Jain Tark Me Anuman

Here's a comprehensive summary of the Jain text "Jain Tark me Anuman" by Basistha Narayan Sinha, based on the provided PDF pages:

This text is a detailed exploration of the concept of Anuman (Inference) within Jain logic and its comparison with other Indian and Western philosophical traditions.

Page 1: Introduction to Anuman

• Anuman's Importance: The book defines Anuman as the second most important proof (pramana) of knowledge after direct perception (pratyaksha). It's considered the most significant among indirect proofs. While most Indian philosophical schools accept Anuman, only Charvaka rejects it.
• Definition of Anuman: The word "Anuman" is derived from "Anu" (after, following) and "Man" (knowledge). Therefore, it means knowledge that follows some prior knowledge. Maharishi Gautama defines it as knowledge that arises after the knowledge of the sign (linga) and the qualified object (lingi). Jain acharya Vadiraaj states that Anuman is knowledge that arises after the determination of the pervasive relation (vyapti).
• Example of Anuman: The classic example of smoke (dhuma) on a mountain indicating fire (agni) is presented:
  • We have prior direct knowledge of the smoke-fire relationship (vyapti).
  • Seeing smoke on the mountain (linga-darshana).
  • This leads to the inference of fire on the mountain (lingi).
• Two Meanings of Anuman: The word "Anuman" can refer to:
  1. Anumiti: The result of inference (the knowledge itself).
  2. Anumana: The process or instrument of inference (the reasoning).
• Western Parallel: The English word "Inference" is considered appropriate for Anuman, encompassing inferring, reasoning, and decision-making. Western logic often emphasizes deduction and induction. John Stuart Mill's view is that inference moves from a specific fact (or facts) to another specific fact, often through a general statement derived from observations.
• Conditions for Anuman: For an inference to be valid, two conditions are necessary:
  1. Prior knowledge of something.
  2. A pervasive or inseparable relationship (vyapti or avinabhava) between the known and the unknown.

Page 2-3: Anuman in Different Indian Philosophical Schools

The text then systematically reviews the definition and understanding of Anuman in various Indian philosophical schools:

• Vaisheshika: Maharishi Kanada defines it as the knowledge related to a sign (linga) such as effect, cause, co-existent, contrary, or inhering.
• Nyaya: Maharishi Gautama defines it as knowledge following the knowledge of the sign and the qualified object. Navya Nyaya thinkers like Ganges Upadhyaya define Anumiti (the result of inference) as knowledge arising from knowing the subject qualified by pervasion, and Anumana as the cause of Anumiti, which is the deliberation of the sign (parāmarśa).
• Samkhya: Maharishi Kapila states that Anuman is the knowledge of the conditioned entity obtained by seeing the conditioning factor (linga).
• Yoga: The commentator of Yoga Sutras defines Anuman as the primary mental modification that determines the relationship of an inferable object, differentiating it from similar and dissimilar things.
• Mimamsa: Shabar Swami defines Anuman as the knowledge of an unperceived object based on the knowledge of one of its related parts, where the relationship (vyapti) is known.
• Vedanta: Vedanta Paribhasha states that the instrument of Anumiti is Anumana, and the knowledge arising from the knowledge of pervasion is Anumiti.
• Baudha (Buddhist): Acharya Dignaga defines Anuman as the knowledge of an inseparable (avinābhāvin) object through the knowledge of its sign. Dharmakirti simplifies it as knowledge indirectly related to an object due to a characteristic.

Page 3-4: Anuman in Jain Tradition

• Ancient Form: Jain scholars believe the initial form of Anuman is found in "Abhinibodha" knowledge. Although Umaswati doesn't explicitly discuss Anuman, his concept of Abhinibodha hints at it. Acaryas like Akalanka, Vidyananda, and Shrutsagara support this view, with Akalanka's statement "Chinta Abhinibodhasya Anumanadeḥ" confirming Anuman's ancient presence in the form of Abhinibodha.
• Prevalent Form: Many Jain acharyas have discussed Anuman.
  • Samantabhadra: Although no direct definition is given in "Aptamimansa," his writings contain glimpses of inference. Dr. Kothia notes his mention of inferential tools like reason (hetu), predicate (sadhy), proposition (pratigya), etc.
  • Vidyananda: In "Pramana Pariksha," he defines Anuman as knowledge of the subject (sadhy) from the means (sadhana), reiterating Akalanka's definition. He emphasizes the need for completeness in the relationship between means and subject.
  • Siddhasena Divakara: He provides the clearest definition of Anuman in Jain tradition, stating that knowledge which determines the subject (sadhyanischayakam) from the inseparable sign (sadhya-avinabhubho lingat) is Anuman. He emphasizes that the knowledge of the subject not possible in the absence of its cause (sadhyabhavasambhava-niyamalakshanat sadhanadev) is Anuman, and it is faultless like direct perception due to its certainty.
  • Akalanka: In "Tattvartha Sutra," he defines Anuman as the knowledge of the subject from the means (sadhanat sadhyavijnanam). This knowledge arises after grasping the sign and recollecting pervasion. Though it is indirect and unclear, it is infallible and resolves doubts, hence considered a pramana. In "Laghiyastraya," he describes it as knowledge of the subject from an inseparable sign.
  • Manikyavadi: He follows Akalanka's definition (sadhanat sadhyavijnanam). He explains that if inference were simply knowledge from any pramana, it would conflict with Agama (scriptural testimony). Therefore, knowledge of the subject is inference, and to differentiate it from direct perception, the term "sadhanat" (from the means) is added.
  • Hemachandra: In "Pramana Mimamsa," he defines Anuman as knowledge of the subject from the means, which is decisive and based on the observed or stated means. It's the knowledge obtained after grasping the sign and recollecting the relationship.
  • Dharmabhushana and Yashovijaya: They also contributed to the discussion of Anuman, largely following their predecessors.
• Core of Inference: The fundamental basis of inference across Jain and non-Jain traditions is the relationship between the means (sadhan), the subject (sadhy), and pervasion (avinabhava).

