Jain Nyaya Ke Anuman Vimarsh

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Jain Nyaya ke Anuman Vimarsh" by Dr. Darbarilal Kothiya, focusing on the analysis of inference (Anumana) within Jain logic:

The book delves into the concept and development of inference within Jain philosophical and logical traditions, tracing its roots and evolution through various canonical and post-canonical Jain texts.

I. Early Mentions and Foundations of Inference in Jainism:

• Shatkhandagama: The text highlights that "Hetuvada" (the theory of reasons or causes) is mentioned as a name for Jain scripture. Acharya Virsen defines it as gaining knowledge of something related to an object through its cause/reason, which is directly analogous to inference, defined as gaining knowledge of the inferred (sādhya) through the inferential mark (hetu). Thus, Hetuvada is seen as synonymous with the science of reasoning, logic, and inference.
• Sthanangasutra: The word "hetu" (reason/means of knowledge) is used in two ways:
  1. As a general term for a means of knowledge (Pramana): Here, it lists the four means of knowledge as Pratyaksha (perception), Anumana (inference), Upamana (comparison), and Agama (testimony/authority), aligning with the Buddhist and Nyaya schools.
  2. As a component of inference (Hetu/Sadhan): It further categorizes "hetu" into four types based on the presence or absence of the inferential mark (sādhana) and the inferendum (sādhya):
     • Vidhi-vidhi (Positive-Positive): Where both the inferential mark and the conclusion are present. Example: "There is fire because there is smoke."
     • Vidhi-Nishedh (Positive-Negative): Where the mark is present but indicates the absence of the conclusion.
     • Nishedh-Vidhi (Negative-Positive): Where the absence of the mark indicates the presence of the conclusion.
     • Nishedh-Nishedh (Negative-Negative): Where the absence of the mark indicates the absence of the conclusion. The text translates these into concepts like Aviruddhopalabdhi (uncontradicted apprehension), Viruddhanupalabdhi (contradicted non-apprehension), etc.
• Bhagavatisutra: This scripture also mentions the four types of Pramanas, including Anumana, through dialogues between Lord Mahavir and his chief disciple Gautama (Indrabhuti).
• Anuyogadvarasutra: This text provides a more detailed discussion of inference. It classifies Anumana into three types:
  1. Purvavat (As before): Knowing something in the present based on its past observation, even with minor changes. This involves recognizing similarities or identifying the same object through residual marks, like recognizing a child from childhood in adulthood. It can be based on place, color, marks, moles, etc.
  2. Sheshvat (As the remainder): Inferring something based on its cause, effect, attribute, part, or possessor. This category is further divided into five:
     • Karyanuman (Inference from effect): Inferring the cause from the effect (e.g., inferring the source of a sound).
     • Karanamana (Inference from cause): Inferring the effect from the cause (e.g., inferring cloth from threads).
     • Gunanumana (Inference from attribute): Inferring the possessor from the attribute (e.g., inferring a flower from its fragrance).
     • Avayavanumana (Inference from part): Inferring the whole from its part (e.g., inferring a buffalo from its horn).
     • Ashrayi-Anumana (Inference from possessor): Inferring the possessor from its attribute or vice-versa (e.g., inferring fire from smoke).
  3. Drishtasadharrmyavat (Inference from similarity of the seen): This has two sub-types:
     • Samanyadrushta (General sight): Knowing all similar objects from seeing one, or knowing a specific object from seeing many similar ones. It's about generalizing from the known to the unknown.
     • Visheshadrushta (Specific sight): Identifying a particular object among many, based on prior recognition of its unique characteristics.
• Time-based Inference: The Anuyogadvarasutra also classifies inference based on time:
  • Atitkalagrahan (Past time apprehension): Inferring past events from present signs (e.g., inferring good rain from a full pond).
  • Pratyutpannakalagrahan (Present time apprehension): Inferring the present situation from present observations (e.g., inferring a good harvest from abundant food).
  • Anagatkalagrahan (Future time apprehension): Inferring future events from present signs (e.g., inferring rain from dark clouds).

