated philosophical framework with profound insights into the fundamental questions of existence and cognition. The work is noted for its thorough knowledge of original Jaina texts and its ability to engage with modern philosophical ideas.

Part I: Ontology (The Nature of Reality)

The first part of the book delves into the Jaina understanding of reality, proposing that a balanced view requires the co-existence and co-ordination of both identity (abheda) and difference (bheda).

• Five Approaches to Reality: Padmarajiah outlines five primary philosophical approaches to reality:

  1. Philosophy of Identity (Being): Exemplified by Advaita Vedanta, this view posits reality as pure, undifferentiated identity, often viewing the world of difference as illusory (māyā).
  2. Philosophy of Difference (Becoming/Change): Represented by Buddhism, this perspective emphasizes total impermanence and sees reality as a flux of momentary entities, denying any enduring substance.
  3. Identity Subordinating Difference: Systems like Sānkhya, Bhedābheda schools (Bhartṛprapañca, Bhāskara, Yādavaprakāśa, Nimbārka, Rāmānuja), and Hegelianism fall here. While acknowledging difference, they ultimately prioritize identity or a singular ultimate principle that subsumes or subordinates difference.
  4. Difference Subordinating Identity: The Vaiseṣika and Madhva's Dvaita systems are placed in this category, where the principle of difference (viśeṣa) is paramount, and identity is often seen as secondary or derived.
  5. Identity and Difference Co-ordinating: This approach, championed by Jainism, asserts that identity and difference are equally real and co-ordinate aspects of reality, neither subordinating the other.

• Critique of Opposing Views: Padmarajiah meticulously analyzes the criticisms leveled against the Jaina view of identity-in-difference by various schools.

  • Vedanta (Advaita) and Buddhism: Both systems, though diametrically opposed in their core tenets (Advaita's permanence vs. Buddhism's impermanence), raise the charge of contradiction (virodha) against Jainism. They argue that attributing both identity and difference to the same reality simultaneously is logically impossible, akin to a thing being both hot and cold. Padmarajiah argues that these critiques stem from a misunderstanding of the Jaina concept of relative predication and the role of negation. He also critiques Advaita's vivartavāda (theory of illusory transformation) and Buddhism's momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda) for their respective limitations.
  • Bhedābheda Schools: These schools, attempting a synthesis of identity and difference, are often criticized by others (including Rāmānuja) for being self-contradictory or for not achieving a truly co-ordinate synthesis, often subtly subordinating difference to identity (e.g., Nimbārka's emphasis on Brahman's ultimate independence over its manifestations).
  • Vaiseṣika and Dvaita: These systems, emphasizing difference (viśeṣa), are examined for their atomistic pluralism (Vaiseṣika) and the fundamental role of difference in their metaphysics (Dvaita). The author highlights their tendency towards extreme difference, sometimes bordering on nihilism or solipsism, and the difficulty in establishing genuine unity or identity within their frameworks.
  • Hegelianism: While acknowledging Hegel's sophisticated dialectical synthesis of identity and difference in his concept of the "concrete universal," Padmarajiah argues that Hegel ultimately prioritizes identity and a mentalistic view of reality, diverging from the Jaina emphasis on objective reality and co-ordinate difference.

• Jaina Defense: The Jaina position, articulated through Anekāntavāda (Theory of Manifoldness), is presented as the most consistent form of realism.

  • Ontological Foundation: Reality is fundamentally understood as utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-yuktaṁ sat—that which is characterized by origination, destruction, and permanence simultaneously. This captures the essence of identity-in-difference.
  • Refutation of Fallacies: Padmarajiah systematically addresses and refutes the charges of contradiction (virodha), confusion (saṅkara), infinite regress (anavasthā), and others leveled against Jainism. He argues these arise from misinterpreting the Jaina concept of relative predication and the inherent manifoldness of reality. The Jaina view holds that identity and difference are not contradictory but complementary aspects of a single, complex reality.
  • Ubhayavāda vs. Jātyantaravāda: The Jaina critiques Ubhayavāda (externalistic doctrine of identity-in-difference), which views substance (dravya) and mode (paryāya/guṇa) as separate entities. In contrast, Jainism posits Jātyantaravāda (unique integral synthesis), where identity and difference are intrinsically woven together, making each real unique (sui generis).
  • Confirmation from Western Thinkers: Padmarajiah draws parallels between the Jaina emphasis on the co-existence of permanence and change and the philosophies of A. N. Whitehead, Kumārila Bhatta, and Immanuel Kant, suggesting that this perspective is not unique to Jainism but reflects a deeper philosophical truth.

