Jain Tarka Shastra Me Hetu Prayog

Added to library: September 2, 2025

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First page of Jain Tarka Shastra Me Hetu Prayog

Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary in English of the provided Jain text, "Jain Tarka Shastra me Hetu Prayog" by Dr. Darbarilal Kothiya:

The book "Jain Tarka Shastra me Hetu Prayog" (The Application of the Middle Term in Jain Logic) by Dr. Darbarilal Kothiya, highlights the significant role of Anumana (Inference) as a means of knowledge in epistemology. Anumana is crucial for understanding things that are not directly perceptible by the senses, such as subtle, past, future, or distant objects. It is defined as gaining knowledge of the unknown from the known, or establishing a predicate (Sadhya) through a means (Sadhan/Ling). Examples include inferring heavy rainfall from a flooded river, an elephant submerged in water from its trunk, or fire from smoke. This principle is accepted by all Indian philosophical schools except Cārvāka.

The text then delves into the constituent parts (Anga/Avayava) of Anumana. While there isn't a consensus among Indian philosophies regarding the exact number of these parts, estimates range from a minimum of one (accepted by the Buddhist logician Dharmakirti) to a maximum of ten (accepted by the Sāṅkhya scholar Yuktidīpikākāra). The Jain tradition, following Ācārya Bhadrabāhu, also accepts ten parts. However, the Hetu (Middle Term) is universally acknowledged and considered the most vital part, hence the focus of this book.

The Hetu is defined as the statement used as the means (Sadhan or Ling) to establish the predicate (Sadhya/Anumeya). While often used interchangeably, there's a subtle distinction: Sadhan refers to the means itself (the object), whereas Hetu refers to the statement conveying the means. Therefore, it is said, "Sādhana-vacanaṁ hetuḥ" (The statement of the means is the Hetu).

The text further discusses the definition of Hetu according to various schools:

  • Akṣapāda (Nyaya): Hetu is that which establishes the predicate through similarity (Sādharmya) or dissimilarity (Vaidharmya) with an example. This implies two types of Hetu application:

    • Sādharmya (Concomitance/Affirmative concomitance): This is synonymous with Anvaya (positive concomitance).
    • Vaidharmya (Contrariety/Negative concomitance): This is synonymous with Vyaticāra (negative concomitance). According to them and their commentators (Vātsyāyana, Udyotakara), a Hetu must be present in the subject (Pakṣa), present with the predicate in a positive example (Sapakṣa), and absent with the predicate in a negative example (Vipakṣa). This leads to the concept of a "Tri-rūpa Hetu" (Hetu with three characteristics).
  • Kaṇāda (Vaiśeṣika) and Praśastapāda: They concur that a Hetu is that which is connected to the predicate, well-established in a positive example, and absent in a negative example. A Hetu with these three characteristics is an inferential instrument, while anything deviating from this is an "Ahetu" (fallacious Hetu) that fails to establish the predicate.

  • Buddhist Logicians (Nyāya Praveśakāra, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara): They also uphold the application of the Tri-rūpa Hetu as the means of establishing the predicate.

  • Sāṅkhya Logicians (Māṭhara): They too emphasize the Tri-rūpa Hetu.

Thus, Nyaya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist, and Sāṅkhya schools generally accept the Tri-rūpa Hetu.

The book notes that besides the Tri-rūpa Hetu, Dvi-rūpa (two-character), Catuḥ-rūpa (four-character), Pañca-rūpa (five-character), Ṣaḍ-rūpa (six-character), and Sapta-rūpa (seven-character) Hetus are also mentioned in logical texts. Udyotakara, Vācaspati, and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa acknowledge and support the Dvi, Catuḥ, and Pañca-rūpa Hetus, indicating their existence within Nyaya thought. Dharmakīrti alludes to the Ṣaḍ-rūpa Hetu, and Vādirāja to the Sapta-rūpa Hetu, though these are more for critical review than their own acceptance.

Jain Logicians' Application of Hetu:

Jain logicians, however, exclusively accept a single characteristic of Hetu: Avinābhāva (inseparable relationship or non-accidental connection). Their core tenet is that the Hetu must be inseparable from the Sadhya. It should not exist in the absence of the Sadhya and must exist in its presence. Anyathānupapannatva (inability to exist otherwise) and Anyathānupapatti are synonyms for this inseparable connection. This implies that Jain thinkers reject the multi-characteristic Hetus (Dvi, Tri, Catuḥ, etc.) proposed by other schools, focusing solely on Avinābhāva.

