Jaina Philosophy Of Non Absolutism

This comprehensive summary synthesizes the key ideas presented in "The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism" by Satkari Mookerjee. The book offers a critical study of Anekāntavāda (Non-Absolutism), a central doctrine in Jaina philosophy, particularly focusing on its epistemological and metaphysical implications.

Core Tenets and Aims of the Book:

• Non-Absolutism (Anekāntavāda) as the Foundation: Mookerjee argues that Anekāntavāda, often expressed through the Syādvāda (the doctrine of conditional predication), is the bedrock of Jaina thought. It posits that reality is multifaceted and can be viewed from multiple perspectives, avoiding extreme or absolute claims.
• Critique of Absolutism: The book systematically deconstructs absolutistic viewpoints prevalent in other Indian philosophical systems (like Advaita Vedanta and certain Buddhist schools). Mookerjee demonstrates how absolutism, which asserts a single, unqualified truth about reality, leads to logical contradictions and fails to account for the complexity of experienced reality.
• Empiricism and Logic: Mookerjee champions a Jaina-centric view that prioritizes experience as the ultimate source of knowledge. Logic, while crucial for organizing and systematizing experience, must be grounded in and validated by empirical data, not abstract reasoning divorced from reality.
• Reconciliation of Opposites: A key Jaina insight, according to the author, is the ability to hold seemingly contradictory attributes (like existence and non-existence) as simultaneously true of a single entity, provided they are understood within specific contexts. This is the essence of Anekāntavāda.
• Comparative Philosophy: Mookerjee engages extensively with other major Indian philosophical schools, including Nyāya, Mimāṁsā, Sankhya, Buddhism (especially Dignāga and Dharmakirti), and Vedānta. He highlights points of contact and divergence, arguing that Jaina philosophy offers a more coherent and realistic explanation of phenomena.
• Originality of Jaina Thought: The author emphasizes the unique contribution of Jaina philosophy, particularly the doctrine of sevenfold predication (Saptabhanginaya), as a logical tool for articulating non-absolutism.

Key Arguments and Concepts Discussed:

1. The Logical Background:

   • Laws of Thought Re-evaluated: Mookerjee challenges the a priori validity of the traditional Laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle. He argues that these laws, when applied to the dynamic and complex nature of reality as revealed by experience, require contextual qualifications.
   • Universals and Particulars: The book refutes the Buddhist view of universals as mere conceptual fictions. Mookerjee, aligning with Jaina realists, argues that both particulars and universals are real and that things are "concrete universals." Experience apprehends both aspects simultaneously.
   • The Nature of Existence and Non-Existence: Mookerjee demonstrates that denying the reality of non-existence (in its various forms like pre-non-existence, post-non-existence, and mutual non-existence) leads to absurdities, particularly in explaining causation. He asserts that reality is a complex of both existence and non-existence, understood contextually.

2. Non-Absolutism (Anekāntavāda):

   • Critique of Causation: Absolutism, Mookerjee contends, makes the law of causation untenable. An absolute real cannot be a cause or effect. Jaina philosophy, through Anekāntavāda, resolves this by viewing causes and effects as having both persistent and changing aspects.
   • The Four Types of Non-Existence: The denial of these types of non-existence leads to a monistic or undifferentiated view of reality, which is contrary to experience.
   • The Problem of Causality: The book analyzes various theories of causation, including those of the Buddhists (momentary existence), Vedāntists (illusionary causality), and Sankhya (identity of cause and effect), finding them all wanting compared to the Jaina nuanced understanding. Causality is seen as a relation of determination, involving both sequence and identity-in-difference.

3. Numerical Difference and Absolute Non-Existence:

   • The Reality of Relations: Relations, far from being mere subjective constructions, are objective realities integral to the terms they relate. The denial of relations leads to skepticism and self-contradiction.
   • Identity-in-Difference: The Jaina position on relations is that they are neither absolute identity nor absolute difference, but a synthesis of both, a unique characteristic sui generis.

4. The Inexpressible or the Indefinite (Avācya):

   • Limitations of Language: While reals are complex entities embodying being and non-being, their full individuality is often beyond the scope of single words or concepts. This "inexpressibility" or "indefiniteness" is an ontological attribute, not a product of linguistic limitations alone.
   • Critique of Buddhist and Grammarian Extremes: Mookerjee critiques the Buddhist view that reality is entirely inexpressible and the Grammarian (Bhartrhari) view that all reality is reducible to word. Jaina thought finds a balance, acknowledging both expressible and inexpressible aspects of reality.

5. The Dialectic of Sevenfold Predication (Saptabhanginaya):

   • Structure and Justification: This chapter delves into the seven propositions (bhānga) that articulate Anekāntavāda. Each proposition represents a different perspective on reality, qualified by "syāt" (in some respect). The necessity of seven propositions arises from the logically and ontologically conditioned nature of reality and the need to avoid absolutist interpretations.
   • Critique of Opponents: Mookerjee addresses objections from various schools regarding contradiction, infinite regress, confusion, and indeterminacy, arguing that these criticisms stem from an a priori understanding of opposition that fails to account for context-dependent truths.
   • Universality of Non-Absolutism: The author argues that the doctrine of non-absolutism itself is subject to the sevenfold predication, demonstrating its self-consistent application.
   • Illustrations: The text uses examples like existence/non-existence, permanence/impermanence, and one/many to illustrate the workings of Saptabhanginaya.

6. Relations and Inherence:

   • Objective Status of Relations: Relations are not mere subjective constructions but objective facts that hold together the manifold of reality.
   • Critique of Buddhist Denial of Relation: The Buddhist denial of relation, particularly causality, is refuted for its reliance on abstract logic and its self-contradictory nature.
   • Jaina Critique of Inherence (Samavāya): Mookerjee critically examines the Vaiseṣika concept of inherence as a relation distinct from identity and difference. He argues that inherence is ultimately reducible to the Jaina concept of "identity-in-difference," thus undermining the Vaiseṣika's dualistic ontology. Causality is also explained through this lens of identity-in-difference.

7. The Nyāya Conception of Universals:

   • Rejection of Buddhist Nominalism: The book critiques the Buddhist view of universals as fictions and argues for their objective reality, a position supported by Naiyāyikas and Jainas.
   • Critique of "Negation of the Opposite": Mookerjee refutes the Buddhist theory that concepts derive their meaning from the negation of their opposites, highlighting its psychological and logical inadequacies.
   • Jaina Reinterpretation: The book notes how later Jaina thinkers, influenced by Buddhism, tended to reinterpret universals as mere similarities, which Mookerjee finds a dilution of the original Jaina philosophical strength and a regression towards a less robust pluralism. He highlights Vimaladāsa as an exception who maintained a more consistent Jaina position.
   • Critique of Similarity as a Substitute: The author argues that similarity, when analyzed, either leads back to an underlying identity (universal) or devolves into problematic numerical differences, thus failing to adequately explain the unity of concepts.

Overall Contribution:

"The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism" serves as a profound exploration of Anekāntavāda, presenting it not just as a philosophical curiosity but as a robust and realistic framework for understanding reality. Mookerjee's rigorous critique of absolutist positions and his defense of an empirically grounded logic make a strong case for the enduring relevance and sophistication of Jaina thought. The book aims to elevate the understanding of Jaina philosophy beyond its often-misunderstood status, highlighting its originality, subtlety, and power in engaging with fundamental philosophical problems.