Part II: Epistemology

The second part focuses on Jaina epistemology, demonstrating how it supports and is supported by the ontological framework.

• Anekāntavāda as Realism: Anekāntavāda is presented as the most consistent form of realism because it acknowledges the objective, independent existence of the material universe and the manifold nature of each real. Unlike idealism, which tends towards mentalism, Jainism affirms the reality of both the mental (consciousness) and the material. The principle of distinction, central to realism, is taken to its logical conclusion in Anekāntavāda, leading to the idea that reality is infinitely diversified.
• Nayavāda (Theory of Standpoints): This is presented as the analytical method stemming from Anekāntavāda. It recognizes that reality can be viewed from multiple, partial standpoints (nayāḥ), each yielding a partial truth. The primary division is between dravyārthikanaya (substantive viewpoint) and paryāyārthikanaya (modal viewpoint). Several specific nayas are discussed, including:
  • Naigamanaya: The teleological or universal-particular standpoint, considering the purpose behind actions or the undifferentiated whole.
  • Sangrahanaya: The class view, focusing on the general or class character.
  • Vyavahāranaya: The standpoint of the particular, focusing on specific features.
  • Ṛjusūtranaya: The standpoint of momentariness, focusing on the immediate present aspect of reality.
  • Śabdanaya: The standpoint of synonyms, recognizing that different words can denote the same object due to convention.
  • Samabhirūḍhanaya: The etymological standpoint, differentiating meanings based on word roots.
  • Evambhūtanaya: The 'such-like' standpoint, which designates an object differently based on its specific attitudes or functions at a given moment. Padmarajiah also discusses the debate on the number of nayas and their classifications, ultimately affirming their complementary function in providing an articulated understanding of reality.
• Syādvāda (Conditional Dialectic/Sevenfold Predication): This is presented as the synthetical method that complements Nayavāda. It uses the prefix "syāt" (in a certain sense) to qualify propositions, acknowledging that any assertion about reality is conditional and partial, reflecting a particular standpoint. The Saptabhangi (Sevenfold Predication) outlines seven possible ways to predicate a characteristic of a thing:
  1. Syādasti (In a certain sense, it is)
  2. Syānnasti (In a certain sense, it is not)
  3. Syādasti nāsti ca (In a certain sense, it is and is not)
  4. Syādavaktavyaḥ (In a certain sense, it is inexpressible)
  5. Syādastyavaktavyaśca (In a certain sense, it is and is inexpressible)
  6. Syānnāstyavaktavyaśca (In a certain sense, it is not and is inexpressible)
  7. Syādastināsti cāvaktavyasca (In a certain sense, it is, is not, and is inexpressible) These modes represent a logical unfolding of the inherent manifoldness of reality. Padmarajiah explains the concepts of 'being' (asti), 'non-being' (nāsti), and 'inexpressible' (avaktavya) and how Syādvāda attempts to reconcile these potentially contradictory aspects through conditional predication, avoiding absolutism and scepticism. He refutes criticisms of Syādvāda as eclectic, agnostic, or self-contradictory by emphasizing its relative nature and its role in providing a comprehensive, albeit complex, understanding of reality.

Conclusion:

The book concludes by reiterating that the Jaina philosophy, centered on Anekāntavāda and expressed through Nayavāda and Syādvāda, offers a comprehensive and consistent form of realism. It achieves a balanced view of reality by integrating identity and difference as co-ordinate principles, acknowledging the objectivity of the world, and providing nuanced epistemological tools to grasp its manifold nature. The work highlights Jainism's philosophical depth and its contribution to understanding reality through a relativistic, analytical, and synthetical approach, contrasting it with the absolutistic and often mentalistic tendencies of other schools. The author emphasizes that this nuanced approach avoids both the pitfalls of extreme monism and extreme pluralism, offering a robust framework for understanding the complexities of existence and knowledge.