Jain Darshan Me Anuman Paribhasha

Here is a comprehensive summary in English of the provided Jain text, "Jain Darshan me Anuman Paribhasha" by Darbarilal Kothiya:

This text, "Jain Darshan me Anuman Paribhasha," by Darbarilal Kothiya, delves into the definition and nature of anumana (inference) within Jain philosophy. It highlights that, much like pratyaksha (perception), anumana is considered a strong tool for acquiring knowledge and realizing truth in Jainism.

The book begins by dissecting the etymology of the word anumana. It is derived from anu (after) and mana (knowledge), signifying "subsequent knowledge." The author addresses the philosophical question of what prior knowledge is required for this subsequent knowledge to be distinctively called anumana, as many other forms of knowledge also occur after direct perception. The answer provided is that anumana arises from a specific prior knowledge – the knowledge of vyapti (invariable concomitance) or the logical connection between a sign (linga) and the thing inferred (lingi). This knowledge of vyapti is arrived at through reasoning (tarka-uha-chinta) and is essential for anumana.

The text distinguishes anumana from other forms of subsequent knowledge. While sensory perception can grasp related and present, near and gross objects, it is incapable of knowing unrelated, absent, past, future, distant, or subtle objects. This is where anumana plays a crucial role. Jain philosophy, with the exception of Charvaka, universally accepts anumana as a valid means of knowledge for such objects.

The author then traces the development of the definition of anumana within Jain logical texts:

• Samantabhadra: In his Aptamimamsa, Samantabhadra established the inferential knowability (anumeyatva) of the omniscient (sarvajna) using various logical reasons (hetu). While he outlined the components of inference such as hetu (reason), sadhyam (what is to be proved), pratigna (proposition), sapaksha (positive example), vipaksha (negative example), and drishtanta (illustration), he did not explicitly provide a formal definition of anumana as his works were not primarily definition-oriented. However, his emphasis on "other-than-which-there-is-no-other-way" (anyathanupapatti) as a characteristic of the hetu implies the importance of vyapti.

• Akalanka: Akalanka is presented as a key figure who provided clear definitions of anumana.

  • In his Nyaya-vinishchaya, the definition is: "The knowledge of the thing to be inferred (sadhyam) derived from the instrument (sadhanam) which is known to be invariably related to the thing to be inferred." He also clarifies that the sadhanam itself is that which has a determined invariable relation to the sadhyam.
  • In his Laghīyastraya, Akalanka defines anumana as: "The knowledge of the inferable object (lingi) from the sign (linga) that illuminates the invariable relation to the inferable object, and the fruits of this are knowledge of gain, acquisition, and relinquishment." This definition is lauded for its completeness, encompassing both the cause and the nature of anumana, along with its results.

• Vidyānanda: Vidyānanda supports and elaborates on Akalanka's definition, emphasizing that both the correct sign (sadhanam) and the inferable object (sadhyam) are indispensable for anumana. Without the correctly defined sign, the inference is not possible, and similarly, without a knowable inferable object, inference cannot occur.

• Manikyandi: Manikyandi adopts Akalanka's definition verbatim and further defines the hetu (reason) as the sadhanam that has the certainty of being invariably related to the sadhyam.

• Hemachandra: Hemachandra also adheres to Manikyandi's formulation of Akalanka's definition.

• Dharmabhushana: Dharmabhushana, in his Nyaya Deepika, not only explains Akalanka's definition but also critically reviews other definitions, particularly the concept of linga-parāmarśa (contemplation of the sign) as anumana proposed by Udyotakara. Dharmabhushana argues that mere contemplation of the sign (knowledge of the sign) only removes ignorance about the sign itself, not necessarily ignorance about the inferable object. True inference, for him, is the knowledge of the inferable object after the removal of ignorance about it, and the most effective instrument for this is the direct knowledge of the inferable object, which is itself anumana. He compares this to other cognitive processes where prior knowledge is a cause for subsequent knowledge.

The text also briefly touches upon the definitions of anumana from other Indian philosophical schools, such as Gautama, Prashastapada, and Udyotakara. It notes that while some definitions like Udyotakara's linga-parāmarśa (contemplation of the sign) focus on the cause, they might not fully capture the essence of anumana as the knowledge of the inferable object. Dignaga's definition is mentioned as having elements of both cause and form, but the author suggests that substituting "from the contemplation of the sign" for "from the sign" would make it more complete.

In conclusion, the book emphasizes that Akalanka's definition of anumana is considered the most systematic, reasoned, and complete within Jain logic, being widely adopted by subsequent Jain logicians like Vidyānanda. The text underscores the significance of anumana as a vital tool for knowledge acquisition in Jainism, particularly for understanding aspects of reality that are beyond direct sensory perception.