Jain Praman Shastra Ek Anuchintan - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Jain Praman Shastra Ek Anuchintan" by Darbarilal Kothiya:

This text delves into the foundational concepts of Jain epistemology (Praman Shastra), exploring the nature of knowledge and its valid means. The author, Darbarilal Kothiya, defines Nyaya (logic or reasoning) as that through which the true nature of reality is understood. Different philosophical schools define Nyaya based on either:

Laksana and Pramana: The characteristics and valid means of knowledge.
Pramana alone: The testing and correct understanding of reality through various means of knowledge.
Anumana (Inference): The five-membered process of inference (pratigna, hetu, udaharana, upanaya, nigamana).

However, Jain logicians, following Umaswati (Griḍhpichchha), consider both Pramana (valid means of knowledge) and Naya (viewpoints or partial truths) as essential for grasping reality. Therefore, in Jain philosophy, both Pramana and Naya are considered instruments of knowledge and thus constitute Nyaya.

Nature of Pramana (Valid Means of Knowledge):

Jain scriptures describe eight types of knowledge, categorizing five as Samyagjnana (right knowledge) – Mati, Shrut, Avadhi, Manahparyaya, and Kevala – and three as Mithyajnana (wrong knowledge) – Kumati, Kushrut, and Kuvavadhi (Vibhaga).

Umaswati established the five Samyagjnana as Pramana and the three Mithyajnana as Apramana (invalid means of knowledge).
Samantabhadra defined Pramana as "that which illuminates oneself and others" (svaparavabhasi buddhi) or "knowledge of reality" (tattvajnan).
Siddhasena Divakara (Nyayavatar) further refined this to "knowledge that illuminates oneself and others, free from contradiction" (badhavijita).

Most subsequent Jain logicians have accepted Samyagjnana as the definition of Pramana. Akalanka, Vidyanandi, and Manikyanandi further elaborated this by defining Samyagjnana as "knowledge that is certain and about an unknown object" (svapurvarthavyavasayatmak). This understanding of Pramana has been consistently adopted by later scholars like Vadiraja, Devsuris, Hemachandra, and Dharmabhushana.

Types of Pramana:

The Tattvartha Sutra by Umaswati is credited with the initial systematic classification of Pramana. It states that there are two fundamental types of Pramana: Paroksha (indirect knowledge) and Pratyaksha (direct knowledge).

Paroksha: Mati (sensory and mental knowledge) and Shrut (scriptural or verbal knowledge) are classified as Paroksha because they depend on senses, mind, or external aids.
Pratyaksha: Avadhi (clairvoyance), Manahparyaya (telepathy), and Kevala (omniscience) are considered Pratyaksha because they do not depend on external sense organs and arise from the self.

Umaswati also identified five subdivisions of Matijnana which are considered sub-types of Paroksha in Jainism, though recognized as independent means of knowledge in other Indian philosophies:

Smriti (Memory): Recalling past experiences.
Samjna (Recognition/Identification): Identifying something based on past experience and current perception (e.g., "This is that").
Chinta (Reasoning/Thought): Logical deduction or inference based on observed correlations (e.g., if this exists, then that exists).
Abhinibodha (Inference): Inferring a hidden cause from an observable effect (e.g., inferring fire from smoke).
Shruta (Verbal Testimony/Scriptural Knowledge): Knowledge gained from words, signs, or scriptures.

Akalanka accepted these two primary divisions and provided detailed logical definitions and subdivisions. He defined Pratyaksha as clear knowledge and Paroksha as unclear knowledge. He further classified Pratyaksha into two main types: Mukhya (primary) and Samvyavahara (conventional). Paroksha, he detailed, has five types: Smriti, Samjna, Chinta, Abhinibodha, and Shruta.

Nature of Paroksha (Indirect Knowledge):

Acharya Devnandi Pujyapada first clearly defined Paroksha as knowledge that arises with the dependence on external factors like senses, mind, light, or teachings, as well as internal factors like the partial subsidence of obscuring karma.
Akalanka proposed a new, more concise definition: Paroksha is unclear (avishada) knowledge. While both definitions are fundamentally the same (dependence on externals leads to unclearness), Akalanka's definition is considered more philosophical and brief.
Vidyanandi presented these as a means-result relationship: Paroksha is dependent on external factors (means) and therefore unclear (result).
Manikyanandi also accepted the "unclear knowledge" definition, calling it Paroksha because it arises after direct knowledge (Pratyaksha) or other means.