  • Samantabhadra in his Āptamīmāṁsā adds the crucial qualifier 'Avirōdha' (non-contradiction) to the definition of Hetu. This means that regardless of whether a Hetu has three or more characteristics, it must be non-contradictory to the Sadhya, meaning it must have the character of Anyathānupapatti.
  • Akaḷaṅkadeva clarifies Samantabhadra's intention, stating that while the phrase "Sadharmēṇaiva sādhyasya sādhayati" suggests the Tri-rūpa Hetu, the term "Avirōdhataḥ" emphasizes the necessity of Anyathānupapatti. He argues that fallacious Hetus like 'Tatpūrvatva' (being preceded by that) may possess the three characteristics but lack Anyathānupapatti. Conversely, Hetus lacking the three characteristics but possessing Anyathānupapatti are valid inferential instruments. Jain texts frequently rely on Anyathānupapatti in arguments, as seen in verses like "nityatvaikāntapakṣē'pi vikriyā nōpadyatē" (even in the case of absolute eternality, change is not possible).
  • Vidyānanda also considers Samantabhadra's "Avirōdhataḥ" as the defining characteristic of a Hetu.

Although no independent logical text by Pātrasvāmi is available, according to Anantavīrya, he authored a significant work titled "Trilakṣaṇakadarthana," likely refuting the Tri-rūpa Hetu. Śāntarakṣita quotes several verses attributed to Pātrasvāmi in his Tattvasaṅgraha, which are presumed to be from this work. These verses, including "Nānyathānupapannatvē na ca dṛṣṭā suhetutā" and others, strongly advocate for Anyathānupapannatva as the sole criterion for a Hetu and dismiss the multi-characteristic Hetus as inadequate. The presence of these verses in Jain texts further confirms Pātrasvāmi's stance against the Tri-rūpa Hetu and his advocacy for a single-characteristic Hetu.

Siddhasena also defined the Hetu's characteristic as "Anyathānupapannatvaṁ hētōrlakṣaṇamīritam," implying its pre-existing recognition.

Bhaṭṭa Akaḷaṅkadeva, who significantly developed and enriched Jain logic, substantiated this Anyathānupapanna Hetu through meticulous analysis. He even incorporated Pātrasvāmi's aforementioned famous verse as his own in the Nyāyaviniscaya.

Subsequently, numerous Jain logicians, including Kumāranandi, Vīrasena, Vidyānanda, Māṇikyanandi, Prabhācandra, Anantavīrya, Vādirāja, Devasūri, Śāntisūri, Hemacandra, Dharmabhūṣaṇa, Yaśovijaya, and Cārukīrti, followed and supported this definition of Hetu and debated the merits of the Tri-rūpa, Pañca-rūpa, and other multi-characteristic Hetu definitions.

In conclusion, Jain thinkers firmly believe that the Saadhyāvinābhāvī-Anyathānupapanna Hetu is the sole means of establishing the predicate. They reject the Tri-rūpa, Pañca-rūpa, etc., Hetus, citing their potential for inadequacy (Avyāpakatva) and over-extension (Ativyāpakatva).

The text further explains that the application of Hetu occurs in two ways:

  1. Tathōpapatti (Possibility of existence): This means the Hetu exists only when the Sadhya exists. Example: Smoke exists only when fire exists.
  2. Anyathānupapatti (Inability to exist otherwise): This means the Hetu does not exist in the absence of the Sadhya. Example: Smoke does not exist in the absence of fire.

While these two are akin to Sādharmya/Anvaya and Vaidharmya/Vyaticāra respectively, there's a crucial difference. Sādharmya and Vaidharmya might not always involve an explicit "only" (niyama/ēvakāra) and could be irregular. However, Tathōpapatti and Anyathānupapatti, by their very nature, imply a rule (niyama) and are thus regular. Moreover, these two are cognitive in nature, whereas Sādharmya and Vaidharmya are characteristics of knowable objects. Therefore, Jain scholars preferred Tathōpapatti and Anyathānupapatti and considered the use of either one sufficient, not both.