Jain Darshan Me Vastuk Swarup Ek Darshnik Vishleshan - Book Summary

Here is a comprehensive summary of the Jain text "Jain Darshan me Vastuk Swarup Ek Darshnik Vishleshan" by Bansidhar Pandit, based on the provided text:

The book "Jain Darshan me Vastuk Swarup Ek Darshnik Vishleshan" (The Nature of Reality in Jain Philosophy: A Philosophical Analysis) by Bansidhar Pandit, explores the fundamental Jain concept of vastu (reality or substance) and its inherent characteristics.

The central thesis of the text is that Jain philosophy posits reality as infinitely qualified (anantadharmātmak) and manifold (anekāntātmak).

Infinitely Qualified (Anantadharmātmak): This means that a single object simultaneously possesses an infinite number of inherent qualities. All objects in the universe, according to Jainism, contain their own distinct set of infinite qualities.
Manifold (Anekāntātmak): This is the more distinctive Jain concept. It asserts that within the same object, and simultaneously, contradictory or opposing qualities can exist. The author clarifies that the term "anekānta" specifically refers to the co-existence of two mutually contradictory qualities at the same time in a single object. The reason for limiting it to two is that true contradiction is only possible between two qualities; any more than two qualities, even if infinite, do not inherently oppose each other in the same way. If one quality is the opposite of another, all remaining qualities will be non-contradictory with one of these two.

The text highlights the crucial difference between Jain and other (Jainettara) philosophical systems. While other philosophies readily accept that an object can possess infinite non-contradictory qualities (e.g., earth having form, taste, smell, and touch), they hesitate to accept the simultaneous co-existence of contradictory qualities. Jainism, by embracing this latter concept, is termed "anekāntavādī" (advocate of manifoldness), while other philosophies that reject it are labeled "ekāntavādī" (advocates of singularity or exclusiveness).

The author elaborates that while all philosophies might accept non-contradictory infinite qualities, only Jainism accepts the simultaneous presence of mutually contradictory qualities. For example, Sankhya accepts eternity but denies impermanence, while Buddhism accepts impermanence and denies eternity. Jainism, however, accepts both eternity and impermanence within the same object.

This inherent manifoldness of reality, where each quality co-exists with its opposite, leads to an infinite number of potential combinations of contradictory dualities within each object. This is the foundation for Jainism's Saptabhangi (the doctrine of sevenfold predication or "may be").

The text quotes a passage (from Shlokavartika, Sutra 6, Vartika 52) addressing an objection that if a thing has infinite qualities, there should be infinite ways of speaking about it, not just seven. The response is that Saptabhangi is accepted based on the alternatives of the posited and negated qualities. Therefore, for Jain scholars (syādvādī), the acceptance of Saptabhangi, leading to infinite combinations of these sevenfold predications (ananta saptabhangi), is not considered an undesirable outcome.

The author then delves into specific examples of these contradictory dualities as explained by Acharya Amritchandra in the context of the Syadvadādhikāra chapter of Samaysāra:

"That which is that, is not that" (Yadeva tat tad-evā-tat): This means that an object exists in its own specific form but does not exist in the form of another. Each object has a distinct "form" (ākṛti), "nature" (prakṛti), and "modification" (vikṛti). Ākṛti represents its substantiality (possessing extension or pradeśa), prakṛti its essential quality (inherent power), and vikṛti its transformation or paryāya. For instance, a soul is a soul, not matter; matter is matter, not a soul. Even a single soul is not another soul, nor is one particle of matter another particle of matter. This principle underlies the idea that things retain their unique identity and do not become each other, even when in conjunction or mixture, their transformations remain within their own nature.
"That which is one, is not one, i.e., is many" (Yadevaikaṁ tad-evānekaṁ): This refers to the manifoldness arising from the interplay of substance, quality, and mode. An object has a singular substantial aspect (dravyaṁśa), but multiple qualitative aspects (guṇāṁśa). For example, the soul is one substance but possesses infinite qualities like knowledge, perception, etc. Similarly, matter is one substance with qualities like form, taste, smell, and touch. Furthermore, while the substantial aspect remains constant, the modic aspect (paryayāṁśa) is ever-changing, leading to multiplicity. For example, the soul, though having a fixed number of spatial units, changes its perceived "size" according to the body it inhabits. Even inherent qualities transform into various modes. For instance, the soul's knowledge, an inherent quality, manifests in five forms (mati, shruta, avadhi, manahparyaya, kevala) depending on the circumstances. Thus, an object is one in its substance but many in its qualities and modes.
"That which is existent, is not existent, i.e., is non-existent" (Yadeva sat tad-evāsat): This explains that existence is relative to substance, space, time, and state. For example, a lump of clay transformed into a pot is existent as a pot, but not existent as a pot at the moment it is being made into a pot (i.e., it is not yet fully a pot but a state of becoming). It is existent as clay but not existent as a pot. Existence is also determined by space (a thing is existent in the space it occupies, not in unoccupied space), time (a thing is existent in the present, not in the past or future in the same way), and state (a thing is existent in its current state, not in potential future states).
"That which is eternal, is not eternal, i.e., is non-eternal" (Yadeva nityaṁ tad-evānit'yaṁ): This duality arises from the distinction between the permanent substance and the transient modes. Every object is eternal in its substantial aspect (dravyātmakatā) and qualitative aspect (guṇātmakatā) (its inherent nature). However, it is non-eternal or transient in its modic aspect (paryāyātmakatā), which undergoes constant change through time. Jainism therefore considers an object to have a permanent essence (dhrauvya) and transient characteristics of origination (utpāda) and cessation (vyaya). The former signifies eternality, and the latter signifies non-eternality.

The author concludes by reiterating that every object in the universe is infinitely qualified and, through the infinite combinations of contradictory dualities, becomes manifold. He expresses hope that this explanation will help the general public understand Jain metaphysics. The author also laments that contemporary Jain scholarship has become contentious, attributing this to scholars themselves, who should be custodians of philosophical truths but are sometimes seen to contradict the teachings of earlier great masters. He urges scholars to deeply reflect on this issue.