Page 4-12: The Components (Avayava) of Anuman

• Definition of Avayava: Avayava refers to the parts or components that contribute to establishing an inference. Vatsyayana defines them as the set of words or sentences that prove the intended meaning.
• Number of Avayavas: Scholars have different views on the number of avayavas:
  • Nyaya: Traditionally five: Pratigya (proposition), Hetu (reason), Udaharan (example), Upanaya (application), and Nigaman (conclusion). Nyaya Bhashya lists eight: Pratigya, Hetu, Udaharan, Upanaya, Nigaman, Jigyasa, Samshaya, Shakya, Prapti, Prayojana, and Samshaya-vyudasa.
  • Vaisheshika: Five: Pratigya, Apadesha, Nidarsana, Anusandhana, and Pratyāmnāya.
  • Samkhya: Five: Pratigya, Hetu, Udaharan, Upanaya, and Nigaman. Acharya Mathara sometimes uses three and sometimes five.
  • Mimamsa: Paksha (subject), Hetu, Udaharan, and Upanaya. However, some Mimamsakas like Shalikanatha and Parthasarathi only accept three: Pratigya, Hetu, and Drishtanta.
  • Vedanta: Udaharan and Upanaya.
  • Baudha: Early thinkers like Dignaga accept three: Paksha, Hetu, and Drishtanta. Dharmakirti and later scholars include Udaharan and Upanaya.
  • Jain Tradition: Acharya Mehta notes that avayavas are parts used to explain inferences to others, focusing on how sentences should be connected and how many sentences are needed.
• Specific Avayavas:
  • Pratigya (Proposition/Paksha): States the subject to be proven. It is also called Paksha.
  • Hetu (Reason): The means that proves the subject. Vaisheshika defines it as the means of proof through the example. It can be based on similarity (sadharmya) or dissimilarity (vaidharmya). Siddhasena Divakara defines it as that which is not possible without the subject (anyathanupapannatvam). Vidyananda emphasizes the relationship of the means. Hemachandra defines it as the word indicating the means.
  • Drishtanta (Example): A case demonstrating the relationship between the means and the subject. Jain acharyas use terms like example, illustration, and instance. The number of divisions of drishtanta can be two (sadharmya/vaidharmya) or more.
  • Upanaya (Application/Upasamhara): The application of the general rule to the specific case. It's a restatement, like "Tatha" (similarly) or "Na Tatha" (not similarly). Jain scholars like Manikyanandi and Prabhachandra explain it as the conclusion of the reason in the subject.
  • Nigaman (Conclusion): The final statement that reconfirms the proposition. It ties together the preceding parts.

Page 12-14: Vyapti (Pervasion) and Pakshadharma (Presence in the Subject)

• Vyapti: Derived from "prapti" with "vi" meaning special, it refers to a special, unwavering, or uncontradictory relationship. It must be free from "upadhi" (a condition that vitiates the pervasion).
  • Shreedharacharya: Defines it as a naturally determined and unwavering relationship.
  • Mimamsa: Prabhakara defines it as an unwavering and regular cause-effect relationship.
  • Samkhya: Defines it as the association of a constant characteristic.
  • Yoga: Defines it as a relationship that has continuity in similar things and separation from dissimilar things.
  • Vedanta: It's the relationship between the means and the subject that pervades all means.
  • Baudha: Dignaga and Karnagomin use "avinabhava" for pervasion, meaning the absence of one implies the absence of the other.
  • Jainism: Uses "avinabhava" and "anyathanupapatti." Manikyanandi defines it as something that exists only when another exists, and not when it doesn't, like smoke and fire. Devsurí sees it as triangular (trikona), existing in the past, present, and future. Hemachandra considers it a property of both the pervaded and the pervader. Dharmabhushana calls it all-pervasive (sarvopasamhavati).
• Pakshadharma: The presence of the means (hetu) in the subject (paksha).
• Types of Vyapti:
  • Anvaya Vyapti: Positive co-occurrence of means and subject.
  • Vyatreka Vyapti: Negative co-occurrence (absence of one implies absence of the other).
  • Samyaptya/Vishamyapti: Equal or unequal pervasion.
  • Tathopapatti/Anyathanupapatti: Perversion based on presence or absence.
  • Bahirvyapti, Sakalavyapti, Antarvyapti: Classification based on scope (external, universal, internal).
• Acquiring Vyapti: Primarily through direct perception, but also through reasoning (tarka).

