Jain Nyay Me Smruti Pratyabhigyan Tatha Tarka

This document, "Jain Nyay me Smruti Pratyabhigyan tatha Tarka" by Basistha Narayan Sinha, explores the concepts of memory (Smriti), recognition (Pratyabhigyan), and reasoning (Tarka) within Jain jurisprudence. The author delves into how these are understood in Jain philosophy and contrasts them with other Indian philosophical schools.

Key Concepts and Discussions:

• Smriti (Memory):

  • The text begins by acknowledging that memory is a common experience but its status as a valid means of knowledge (pramana) is debated across philosophical schools. Some consider it a pramana, others deem it flawed, and some accept it from one perspective but not another.
  • Jain philosophy categorizes memory as a form of paroksha pramana (indirect knowledge), along with Pratyabhigyan, Tarka, Anumana (inference), and Agama (scriptural authority).
  • The author notes that Vadirajasuri, in his commentary on Akalanka's "Nyaya Vinischaya," divides paroksha pramana differently. He considers Smriti, Pratyabhigyan, and Tarka as types of "gauna anumana" (secondary inference), suggesting a hierarchical relationship where Smriti leads to Pratyabhigyan, which leads to Tarka, and finally to Anumana. This likely stems from Akalanka's influence.
  • Definition: Memory is defined as the knowledge that arises from the awakening of "vasana" (tendencies or impressions from past experiences). These impressions are like imprints left by past events. The example of seeing the Taj Mahal in Agra and later recalling its details is used to illustrate this.
  • Two Forms of Smriti:
    • Granth rup (Literary Form): Refers to texts like the Smritis (e.g., Manusmriti, Yajnavalkyasmriti) which are considered important in Vedic literature. The question of their pramanic status is raised.
    • Anubhav rup (Experiential Form): This is the personal experience of memory, based on individual experiences.
  • Jain View on Smriti as Pramana: Jainism uniquely considers memory as a valid pramana. The text defends this against criticisms, such as memory being "grihitagrahi" (taking what is already grasped) and lacking a present object.
  • Criticisms of Memory as Pramana (and Jain Rebuttals):
    • Grihitagrahi: The Jain response is that inference also relies on prior knowledge, so this doesn't invalidate memory.
    • Absence of a Specific Subject: The subject of memory is the previously experienced object.
    • Subject Matter is Past: While the object might not exist in the present, it did exist in the past, making its experience valid.
    • Not Arising from an Object: This is seen as illogical, as even direct perception's object vanishes quickly.
    • Prone to Error: Any perceived error might be an "abhāsa" (illusion) of memory, not a flaw in memory itself.
    • Inability to Resolve Doubt: Strong memory can dispel doubts.
    • Lack of Purpose: Memory serves various practical purposes.
  • The author argues that the validity of knowledge depends on its accuracy, not its present existence.

• Pratyabhigyan (Recognition):

  • Defined as "sankalan jnana" (compiled knowledge), which involves the synthesis of direct perception and past knowledge.
  • Manikyandi defines it as the knowledge that arises from "darshan" (direct perception) and "smarana" (memory).
  • Four Types of Sankalan Jnan:
    1. Ekattva (Identity): Recognizing someone as the same person seen before.
    2. Sadrishya (Similarity): Recognizing an animal as a "nilgai" because it resembles a cow.
    3. Visadrishya (Dissimilarity): Identifying an elephant by its dissimilarity from a horse.
    4. Pratiyogi (Comparison): Comparing distances, e.g., knowing the distance to Kolkata from Varanasi is greater than the distance to Allahabad.
  • Types of Pratyabhigyan based on compilation:
    1. Pratyaksha-Smriti Sankalan (Perception-Memory Compilation): The most fundamental type.
    2. Pratyaksha-Pratyaksha Sankalan (Perception-Perception Compilation):
    3. Smriti-Smriti Sankalan (Memory-Memory Compilation):
  • Jain Critique of Nyaya and Mimamsa: The author challenges the Nyaya and Mimamsa view that Pratyabhigyan is merely direct perception. They argue that senses only grasp their specific objects and cannot combine past and present knowledge without memory.
  • Pratyabhigyan as an Independent Pramana: Jain thinkers argue that since other systems accept "Upamana" (analogy) as a pramana, they should also accept Pratyabhigyan, as its similarity aspect is akin to Upamana.

• Tarka (Reasoning/Logic):

  • The term "tarka" has various meanings like reasoning, debate, doubt, and cause.
  • Ancient Usage: Found in Upanishads, Manusmriti, Mahabharata, and Acharanga Sutra.
  • Jain Definition: Tarka is defined as "vyapti jnana" (knowledge of invariable concomitance), which is obtained through understanding "upalambha" (presence) and "anupalambha" (absence). This knowledge helps establish the relationship between a sign (linga) and what it signifies (sadhyam).
  • Upalambha and Anupalambha:
    • Upalambha: The presence of the sign implies the presence of what it signifies (e.g., smoke implies fire).
    • Anupalambha: The absence of what it signifies implies the absence of the sign (e.g., absence of fire implies absence of smoke).
  • Avinābhāva (Invariable Concomitance): This is the core of Tarka. It describes the relationship where two things occur together (sahabhavi) or in sequence (kramabhavi). Examples include causal relationships (smoke and fire).
  • Nature of Vyapti: Vyapti is described as universal and eternal, not limited by time or place.
  • Tarka vs. Perception and Inference: Jain thinkers maintain that Vyapti (Tarka) cannot be directly perceived as perception is limited to the present and specific objects. Inference itself relies on Tarka. Therefore, Tarka is considered an independent pramana.
  • Tarka as "Pratibha Jnan" (Intuitive Knowledge): Dr. Sagarmal Jain is quoted suggesting Tarka is an "antrbodhatmak jnan" (internal knowledge) or "pratibha jnan" (intuitive knowledge), distinct from empirical perception and deductive inference. It deals with abstract relationships like genus-species, cause-effect, etc.
  • The Yogi's Insight: The text highlights that the person who grasps Vyapti (Tarka) becomes like a Yogi, as only a Yogi can comprehend something universal and eternal. This elevates Tarka to a highly advanced form of knowledge.
  • Critique of Other Systems on Tarka:
    • Buddhism: Rejects Tarka as a pramana because it is subsequent to perception and thus relies on the fleeting nature of reality.
    • Nyaya and Mimamsa: Consider Tarka as an assistant to pramanas but not a pramana itself. They see it as a way to strengthen one side of an argument by demonstrating the flaws in the opposing view.

Overall Summary and Conclusion:

The article "Jain Nyay me Smruti Pratyabhigyan tatha Tarka" meticulously examines three crucial cognitive faculties within Jain philosophy. It establishes that Jainism uniquely validates Smriti (memory) as a pramana, defending it against common criticisms by emphasizing its practical necessity and grounding its validity in accuracy rather than present existence. Pratyabhigyan (recognition) is presented as an independent pramana, characterized by the synthesis of past and present knowledge, with the Jain understanding of its various forms being more comprehensive than that of other schools. Finally, Tarka (reasoning), specifically in the form of grasping Vyapti (invariable concomitance), is shown to be a central concept in Jain epistemology. Jain philosophers view Tarka not merely as a tool for logic but as an intuitive, supra-rational knowledge that forms the bedrock of inference and elevates the knower to a yogic state. The text concludes by affirming the distinct and well-reasoned position of Jain philosophy on these epistemological concepts.