II. Development and Comparison with Other Schools:

• The text notes that the classification of inference into Purvavat, Sheshvat, and Samanyatodrishta is also found in other systems like Nyayasutra, Upayahridaya, and Sankhyakarika, though the third category is sometimes called Samanyatodrishta instead of Drishtasadharrmyavat.
• It suggests that the descriptive, non-technical explanations in Anuyogadvarasutra are likely older than the technical definitions found in Vatsyayana's commentary on Nyayasutra.
• Components of Inference (Anumana-avayava): While early Jain Agamas don't detail the components, the Tattvarthasutra, likely based on them, implies the acceptance of Paksha (proposition/thesis), Hetu (reason/probans), and Drishtanta (example) for proving the upward movement of liberated souls. Samantabhadra, Pujyapada, and Siddhasena also mention these three. Bhadrabahu, in the Dashavaikalika Niryukti, discusses five different ways of enumerating the components of an inferential statement.
• Focus on Vyapti: The author points out that Jain logicians, unlike some other Indian traditions, placed less emphasis on Pakshadharmata (the property of being present in the subject) and much more on Vyapti (invariable concomitance or the relation of inseparable union) as the essential requirement for inference. Some Jain scholars even considered Pakshadharmata unnecessary.
• Origins of Vyapti: The text asserts that Samantabhadra (2nd-3rd century CE) was likely the first to use the term Avinābhāva (inseparable connection), a synonym for Vyapti, in a philosophical context. Pujyapada, Siddhasena, Akalanka, and others followed, using Avinābhāva, Vyapti, and Anyathanupapannatva (inconceivability otherwise) interchangeably. The text suggests that these terms might have originated in Jain logic and were later adopted by other schools.
• Logical Development: The logical exposition of inference in Jainism begins with Samantabhadra, who laid out its components. Siddhasena's Nyayavātāra is considered a cornerstone, detailing the nature of inference, its two types (Swartha and Parartha), the characteristics of the proposition (Paksha), the use of reasons (Hetu) in their valid and invalid forms, the importance of the "invariable concomitance" (Vyapti) for proving the thesis, and the fallacies of the inferential mark (Hetvabhasa) and example (Drishtantabhasa). Akalanka's extensive works further solidified Jain Nyaya. Subsequent scholars like Haribhadra, Vidyānanda, Manikyanandi, Prabhachandra, and Hemachandra enriched the field with detailed analyses.

III. Key Concepts and Components of Inference:

• Nature of Inference: It's defined as a subsequent knowledge derived from a prior knowledge, usually perception. It bridges the gap between the known and the unknown.
• Basis of Inference: While perception is the primary basis, scriptural testimony (Agama) can also serve as a basis for inference.
• Inference's Purpose: To gain knowledge of the unperceived (paroksha) from the perceived (pratyaksha).
• Angas (Limbs) of Inference: The essential components are:
  1. Sādhana (Inferential Mark/Means): The reason or evidence.
  2. Sādhya (Inferendum/Thesis): The proposition to be proved.
  3. Dharmi (Subject/Sustainer): The entity that possesses the Sādhya. The text further breaks these down into:
  • Paksha (Subject/Probans): The subject possessing the inferential mark.
  • Hetu (Reason/Probans): The inferential mark itself.
• Pakshadharmata (Presence in the Subject): The requirement that the inferential mark must be present in the subject. The text notes that the terms "paksha" and "pakshadharmata" appear clearly in Buddhist logic before their widespread use in other Indian schools. However, Jain logicians, while acknowledging it, did not give it the same primacy as Vyapti.
• Vyapti (Invariable Concomitance): The most crucial and indispensable element. It's the unexceptionable, necessary co-existence between the inferential mark and the inferendum. Without it, the mark cannot serve as evidence. Other terms like Niyama (rule), Pratibandha (restriction), and Avinābhāva are considered synonyms.
• Dosh (Fallacies): Inference can be flawed by defects in its components. These are categorized as:
  • Pakshābhāsa (Fallacies of the Subject/Thesis): Where the subject is improperly stated or understood.
  • Hethvābhāsa (Fallacies of the Inferential Mark): Where the inferential mark is flawed.
  • Drishtāntābhāsa (Fallacies of the Example): Where the example used is inappropriate or flawed. The text discusses various classifications of fallacies from different schools, including the Nyayasutra's five Hethvābhāsa (Savyabhichara, Viruddha, Prakaranasama, Sadhyasama, Kalatita) and elaborates on the Jain perspective, particularly Akalanka's view that Anyathanupapannatva (inconceivability otherwise) is the sole valid form of a reason, and all other defects are deviations from this.

IV. Components of the Inferential Statement (Parārthānumāna-vākya):

• Five-membered syllogism (Nyayasutra): Pratigya (Thesis), Hetu (Reason), Udaharana (Example), Upanaya (Inference by similarity), and Nigamana (Conclusion).
• Ten-membered syllogism: The above five plus Jijnasa (Inquiry), Samshaya (Doubt), Prayojana (Purpose), Shakyaprapti (Possibility of attainment), and Samshayavyudasa (Removal of doubt). This is attributed to certain logicians and discussed in works like Yuktidipika.
• Three-membered inference (Paksha, Hetu, Drishtanta): This is the primary view supported by the Tattvarthasutra and adopted by Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, and others.
• Two-membered inference (Paksha and Hetu): Later Jain logicians like Akalanka and Vidyānanda argued for the necessity of only Paksha and Hetu, considering Drishtanta optional or unnecessary for the highly learned.

V. Conclusion:

The book meticulously traces the evolution of the concept of inference in Jainism, highlighting its early presence in the Agamas, the detailed classifications in texts like Anuyogadvarasutra, and the sophisticated logical analyses by later scholars. It emphasizes the Jain focus on Vyapti as the cornerstone of valid inference and contrasts it with the emphasis placed on Pakshadharmata in other Indian philosophical traditions. The work provides a comprehensive overview of the structure, components, types, and fallacies of inference within the Jain logical framework.