Akalanka's five subdivisions of Paroksha are:

Smriti (Memory): Remembering past experiences.
Samjna (Recognition): Identifying based on past and present (e.g., "This is that," "This is similar to that"). It includes distinctions of unity, similarity, and dissimilarity.
Chinta (Reasoning): Knowledge of the invariable relationship (vyapti) between a cause and effect or subject and predicate, established through positive and negative instances (e.g., smoke always follows fire). It's also called 'Ooha' or 'Oohapoha'.
Abhinibodha (Inference): Knowledge of the subject (sadhya) from a definite cause (sadhan) that has an invariable relationship with it (e.g., inferring fire from smoke).
Shruta (Verbal Testimony): Knowledge gained through words, signs, etc. (e.g., understanding "Meru" to refer to Mount Sumeru).

These are all considered Paroksha because they are dependent on other factors. Vidyanandi emphasized that the validity of these forms of knowledge lies in their non-contradictory nature. If there is a contradiction, they are mere illusions (abhasas).

Nature of Pratyaksha (Direct Knowledge):

Pratyaksha is defined as knowledge that arises solely from the self, without dependence on senses, mind, or external factors. This is the traditional Jain understanding.
Akalanka introduced a widely accepted philosophical definition: Pratyaksha is clear (vishaḍa) knowledge, meaning it is more distinct than inferred knowledge. The clarity is the distinguishing feature. For instance, directly seeing fire is more distinct than inferring it from smoke or hearing about it.
Vidyanandi extensively elaborated on Pratyaksha, classifying it into three types:
1. Indriyapratyaksha (Sense-organ Pratyaksha): Knowledge gained through the five senses. It is further divided into Avagraha (reception), Eha (investigation), Avaya (determination), and Dharana (retention), with numerous sub-classifications based on the senses and objects.
2. Anindriyapratyaksha (Non-sense-organ Pratyaksha): Knowledge gained solely through the mind, also with the four stages mentioned above.
3. Atiindriya Pratyaksha (Trans-sensory Pratyaksha): Knowledge that transcends the senses and mind. This is further divided into:
  - Vikal Atiindriya Pratyaksha: Limited trans-sensory knowledge, including Avadhi (clairvoyance) and Manahparyaya (telepathy).
  - Sakal Atiindriya Pratyaksha: Complete trans-sensory knowledge, which is Kevalajnana (omniscience).

Scope of Knowledge (Pramana's Subject Matter):

Jainism posits that reality is anekanta (multi-faceted). Therefore, both Pratyaksha and Paroksha knowledge apprehend this anekanta nature of reality, encompassing its general and specific aspects, substance and mode, unity and difference, permanence and change. No single Pramana grasps reality in an absolutist or one-sided manner.

Result of Knowledge (Pramana's Fruit):

The direct result of Pramana is knowing the object and removing the ignorance of the knower. Indirectly, this knowledge leads to appropriate responses: acceptance of desirable things, rejection of undesirable things, and indifference towards neutral things. These fruits are considered both different from and identical to the Pramana and the knower.

Naya (Viewpoints) as Means of Knowledge:

Following the discussion on Pramana, the text highlights the importance of Naya (viewpoints) as indispensable means of knowledge. While Pramana provides an integral, anekantic view of reality, Naya provides a partial, one-sided (ekanta) view based on specific intentions or perspectives.

Dravyarthika Naya: Focuses on the eternal essence or substance of things.
Paryayarthika Naya: Focuses on the transient modes or changes of things.

In spiritual contexts, these are further classified as:

Nischaya Naya: The absolute or ultimate viewpoint (bhutartha).
Vyavahara Naya: The conventional or practical viewpoint (abhutartha).

The text concludes by stating that both Pramana and Naya, by enabling the understanding of reality, are central to logic and epistemology, and this work has attempted a concise contemplation of these concepts.