Jain Tarka Shastra Me Anuman Vimarsha

Here's a comprehensive summary in English of the provided Jain text on the topic of "Anumana Vimarsha" (Discussion on Inference) in Jain Logic, authored by Dr. Darbarilal Kothiya:

The article "Jain Tarka Shastra me Anuman Vimarsha" by Dr. Darbarilal Kothiya delves into the significant contributions of Jain philosophers to the understanding of inference (anumana) within Indian logic. It presents a critical and historical overview of how Jain logicians enriched and modified existing theories of inference.

Key Points and Contributions of Jain Logic to Anumana:

• Historical Context of Anumana: The text traces the origin of the need for inference back to the Upanishadic period, where emphasis was placed on contemplation (manana) alongside listening (shravana), implying the use of reasoning and logic. Though the term "anumana" may not have been explicitly used, concepts like "vakovakyam," "anvikshiki," and "hetuvidya" indicate its presence.

• Jain Terminology and Classification of Anumana:

  • In ancient Jain literature, inference is referred to as "hetuvada" or "abhinibodha," often considered synonymous with "shruta" (scriptural knowledge).
  • The Tattvarthasutra refers to it as "abhinibodha."
  • Jain philosophy accepts anumana as a valid means of knowledge (pramana) alongside perception (pratyaksha). The primary distinction made is between the clarity of perception (vaishadya) and the less clear nature of inference (avaishadya), classifying inference as paroksha (indirect) knowledge.

• Early Development and Comparison with Other Schools:

  • Kanada: Introduced the concept of "laingika" (related to signs or marks), highlighting the linga (middle term) as the primary component of inference. He focused on the study of lingas, their forms, and fallacies.
  • Prashastapada: His commentator, added the five avayavas (limbs/parts) of an argument to the components of inference.
  • Akshapada (Nyaya): Systematized inference with clear definitions of its causal factors, types, limbs, and fallacies (hetvabhasas). He also introduced supporting concepts like anumana pariksha (examination of inference), vada, jalpa, vitanda, chala, jati, and nigrahasthana, making inference useful for philosophical debate. Later Nyaya thinkers like Vatsyayana, Udyotakara, Vachaspati, and Jayanta refined it further by introducing concepts like vyapti (invariable concomitance) and paramarsha (mental apprehension of the linga).
  • Buddhist Logicians (Asanga, Vasubandhu, Dignaga, Dharmakirti): Critically analyzed Nyaya theories and presented their own subtle and extensive thoughts on inference, significantly influencing subsequent Indian logic and making it more refined and complex. They are credited with removing logical "stagnation" and enabling free philosophical inquiry.
  • Other Schools (Samkhya, Mimamsa): Even Samkhya and Mimamsa thinkers, while focusing on their core subjects (Prakriti-Purusha and ritual action respectively), engaged with the concept of inference, accepting it as a means of knowledge beyond scripture.

• Unique Jain Contributions to Anumana:

  1. Inclusion of Anumana within Paroksha Pramana: Unlike other Indian schools that consider anumana an independent pramana, Jain logicians classify it under paroksha pramana because it yields indirect and less clear knowledge. This broad classification encompasses various indirect knowledge forms like memory, recognition, logic, implication, possibility, absence, and word (shabda).

  2. Rejection of Arthāpatti as a Separate Pramana: Jain logicians do not accept arthāpatti (presumption/implication) as distinct from anumana. They argue that both involve inference based on an anyathānupapanna (that which cannot be explained otherwise) or anyathānupapadyamāna (that which cannot be established otherwise) relationship, which is essentially vyapti. The example of Devadatta being stout and not eating during the day implies he eats at night, which Jain logicians see as a form of anumana based on the inseparable connection between stoutness and eating, coupled with the negation of daytime eating.

  3. Specific Nature of Anumana:

     • Jain logicians criticize earlier definitions of anumana (e.g., from Nyaya Sutras, Prashastapada, Udyotakara) for focusing only on the cause (linga) and not the nature of inference itself.
     • They highlight the definition by Akalaṅka as superior and complete. Akalaṅka's definition includes the knowledge of the linga (sign) and the lingi-dhi (knowledge of the sign-bearer/subject, i.e., the probandum or sadhya). It also specifies the fruit of inference as hanadi-buddhi (understandings related to acceptance or rejection).
     • Significance of Vyapti: Jain logic asserts that only a vyāptiya (invariably concomitant) relationship makes a reason (hetu) valid. If this avina-bhava (inseparability) is not certain, the reason is not a valid means of inference, even if it possesses other qualities.

  4. Single Criterion for Hetu (Reason):

     • While other schools (Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Bauddha, Sankhya) define a valid reason by multiple characteristics (e.g., trirupa, pancharupa), Jain thinkers, particularly Acarya Samantabhadra, identify avina-bhava (inseparability) or anyathānupapanna-tva (unexplainability otherwise) as the sole and principal characteristic of a valid reason. They consider the multi-characteristic definitions to be either too narrow (avyapta) or too broad (ativyapta).

