Jain Darshan Me Nayavada - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary in English of the provided Jain text on "Nayavada" (The Theory of Standpoints/Perspectives) by Bansidhar Pandit:

The text, titled "Jain Darshan me Nayavada" (Nayavada in Jain Philosophy), by Bansidhar Pandit, is a detailed exploration of the concept of Nayavada within Jainism. It begins by acknowledging the unique brilliance of Jain philosophers, who established concepts like Anekantavada (Non-absolutism), Syadvada (Conditional Predication), and Saptabhangivada (Seven-fold Predication) based on their experiential understanding of reality. The author asserts that without accepting these doctrines, a complete or accurate understanding of reality remains elusive.

The primary focus of the article is Nayavada. However, since Nayas (standpoints) are rooted in Pramana (means of valid knowledge) in Jain scriptures, the author first provides a brief overview of Pramana.

1. Pramana (Means of Valid Knowledge):

Definition: Pramana is defined as that by which reality is apprehended by removing doubt, error, and indecision.
Core: Jainism identifies Jnana (knowledge) as Pramana. Knowledge that definitively understands one's own self and other distinct, previously undetermined objects is Pramana.
Purpose: Pramana is capable of achieving beneficial outcomes and avoiding adverse ones, thus knowledge itself is considered Pramana.

2. Jnana (Knowledge) and its Classification:

Imperfect Knowledge (Apramana): Not all knowledge leads to benefit and avoidance of harm. Knowledge that lacks this capability is termed Apramana. Jainism refers to these as Pramanasabha or Pramanasapasa (fallacies of knowledge). Examples include knowledge that is unable to self-cognize, apprehends the already grasped, is mere perception, or is characterized by doubt, error, or indecision.
Types of Jnana: According to the Tattvarthasutra, there are five types of knowledge: Mati (sense perception), Shruta (scriptural knowledge), Avadhi (clairvoyance), Manahparyaya (telepathy), and Kevala (omniscience).
Pramana and Apramana Jnana:
- Mati, Shruta, and Avadhi are considered both Pramana and Apramana.
- Manahparyaya and Kevala are always Pramana.
- This leads to eight types of knowledge in total (five as Pramana and three as Apramana).
Cause of Pramana/Apramana Jnana:
- Pramana arises from the absence of Moha (delusion) leading to Samyagdarshana (right faith).
- Apramana arises from the presence of Moha leading to Mithyadarshana (wrong faith).
- Manahparyaya and Kevala arise only in the presence of Samyagdarshana, with Manahparyaya requiring complete conduct and Kevala requiring complete restraint. Hence, they are always Pramana.
- Mati, Shruta, and Avadhi can arise in both Samyagdarshana and Mithyadarshana states, making them capable of being both Pramana and Apramana.
- Furthermore, the flawlessness or defectiveness of the sensory organs and the mind, which are instrumental in Mati and Shruta knowledge, also determines their Pramana or Apramana status.

3. Vachana (Speech):

Pramana and Apramana Vachana: Just as knowledge can be Pramana or Apramana, so can speech.
Basis of Speech's Status:
- Source of Knowledge: Speech that gives rise to Pramana Shruta Jnana is considered Pramana. Speech that gives rise to Apramana Shruta Jnana is considered Apramana.
- Speaker's Status: The Pramana or Apramana status of the speaker (or writer) also determines the status of their speech. An Apta (trustworthy person) produces Pramana speech.
Definition of Apta (Trustworthy Person): An Apta is one who is free from all defects, omniscient, and the master of scriptures. However, the text also suggests that those who are less knowledgeable but have overcome Raga (attachment), Dvesha (aversion), and Moha (delusion) and possess Samyagdarshana can also be considered Aptas in their respective domains.
Types of Speech: Speech is classified into Akshara (letters), Shabda (words), Pada (inflected words), Vakya (sentences), and Mahavakya (complex sentences).
Partiality of Speech (Sanshata): Speech is inherently Sansha (partial) because it is composed of parts (letters, words, etc.). This partiality of speech is the basis for the partiality of Shruta Jnana.

