Jaina Ethical Theory

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided text, "Jaina Ethical Theory" by Kamalchand Sogani, focusing on its normative and meta-ethical perspectives:

I. Introduction: The Scope of Jaina Ethics

The author, Dr. Kamal Chand Sogani, intends to examine Jaina ethics from normative and meta-ethical viewpoints, explicitly excluding a historical or descriptive analysis of Jaina practices. Normative ethics deals with concepts of good and bad, right and wrong, and guides decision-making. Meta-ethics analyzes the meaning and justification of ethical terms and judgments.

II. Jaina Theory of Value

• Intrinsic Good: According to Jainism, what is intrinsically desirable, good, or worthwhile in life is the achievement of:
  • Ahimsa (non-violence) towards all living beings.
  • Attainment of knowledge.
  • Realization of happiness.
  • Leading a virtuous life.
  • Experiencing freedom and good emotions.
• Criterion of Goodness: The fulfillment of these ends, and the satisfaction derived from their fulfillment, serves as the criterion for intrinsic goodness. Goodness is seen as a matter of degree, dependent on the extent to which these ends are realized and the resulting satisfaction.
• Ahimsa-Utilitarianism: Sogani proposes this term to describe the Jaina theory of intrinsic goodness. It considers Ahimsa and other aims as the "general good." Crucially, this general good is not possible without one's own good, and seeking the good of others is intrinsically linked to one's own well-being. This approach abandons narrow egoism.
• Distinction from Hedonistic Utilitarianism: Jaina ethics is not focused on pleasure but on higher values.
• Resemblance to Ideal Utilitarianism: It shares similarities with Ideal Utilitarianism, which values non-hedonistic ends like knowledge and virtue.
• Ahimsa as Both Means and End: Jainism recognizes Ahimsa as both a means to an end and an end in itself. Ahimsa is equivalent to the realization of the highest good. This dual role means both means and ends must be evaluated by the criterion of Ahimsa. The principle that "the end justifies the means" is not necessarily immoral if the means are also evaluated by Ahimsa.

III. Jaina Theory of Obligation

• Criterion of Rightness: The Jaina perspective is that rightness, duty, and obligation are inseparable from the good. The criterion for what is right or obligatory is the greater balance of good over bad that an action brings into being compared to any alternative.
• Teleological Theory of Obligation: This places Jainism within the teleological (consequence-oriented) framework, as opposed to deontology (duty for its own sake). The "right-making characteristic" of an action is its contribution to the maximum balance of Ahimsa over Himsa.
• Act-Utilitarianism vs. Rule-Utilitarianism:
  • While Jaina Acharyas have provided moral rules (like Anuvratas, Mahavratas, etc.), the underlying principle is act-utilitarianism, where each action is judged by its consequences.
  • However, acknowledging the practical impossibility of calculating consequences for every action, guiding principles are offered.
  • Jaina ethics allows for exceptions to general moral principles when the complexities of a situation demand it, prioritizing the actual good outcome. Examples include speaking truth only if it leads to good, or not buying cheaply to maintain a vow of non-stealing.
  • This differs from rule-utilitarianism, which generally disallows exceptions. Jainism avoids "superstitious rule-worship" but stresses caution when deviating from established rules.
  • Acts are logically prior to rules, and the rightness of an action is situational.
• Duty as Extrinsic Good: A moral obligation is always an obligation to bring about the greatest good. Duty is not self-justifying but is good as a means. Pursuing vows like Anuvratas and Mahavratas are dutiful actions because they contribute to the overall good.
• Critique of Deontologism: Jaina ethics would critically view deontological theories (like those of Prichard and Ross) that posit self-evident, prima-facie duties independent of consequences. For Jainism, these duties are binding because they lead to good.

IV. Evaluating the Moral Worth of an Action (Punya and Papa)

• Motivation and External Action: The moral worth of an action is evaluated by considering both the external action and the internal motive. There are four possibilities:
  1. Right action, bad motive: Externally correct but morally insignificant (e.g., deception).
  2. Wrong action, good motive: Morally complicated; depends on the case.
  3. Right action, good motive: Virtuous, having moral merit.
  4. Wrong action, bad motive: Vicious, having moral demerit.
• Subha and Asubha Lesyas: Categories 3 and 4 correspond to "Subha" (auspicious) and "Asubha" (inauspicious) Lesyas respectively, representing virtuous and vicious actions.
• Degree of Morality: The degree of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness depends on the intensity of good or bad motives.
• Importance of Both: While good motives contribute to moral merit, outward behavior and external actions are also significant. Both internal and external aspects must be properly integrated.

V. Meta-Ethical Questions

• Nature of Ethical Judgments:
  • Jaina ethics leans towards a cognitive-effective view of ethical judgments, rejecting purely cognitivist (judgments are objectively true/false) and purely non-cognitivist (judgments express emotions) positions.
  • Ethical judgments, like "Himsa is wrong," are considered objectively true but cannot be separated from the feeling element involved in experiencing that truth.
  • Knowledge (Jnana) and feeling/activity (Caritra) are intertwined in moral life. Knowledge of right and wrong must be acquired, followed by moral practice.
  • Moral life involves both knowing and feeling; one without the other leads to ethical deficiency.
• Justification of Ethical Judgments:
  • Ethical judgments are not justified in the same way as factual judgments (the "is-ought" problem). Value cannot be derived from fact.
  • Jaina ethical judgments are considered self-evident and can be experienced directly, thus they are self-justifying.
  • There's no argument that can "prove" that Ahimsa is good and Himsa is evil; these are direct experiences of intrinsic value.
  • The justification for right action stems from its production of intrinsic good.

VI. Conclusion

Sogani concludes by suggesting that Jaina ethics should continue to engage with contemporary ethical and meta-ethical discussions to remain relevant and to contribute to modern philosophical discourse.