Jain Darshnik Sahitya Me Gyan Aur Praman Ke Samanvay Ka Prashna

Here's a comprehensive summary of the Jain text "Jain Darshnik Sahitya me Gyan aur Praman ke Samanvay ka Prashna" by Kanji Patel:

The book, "The Question of the Coordination of Knowledge and Valid Cognition in Jain Philosophical Literature," by Kanji Patel, delves into the evolution and attempts at harmonizing the concepts of jnana (knowledge) and pramana (valid cognition) within Jain philosophical texts.

The author begins by examining the Anuyogadvara-sutra, a foundational Jain text approximately from the 5th century. Contrary to what its name might suggest, the Anuyogadvara-sutra does not primarily interpret the Avasyaka-sutra but rather lays out a methodology for explaining philosophical concepts. It introduces four key "doors": upakrama (introduction), nikshepa (classification), anugama (analysis), and naya (perspective). The text first discusses the five types of knowledge (abhinibodhika, shruta, avadhi, manahparyaya, and kevala) and emphasizes the supremacy of shruta-jnana (scriptural knowledge) for discourse and teaching, deeming the other four as not suitable for external instruction. The nature of these four is also explained through shruta-jnana.

The Anuyogadvara-sutra's treatment of knowledge and valid cognition is presented as unique. While classical Jainism posits five types of knowledge, the Anuyogadvara-sutra adopts a classification of valid cognitions familiar to the Nyaya school, namely pratyaksha (direct perception), anumana (inference), upamana (comparison), and agama (testimony/scripture). It then integrates the five types of knowledge into these four valid cognitions, specifically placing shruta-jnana under agama. The author notes that the Anuyogadvara-sutra does not follow any of the three distinct stages of development in discussing the nature of knowledge found in Jain scriptures.

The three stages of knowledge discussion are outlined:

1. First Stage: Delineating knowledge into five distinct types.
2. Second Stage: Dividing knowledge into pratyaksha (direct) and paroksha (indirect). In this stage, mati (sensory knowledge) and shruta are considered paroksha, while avadhi, manahparyaya, and kevala are classified as pratyaksha. Crucially, sensory knowledge (mati-jnana) is not considered direct in this stage according to Jain principles; any knowledge requiring external means is classified as paroksha.
3. Third Stage: This stage allows sensory knowledge to be classified under both direct and indirect. This stage is seen as a development of the first, with the Sthananga-sutra following this model by classifying knowledge into two main types (pratyaksha and paroksha) and then incorporating the five types of knowledge within them. The Nandi-sutra is presented as a prime example of the third stage, where knowledge is first divided into five types and then classified as pratyaksha and paroksha.

A key characteristic of the Nandi-sutra's approach is its inclusion of sensory knowledge (mati-jnana) under both pratyaksha and paroksha. While other Indian philosophies consider sensory knowledge to be pratyaksha, the Nandi-sutra attempts to reconcile this by calling sensory knowledge samvyavaharika pratyaksha (conventional direct perception) based on worldly understanding. However, from a strictly philosophical standpoint, it remains paroksha.

The Anuyogadvara-sutra's discussion is seen as distinct from the Nandi-sutra. It doesn't adopt the two-fold division of pratyaksha and paroksha. Instead, it presents the four valid cognitions: pratyaksha, anumana, upamana, and agama. Within pratyaksha, it introduces two sub-categories: indriya-pratyaksha (sensory direct perception), encompassing the five senses, and no-indriya-pratyaksha (non-sensory direct perception), which includes avadhi, manahparyaya, and kevala knowledge. Shruta-jnana is placed under agama.

A significant challenge identified is how to categorize anumana and upamana within this framework, as Nandi-sutra seems to offer a more integrated approach. The Anuyogadvara-sutra places shruta-jnana under agama, while Nandi-sutra only considers sensory knowledge (shrotra-indriya, etc.) as pratyaksha, leading to an almost complete coordination of the five knowledges and two valid cognitions.

The text highlights a deficiency in the original Jain scriptures: while both the agamika (scriptural) and tarkika (logical) methodologies are present for discussing knowledge, their coordination is lacking. The author notes that texts like Dasavaikalika Niyukti attempt to explain logical inference from a Jain perspective, suggesting the logical approach had gained traction. However, a complete synthesis is not evident even in later works. Jain agamika scholars kept the discussion of valid cognition separate from the discussion of knowledge. They didn't explicitly link knowledge with the concept of valid cognition or explain how the five Jain knowledges fit into the framework of valid cognitions.

