Jain Pramanvad Ka Punarmulyankana

Here's a comprehensive summary in English of the provided Jain text, "Jain Pramanvad ka Punarmulyankana" by Sangamlal Pandey:

This work, "Re-evaluation of Jain Epistemology," by Dr. Sangamlal Pandey, delves into the intricacies of Jain logic and epistemology, arguing for its enduring relevance and proposing a modern application.

On the Definition of Pramana (Means of Valid Knowledge):

Pandey begins by noting that Jain philosophers, including prominent figures like Umaswati, Siddhasena Divakara, Akalanka, Vidyananda, Manikyanandi, and Hemachandra Suri, did not have a single, unified definition of pramana. He cites examples: Siddhasena Divakara defined it as that which illuminates the self and the object; Manikyanandi as that which provides knowledge of an unacquired or new meaning; and Hemachandra Suri as that which determines the correct meaning.

Pandey posits that this divergence stemmed from Jain logicians' engagement with and influence from contemporary Indian schools of logic (Jain and non-Jain). He argues that while the attempt to provide distinct Jain definitions for logical concepts was understandable in eras of sectarianism, it's no longer necessary or even desirable. The ideal, he suggests, is a universally acceptable definition, and Hemachandra Suri's definition of pramana as the determination of correct meaning hints at this universal aspiration.

Pandey also points out that ancient Jain āchāryas didn't distinguish between knowledge (jnana) and pramana, a distinction Hemachandra Suri correctly made. He contrasts this with Hindu Naiyayikas who defined pramana as the cause of correct knowledge (prama), linking pramana to true knowledge. He notes the historical shift of pramana from a means of experience to a process of verification and authentication.

Jain Epistemology and its Relation to Western Philosophy:

A core tenet of Jain epistemology, accepted by all Jain āchāryas, is the division of pramana into two types: pratyaksha (direct perception) and paroksha (indirect perception). Importantly, Jain philosophers do not consider pratyaksha superior to paroksha, as direct perception often depends on indirect knowledge. This leads Pandey to conclude that Jain logicians are neither purely empiricists nor rationalists. Their stance, he argues, is closer to Kant's critical philosophy, viewing both direct and indirect knowledge as interdependent.

However, Pandey distinguishes Jain epistemology from Kant's critical philosophy by highlighting its greater emphasis on axiology (value theory) rather than pure epistemology. Jain pramana is about the correct determination of meaning, and meaning itself is categorized as heya (to be abandoned), upadeya (to be accepted), and upekshaniya (to be disregarded). Thus, pramana is the means to ascertain these three types of meaning. The ultimate goal of Jain epistemology is to act upon this discernment – accepting the desirable and avoiding the undesirable. Pandey describes this as a "pragmatic epistemology" that is more profound and comprehensive than Kant's critical philosophy, even incorporating what Kant might consider "transcendental" knowledge or intuitive insight into its framework. He sees this practical critical approach as highly relevant to modern global culture and axiology, offering a standard for verifying all forms of experience.

Dispelling Misconceptions about Jain Logic:

Pandey addresses three prevalent misconceptions about Jain logic:

1. Uniqueness and Independence: The belief that Jain logic is fundamentally different from other Indian logical systems, especially Nyaya, and that Jain scholars strove to create a distinct system parallel to Nyaya and Buddhist logic.
2. Dependence on Jain Metaphysics and Epistemology: The notion that Jain logic is directly derived from Jain metaphysical and epistemological views.
3. Superiority: The idea that Jain philosophers considered their logic superior to other Indian logical systems.

Pandey argues that modern developments in logic render these assumptions incorrect. He contends that the core of Indian logic, irrespective of whether it's Hindu, Jain, or Buddhist, is fundamentally the same. Concepts like aim, definition, and examination are common. He states that while ancient philosophers might have categorized logic based on their respective metaphysical and epistemological frameworks, a comparative analysis reveals no radical differences. The perceived divisions are more a result of ancient scholarly classification errors.

He further asserts that Indian logic is bimolecular (dual-valued) and fundamentally "Indian" rather than belonging exclusively to Hindu, Jain, or Buddhist traditions. He also refutes the idea that Jain logic is solely medieval, highlighting the continuous development of Jain logic from ancient times to the present by numerous scholars.