  5. Vyapti as the Sole Component of Anumana:

     • Indian logic generally considers both pakshadharma-ta (presence of the middle term in the minor term) and vyapti as essential for anumana.
     • Jain logicians, however, consider only vyapti to be an essential component. They argue that pakshadharma-ta is not always necessary, as seen in inferences like "It rained upstairs, because of the downward flow" (Uparī vr̥ṣṭir abhūt, adho-pūra anyathānupapatteḥ). Conversely, a reason might have pakshadharma-ta but be invalid if avina-bhava is absent.

  6. Classification of Reasons (Hetus):

     • Akalaṅka introduced a new classification of reasons: pūrvacara (preceding), uttaracara (succeeding), and sahacara (co-existing). The necessity and distinctiveness of these were clearly explained by him, making it a significant contribution.

  7. Application of Inference Based on the Probandum:

     • Jain thinkers differentiate the application of inference based on the nature of the pratipādya (what is to be proved).
     • For vyutpanna (those who understand abstract concepts), only paksha (minor premise) and hetu (middle term) are necessary, not the drishtanta (example). This aligns with instances where even Buddhists and Naiyayikas do not use examples for anumana with kevalānvayi hetu (all-pervading middle term).
     • For avyutpanna (those who need clearer explanations), in addition to paksha and hetu, drishtanta (example), upanaya (application), and nigamana (conclusion) are also necessary.
     • This classification was further refined by Kumarānandin and Vidyānanda, and later supported by Manikyānandin, Devsūri, and others.
     • Bhadrabahu also proposed ten limbs of an argument (pratidnyāśuddhi etc.), which were followed by Devsūri, Hemacandra, and Yashovijaya.

  8. Tarka (Reasoning/Logic) as the Sole Means of Ascertaining Vyapti:

     • While other Indian philosophies accept frequent observation (bhūyōdarśana), co-occurrence observation (sahacāradarśana), and non-observance of contrary instances (vyabhicārāgraha) as means to ascertain vyapti, Jain tradition, from its inception, has considered tarka (reasoning, deliberation, contemplation) as the exclusive means.
     • Akalaṅka is credited with being the first to strongly support and establish the authority of tarka in ascertaining vyapti even before Vachaspati and Vidyanbhikshu, and subsequent thinkers adopted this view.

  9. Tathopapatti and Anyathānupapatti:

     • Jain logic introduces two specific types of vyapti application: tathopapatti and anyathānupapatti.
     • These are considered knowledge-based (jñānātmak) in contrast to other types of vyapti which are object-based (jñeyātmak).
     • Only internal vyapti (antarvyapti) is considered effective in proving the probandum, and tathopapatti and anyathānupapatti are seen as representing or encompassing this internal vyapti.

  10. Sādhyābhāsa (Fallacy of the Probandum):

      • Akalaṅka replaced the term pakṣābhāsa or pratidnyābhāsa with sādhyābhāsa in his discussion of fallacies of inference.
      • The rationale is that since the object of inference is the sādhya (probandum) and the avina-bhāva (invariable concomitance) exists with the sādhya, the fallacy of the means (hetvābhāsa) directly affects the sādhya, making sādhyābhāsa the more appropriate term.
      • Sādhya is defined as achievable, intended, and established; its negation (aśakya, anabhipreta, asiddha) constitutes sādhyābhāsa. Vidyānanda supported this refined view.

  11. Akiñcitkara Hetvābhāsa (The Useless Fallacy):

      • While Siddhasena mentions three fallacies (similar to Kanada and Nyaya Pravesha), and not five (like Akshapada), Jain logic's emphasis on avina-bhāva as the sole criterion for a valid reason might suggest only one fallacy.
      • Akalaṅka posits that there is fundamentally only one fallacy: akiñcitkara (uselessness), which arises from the absence of avina-bhāva. The others (asidda, etc.) are considered extensions or manifestations of this primary fallacy. This concept of akiñcitkara as a new fallacy is a significant contribution of Akalaṅka.

  12. Bālaprayogābhāsa (Fallacy of Improper Application):

      • Manikyānandin introduced the concept of bālaprayogābhāsa, a fallacy related to the improper number or order of argumentative limbs used to explain something to a less intelligent person. This includes using two instead of three limbs, three instead of four, or incorrect ordering, which are classified into four types.

  13. Inference as both Matijnana and Shrutajnana:

      • Jain tradition identifies inference with both matijnana (sensory/inferential cognition) and shruta-jnana (scriptural knowledge).
      • The Tattvarthasutra associates it with abhinibodha (a type of matijnana), while the Shatkhandagama considers "hetuvada" as a synonym for shruta.
      • Vidyānanda reconciled this apparent contradiction by explaining that the Tattvarthasutra refers to svārthānumāna (inference for oneself), which is non-verbal, whereas the Shatkhandagama and its commentators refer to parārthānumāna (inference for others), which is verbal and thus part of shruta. This is a crucial contribution to Jain epistemology.

In conclusion, Dr. Kothiya's article highlights that Jain thinkers have not merely accepted but significantly refined and innovated in the field of anumana. Their contributions, particularly the emphasis on avina-bhāva as the sole criterion for inference, the classification of reasons, the specific role of tarka in ascertaining vyapti, and the nuanced understanding of anumana's scope and application, have enriched Indian logical discourse and continue to be important in the study of Jain epistemology and logic.