The Anuyogadvara-sutra and Nandi-sutra offer glimpses of coordination. In Anuyogadvara, four valid cognitions are mentioned, with pratyaksha divided into sensory and non-sensory types. Sensory pratyaksha includes the five senses, and non-sensory pratyaksha includes avadhi, manahparyaya, and kevala. Shruta-jnana is placed in agama.

The Nandi-sutra also attempts coordination but with a different method. It divides valid cognition into pratyaksha and paroksha. Pratyaksha is further divided, with sensory knowledge (mati-jnana) in one sub-category and avadhi etc. in another. However, in the description of paroksha, Nandi-sutra includes shruta-jnana along with mati-jnana. This leads to the observation that while Anuyogadvara coordinates four valid cognitions with five knowledges, Nandi coordinates two valid cognitions with five knowledges.

The core of the problem lies in the differing views on sensory knowledge: Jain tradition considers it paroksha, while other philosophies consider it pratyaksha. By incorporating sensory mati-jnana as a part of pratyaksha, the Anuyogadvara and Nandi-sutras acknowledged worldly acceptance and reduced conflict with other schools. However, this did not lead to a clear and unambiguous synthesis of valid cognition and knowledge. In Anuyogadvara, mati-jnana is called pratyaksha (later termed samvyavaharika pratyaksha), shruta-jnana is placed in agama, and avadhi, manahparyaya, and kevala are again called pratyaksha. The status of mentally generated mati-jnana and how anumana and upamana fit into the scheme of valid cognitions remains unclear.

The author proposes that according to Nyaya philosophy, mental knowledge can be both direct and indirect. Mental knowledge related to emotions like happiness and sorrow is direct, while mental knowledge related to inference and comparison is indirect. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to include anumana and upamana within the mentally generated mati-jnana, which is considered paroksha in Jainism. This would lead to a coordination of the five knowledges and four valid cognitions. However, the author notes that the Anuyogadvara writer did not fully achieve this, and the Nandi-sutra offers only a hint.

The author highlights Umāsvati and Kundakundācārya as key figures who attempted to coordinate valid cognition and the five types of knowledge. Umāsvati, in his Tattvartha-sutra and commentary, classified mati and shruta as paroksha and the remaining three as pratyaksha. He also acknowledged four valid cognitions. However, the text points out that he did not integrate the five knowledges into the four valid cognitions in the same way he integrated them into the two (direct and indirect). This might be because the two-fold division of valid cognitions was found more compatible with Jain philosophy, while the four-fold division was seen as originating from other schools. Similarly, Kundakundācārya classified mati and shruta as paroksha and the other three as pratyaksha.

The full resolution of the disagreement between Jain scholars (who consider sensory mati-jnana as paroksha) and other philosophers (who consider it pratyaksha) is attributed to later Śvetāmbara scholar Jinabhadragaṇi Kshamāshramaṇa and Digambara scholar Bhaṭṭāraka Akalanka. Kshamāshramaṇa, in his Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya, clarifies that sensory mati-jnana, called pratyaksha, should be understood as samvyavaharika pratyaksha (conventional direct perception). Akalanka, in his Laghiyastrayi, explicitly states that pratyaksha has two main divisions: mukhya (primary) and samvyavaharika. He assigns avadhi etc. to mukhya pratyaksha and sensory mati-jnana to samvyavaharika pratyaksha.

The core of their argument is that from a philosophical standpoint, avadhi, manahparyaya, and kevala are true direct perceptions. While mati and shruta are inherently indirect, sensory mati-jnana is conventionally called direct due to worldly usage, but from a philosophical perspective, it remains indirect, akin to shruta-jnana. This explanation is considered so definitive that no subsequent scholars have felt the need to alter it.

Following these scholars, other prominent figures like Jinēśvara, Vādidevasūri, Ācārya Hēmacandra, and Upādhyāya Yaśōvijaya (Śvetāmbara) and Māṇikyanandi, Vidyānandi (Digambara) adopted a similar classification. They all accepted Akalanka's terminology, classifying pratyaksha into mukhya (comprising avadhi, manahparyaya, and kevala) and samvyavaharika (comprising sensory mati-jnana). Paroksha was then understood to encompass all other types of knowledge, including memory, recognition, logic, inference, and scripture. This comprehensive approach is seen as achieving the complete coordination of knowledge and valid cognition.