Jain Darshan Me Praman Aur Nay

Here is a comprehensive summary in English of the provided Jain text, "Jain Darshan me Praman aur Nay" by Bansidhar Pandit:

This text, an excerpt from a larger work, delves into the core epistemological principles of Jain philosophy, specifically focusing on Pramana (Means of Valid Knowledge) and Naya (Partial Standpoints).

The author begins by defining "Darshan" (philosophy) from its root "Drish," meaning to see or understand. Darshan is presented as both the process of logical reasoning and analysis for determining the truth of reality, and the acceptance of the truths determined by such reasoning. Philosophy, therefore, encompasses both the doctrines of different schools and the logical arguments that support them.

A broad classification of philosophy is presented: Indian and non-Indian (Western). Indian philosophy is further divided into Vedic and non-Vedic. Vedic philosophies are those that originated within and support the Vedic tradition, while non-Vedic philosophies have independent traditions and often oppose Vedic ones. The text identifies Sankhya, Vedanta, Mimamsa, Yoga, Nyaya, and Vaisheshika as Vedic, and Jain, Buddhist, and Charvaka as non-Vedic.

The author critically examines the common division of Indian philosophies into "Astika" (orthodox) and "Nastika" (heterodox). He argues that this nomenclature is often rooted in sectarian bias, based on support or opposition to the Vedas. He contends that if "Nastika" is understood as denying rebirth, heaven, hell, and liberation, then Jainism and Buddhism would qualify as Astika, as they accept these concepts. Conversely, if "Nastika" means denying an eternal God as the creator of the universe, then Sankhya and Mimamsa would also be considered Nastika. The phrase "Nastiko Vednindakah" (the Nastika is the reviler of the Vedas) further suggests that "Nastika" primarily refers to those who reject or oppose the Vedic tradition. In Jainism, adherents are called "Samyagdrishti" (rightly viewing) and non-Jains are called "Mithyadrushti" (wrongly viewing). Therefore, the author concludes that the Astika-Nastika division is largely meaningless and improper.

The text then highlights the vastness of Jain literature, acknowledging the significant contributions of both the Digambara and Shvetambara traditions. The differences between these two branches are primarily agamika (scriptural) rather than darshanika (philosophical), meaning their core philosophical tenets are the same, but interpretations of scripture differ.

The primary objective of philosophy is stated as the understanding of the nature of reality. Jainism posits that reality is Anekanta (multi-faceted or manifold). This is the central principle of Jainism, meaning the reconciliation of seemingly contradictory elements within an object. While other philosophies might consider an object as only being or non-being, general or specific, eternal or impermanent, one or many, or different or non-different, Jainism asserts that an object possesses all these qualities simultaneously. For example, an object is both existent and non-existent, general and specific, eternal and impermanent, one and many, and different and non-different.

The author explains that Pramana (means of valid knowledge) is crucial in determining this multi-faceted nature of reality. Jainism, unlike other systems that consider various factors as Pramana, defines Pramana as Samyag-jnana (right knowledge) that decisively determines its object. This is because, in grammar, "Karana" (instrument) refers to the immediate and direct cause of an action. Only knowledge directly illuminates an object, not external factors like sense organs or other instruments in themselves.

While other philosophies accept varying numbers of Pramanas (one, two, three, four, five, or six), Jainism simplifies this to two fundamental types: Pratyaksha (direct perception) and Paroksha (indirect perception).

Pratyaksha is further divided into:

• Atindriya Pratyaksha (non-sensory direct perception): This includes Avadhi-jnana (clairvoyance), Manahparyaya-jnana (telepathy), and Kevala-jnana (omniscience). Avadhi-jnana and Manahparyaya-jnana are termed "Deshpratyaksha" (partially direct) due to their limited scope, while Kevala-jnana is "Sakala-pratyaksha" (wholly direct) because its object is unlimited, encompassing all things with all their past, present, and future states simultaneously. Kevala-jnana is attributed to omniscient beings.
• Indriya-janya Pratyaksha (sensory direct perception): This involves the five senses (touch, taste, smell, sight, hearing) and the mind. Thus, there are six types of sensory direct perception: touch-sense perception, taste-sense perception, smell-sense perception, sight-sense perception, hearing-sense perception, and mental perception.