Page 14-16: Types of Anuman

• General Classifications:
  1. Purvavat, Sheshavat, Samanyato Drishta: (Numinous)
     • Purvavat: Inferring the cause from the effect (e.g., clouds -> rain).
     • Sheshavat: Inferring the effect from the cause (e.g., flood in the river -> rain).
     • Samanyato Drishta: Inferring from a general rule (e.g., seeing horns of a cow and inferring about other cows).
  2. Svarthanuman and Pararthanuman:
     • Svarthanuman: Inference for oneself to resolve one's own doubt.
     • Pararthanuman: Inference presented to others for their understanding.
  3. Kevalanvayi, Kevalavyatreki, and Anvayavyatreki: Based on the presence of positive and negative concomitance.
• Specific School Classifications:
  • Nyaya: Purvavat, Sheshavat, Samanyato Drishta. Also, Kevalanvayi, Kevalavyatreki, and Anvayavyatreki based on the logical structure of the reason.
  • Samkhya: Trividham (Purvavat, Sheshavat, Samanyato Drishta).
  • Vedanta: Svarthanuman and Pararthanuman.
  • Baudha: Svarthanuman and Pararthanuman. Asanga also mentions five types based on linga, nature, action, quality, and cause-effect.
  • Jainism: Anuyogadvāra Sūtra mentions Purvavat, Sheshavat, and Samanyato Drishta. Siddhasena Divakara distinguishes between Svarthanuman and Pararthanuman. Vidyananda categorizes inference into Vīta, Avīta, and Vīta-avīta, and also proposes a fourth type, Kāraṇa-kārya-ubhayanumāna. Manikyanandi discusses Svarthanuman and Pararthanuman.

Page 16-20: Fallacies of Inference (Anumanabhas)

• Definition: Anumanabhas refers to faulty or flawed inference, where the reasoning or its components are incorrect.
• Nyaya: Lists five types of Hetvabhasas (fallacies of the reason):
  1. Savyabhichara: The reason is present in both the case and its opposite.
  2. Viruddha: The reason contradicts the accepted proposition.
  3. Prakarana-sama: The reason is inconclusive, leaving the matter undecided.
  4. Sadhyasama: The reason itself is the subject to be proven.
  5. Kalatita: The reason is presented when its time has passed.
• Vaisheshika: Primarily focuses on Hetvabhasas, with Kanada being the first to discuss them, defining a valid reason as "prasiddhi-purvaka" (based on pervasion) and an invalid one as "apadesha" (lacking pervasion).
• Jainism: Siddhasena Divakara identifies three types of fallacies: Pakshabhas (fallacies of the subject), Hetvabhas (fallacies of the reason), and Drishtantabhas (fallacies of the example).
  • Pakshabhas: The subject is faulty or contradicted (pratipadya-siddha pakshabhas, badhita pakshabhas).
  • Hetvabhas: The reason is either unsupported (asiddha), contradictory (viruddha), or uncertain (anaikāntika).
  • Drishtantabhas: The example is faulty, either due to lacking the characteristics of the subject/reason, or being contradictory.
• Samantabhadra: Discusses fallacies in the context of refuting other philosophies.
• Akalanka: Emphasizes "anyathanupapannatvam" (being impossible without the subject) as the sole criterion for a valid reason. Fallacies arise when this is absent.

Page 20-23: References and Conclusion

• The text concludes by referencing numerous philosophical texts and scholars, highlighting the extensive study of inference across Indian traditions.
• It emphasizes that while the number of inferential components (avayavas) varies, the core Jain understanding of inference rests on the inseparable relationship (avinabhava) between the means and the subject, and the presence of the means in the subject (pakshadharma).
• The Jain logical system, particularly the contributions of thinkers like Akalanka, is presented as rigorous and significant, offering a distinct perspective on inference.

In essence, the book "Jain Tark me Anuman" meticulously breaks down the concept of inference within Jain philosophy, comparing it with other schools, analyzing its components, understanding its types, and identifying its potential fallacies. It underscores the logical depth and sophistication of Jain epistemological thought.