The Core Contributions of Jain Logic:

Pandey identifies several key contributions of Jain logic that hold significance even today, transcending sectarian boundaries:

1. Historical Value: Jain logic preserves a vivid account of the evolution of Indian logic, from its origins in the interpretation of religious terms (nirvacana) in texts like Niyukti to the development of ontological logic (exemplified by Siddhasena Divakara's Sammati Tarkaprakaraṇa), the emergence of Nyaya, the rise of mimamsa (critical analysis), the emphasis on verification (viniścaya) by Akalanka, and the scrutiny of arguments (pariksha) by Manikyanandi, culminating in pramana mimamsa and the focus on reasoning (tarka) by Yashovijaya.
2. Comparative and Critical Value: Jain logicians meticulously studied and critically analyzed the doctrines of various schools like Sankhya, Nyaya, Mimamsa, and Charvaka. Hemachandra Suri, for instance, refuted definitions of pramana proposed by Nyaya, Mimamsa, and Buddhist scholars. Jain commentaries on Buddhist and Charvaka logical texts are also notable. Pandey observes that while Nyaya scholars responded to Buddhist critiques, they seemed largely unaware of the comparative and critical insights offered by Jain logicians. This critical engagement by Jain scholars is deemed crucial for the development of modern Indian logic.
3. Intellectual Refinement: Jain philosophers recognized logic's ability to purify and sharpen the intellect. Siddhasena Divakara, in particular, attributed significant importance to logic, calling it an "influential science" (prabhavaka shastra).
4. Linguistic Significance: Jain scholars produced significant logical literature in Prakrit, Sanskrit, Gujarati, and Hindi. The use of Prakrit for logical treatises is unique to Jainism, bridging the gap between Sanskrit and Hindi logical traditions. This demonstrates the connection between language and logic, and Jainism's effort to make logic accessible through vernacular languages.
5. Pragmatic Logic: Jain logic is distinctly pragmatic (saṃvyavahārika), distinct from the empiricist logic of Nyaya or the idealistic logic of the Buddhists. This pragmatic orientation is deeply embedded in Jain principles like syadvada (conditional predication) and anekantavada (non-absolutism). Hemachandra Suri's definition of pramana as the determination of meaning, where meaning is understood in terms of what is to be accepted, rejected, or disregarded, exemplifies this practical approach. The Jain concept of nayavada (theory of standpoints), which examines the practical value of every statement, further reinforces this pragmatic outlook.
6. Metalogic and Three-Valued Logic: Jainism's most significant contribution is arguably the development of a metalogic. By rooting logic in everyday discourse and developing nayavada, they identified naya (standpoint) as a crucial element. They proposed that a statement from a particular standpoint could be true (pramananaya), false (durnaya), or indeterminate (naya). This is seen as a discovery of three values of truth, predating similar concepts in the West. While Jain logic primarily operated with a dual-valued system, the foundation for a three-valued logic exists in their nayavada, which could be further developed by connecting it to thinkers like Łukasiewicz. Furthermore, the saptabhangi naya (seven-valued predication) suggests multiple ways of understanding an object from different contexts, emphasizing context-specific meaning.

Modern Relevance and Conclusion:

Pandey concludes by asserting that ancient Jain logic is not merely an artifact of the past but possesses contemporary relevance. He proposes that modern Indian logic can evolve in three directions: developing a metalogic distinct from Western approaches, constructing a three-valued logic rooted in Jain principles, and fostering a tradition of logic in common vernaculars, a path pioneered by Jain nayavada.

He believes that just as Jain scholars today synthesize various religions based on anekantavada, they should also engage in the comparative and critical study of different logical and metalogical systems. This intellectual synthesis, or at least a thorough comparative and critical analysis, would be a true fulfillment of their tradition. Even if they don't create entirely new logical systems, their role in bridging the understanding gap between diverse modern logics would be original, commendable, and timely. Pandey emphasizes that knowledge is unified and indivisible, making this integrative work possible. He sees the modern direction of Jain epistemology as clearly defined, stating that Jain Pramanavada is not a museum piece but a living and evolving field of study.