4. Relationship between Speech and Shruta Jnana:

Pramana Shruta Jnana: Arises from Pramana Shruta (scriptural knowledge) which is based on Apta speech.
Apramana Shruta Jnana: Arises from Apramana Shruta which is based on Anapta (untrustworthy) speech.
Partiality (Sanshata) of Speech and Knowledge: The partiality of speech (letters, words, sentences, etc.) leads to the partiality of Shruta Jnana. While other types of knowledge (Mati, Avadhi, Manahparyaya, Kevala) are considered non-partial (Niransha) because they grasp reality as a whole or undivided whole, Shruta Jnana, due to its reliance on partial speech, grasps reality in parts.

5. Nayavada (The Theory of Standpoints):

Foundation: Nayas are based on Pramana.
Nature of Naya: A Naya is described as a part (Ekadesha) of Pramana. It is a knowledge that determines a part of the object of Pramana.
Naya in Partial Knowledge: Nayavada exists only in partial knowledge (Sansha Pramana), not in non-partial knowledge (Niransha Pramana).
- Mati, Avadhi, Manahparyaya, and Kevala are considered non-partial. While Mati, Avadhi, and Manahparyaya grasp only a part of the object, they do so as an undivided whole. Kevala grasps the entirety of reality undivided.
- Shruta Jnana is the only knowledge where Nayavada applies because it grasps the object in parts (Sakhanda or Sansha). This is due to its dependence on partial speech.
Conditions for Naya in Knowledge: For Nayavada to be present in knowledge, two conditions are necessary:
1. Exhaustive knowledge of object, time, and place (Nisheshadesha-kalartha-vishayita): The knowledge must be capable of grasping the entire object, time, and place.
2. Indirect knowledge (Parokshakarata): The knowledge must be indirect.
Shruta Jnana and Naya: Shruta Jnana fulfills both these conditions. It grasps the object comprehensively (Nisheshadesha-kalartha-vishayita) and indirectly (Parokshakarata), allowing for the application of different Nayas.
Exclusive Domain of Naya: The author emphasizes that Nayas are exclusively found in Shruta Jnana, not in Mati, Avadhi, Manahparyaya, or Kevala.
Anekantavada as the basis of Naya: The core of Jain philosophy is Anekantavada, the idea that reality is multi-faceted and possesses contradictory attributes simultaneously. This concept is the very foundation of Nayavada. Each Naya represents a specific perspective or facet of this multifaceted reality.
- For example, Jainism states that an object is both eternal and non-eternal. The statement "The object is eternal" is a Naya representing the dravya (substance) aspect, while "The object is non-eternal" represents the paryaya (modification) aspect. Both are valid standpoints within the larger framework of Anekantavada.
- Other philosophies, like Sankhya and Buddhism, are considered Ekantavada (monistic/absolutist) because they assert only one aspect (e.g., eternal or non-eternal) to the exclusion of others.
Naya vs. Pramanasabha: The text distinguishes between Nayas and Pramanasabha. A Naya represents a valid partial truth about reality. Pramanasabha, on the other hand, is erroneous or misleading knowledge that fails to accurately represent even a partial truth. For instance, if an Ekantavadin claims an object is only eternal, this is Pramanasabha because it ignores the non-eternal aspect. A Jain Naya explicitly acknowledges the other aspect as well, albeit from a different perspective.

Conclusion:

The author concludes by summarizing that reality is multifaceted (Anekantatmak). Speech that can represent both contradictory aspects of an object is Pramana. Speech that represents only one aspect is a Naya. Speech that represents a single aspect as if it were the whole truth, or misrepresents an aspect, is Apramana (or Pramanasabha). The understanding derived from this speech will also be correspondingly Pramana, Naya, Apramana, or Pramanasabha.

The text mentions that Jain Agamas further elaborate on Nayas through classifications like Dravyarthika Naya and Paryayarthika Naya (based on substance and modification) and Nishchaya Naya and Vyavahara Naya (based on ultimate and conventional truth), as well as Arthanaya and Shabdanaya. The author highlights the current need to elaborate on these extensively, as misunderstandings regarding Nayas often lead to philosophical disputes within the Jain community.