Atindriya Pratyaksha is also called Paramartha-pratyaksha (ultimate direct perception), and Indriya-janya Pratyaksha is called Samvyavaharika-pratyaksha (conventional direct perception). The reason for this distinction is that while all knowledge originates from the soul, Atindriya Pratyaksha arises independently of the senses, making it "ultimate." Sensory direct perception, though soul-originated, depends on the senses for its origination, making it "conventional" or even arguably a form of indirect perception, as it's mediated by the senses. Jainism classifies these sensory perceptions as "Pratyaksha" in conventional usage because they involve a direct connection between the object of knowledge and the senses.

Each of the six types of sensory direct perception (Samvyavaharika-pratyaksha) is further analyzed through four stages:

1. Avagraha: The initial weak perception of an object.
2. Iha: Arousing effort or inquiry about the object, possibly leading to doubt.
3. Avasaya: A determinate knowledge or conclusion about the object.
4. Dharana: The retention of this knowledge in memory.

Paroksha (indirect perception) is said to have five types:

1. Smriti (Memory): Independent knowledge arising from Dharana.
2. Pratyabhijnana (Recognition): Grasping the unity or similarity between present and past objects.
3. Tarka (Reasoning): Understanding the invariable connection (vyapti) between two things.
4. Anumana (Inference): Knowledge of the predicate derived from the knowledge of the subject (through Tarka).
5. Agama (Testimony/Scripture): Knowledge derived from words.

The text concludes that Samvyavaharika-pratyaksha is sense-dependent, while Paroksha knowledge is derived from Samvyavaharika-pratyaksha. The key difference is the direct involvement of the senses in the former.

Agama Pramana (Testimony/Scripture) is particularly important. Jainism accepts both the meaning derived from words as Agama Pramana and the words themselves as Agama Pramana. This leads to a distinction within Agama Pramana:

• Svartha Pramana (for oneself): All types of knowledge-based Pramanas are Svartha.
• Parartha Pramana (for others): This refers to words (speech) which, lacking the nature of knowledge themselves, are designed to convey knowledge to others. Parartha Pramana is further divided into Vakya (sentence) and Mahavakya (complex sentence or discourse).

The constituent parts of Parartha Pramana, which are words, sentences, and complex sentences, are called Naya in Jainism. Nayas are thus partial standpoints used in the articulation of reality.

The author defines Parartha Pramana as a statement (sentence or complex sentence) that fully explains the intended meaning of the speaker. A Naya is defined as a word, sentence, or complex sentence that explains a part of the intended meaning. Both Parartha Pramana and Nayas are verbal expressions. Since they describe aspects of reality like existence and non-existence, generality and specificity, etc., they form the basis of Jainism's Saptabhangi (Seven-valued logic).

The Saptabhangi, when applied to Pramana and Naya, describes seven modes of predication regarding dual qualities of an object:

1. Syad-asti (It is, in a certain way)
2. Syad-nasti (It is not, in a certain way)
3. Syad-asti-nasti (It is and is not, in a certain way)
4. Syad-avaktavya (It is indescribable, in a certain way - when both attributes are simultaneously predicated in a way that cannot be expressed)
5. Syad-asti-avaktavya (It is, and is indescribable, in a certain way)
6. Syad-nasti-avaktavya (It is not, and is indescribable, in a certain way)
7. Syad-asti-nasti-avaktavya (It is, is not, and is indescribable, in a certain way)

The text clarifies that when one attribute is emphasized (vivaksa), the other is considered non-emphasized (avivaksa). To manage these varying emphases and perspectives, Jainism incorporates Syadvada (the doctrine of conditioned predication). Syadvada means that when describing any attribute of an object, one must consider a specific cause, viewpoint, or purpose. This preserves the contradictory nature of reality without negating it. Without Syadvada, the multi-faceted nature of reality would be lost, and with it, Anekantavada itself.

In conclusion, Anekantavada, Pramanavada, Nayavada, Saptabhangi-vada, and Syadvada are presented as unique and central doctrines of Jainism. While Pramanavada is found in other philosophies, its systematic and complete exposition in Jainism is unparalleled. The author also notes the importance of Sarvajnata-vada (the doctrine of omniscience) in Jainism, as the validity of Agama Pramana (especially Parartha Pramana, i.e., scripture) depends on the speaker being omniscient. An omniscient being is considered the most reliable and truthful source. Jainism's rigorous analysis of these principles leads to profound conclusions. The text specifically commends the "Nyayadipika" by Shrimad Abhinav Dharma-bhushanayati, edited and translated by Pt. Darbari Lal Kothiya, for its clear and concise exposition of these complex topics.