Jain Darshan Me Agam Praman - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary in English of the Jain text "Jain Darshan me Agam Praman" by Harindrabhushan Jain, based on the provided PDF excerpt:

Jain Darshan me Agam (Shruta) Praman: A Summary of Āgama (Shruta) as a Means of Valid Knowledge in Jain Philosophy

This text delves into the concept of Āgama Pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge derived from scripture or testimony) within Jain philosophy, highlighting its foundational role and evolution.

1. The Framework of Knowledge and Means of Knowledge in Jainism:

The discussion on the means of knowledge (Pramāṇa) in Jainism is first systematically presented in Umasvati's Tattvārthasūtra.
Jain tradition categorizes knowledge (Jñāna) into five types: Mati (sensory and mental cognition), Shruta (scriptural knowledge), Avadhi (clairvoyance), Manahparyaya (telepathy), and Kevala (omniscience).
These five types of knowledge are further divided into two primary categories: Pratyaksha (direct) and Paroksha (indirect).
- Pratyaksha is divided into Kevalajñāna (omniscience) and Nokevalajñāna (lesser direct knowledge). Nokevalajñāna includes Avadhi and Manahparyaya.
- Paroksha is described as Abhinibodhika (Mati) and Shruta (Tad-jñāna).
Umasvati considers these five types of knowledge themselves as Pramāṇa. He interprets Mati knowledge as encompassing memory, recognition, reasoning, and inference, thereby integrating previously recognized independent pramāṇas into the fold of Mati.
However, the systematic development of the theory of knowledge and means of knowledge is primarily attributed to Bhatt Akalankadeva.
While Jinbhadra Gani attempted to classify sensory and mental knowledge (Mati) as Sāṁvyavahārika Pratyaksha (conventional direct knowledge), thereby resolving disputes with non-Jain philosophers about the status of sensory knowledge, it is Akalankadeva who is credited with establishing the systematic framework of Pramāṇa.
Akalankadeva, following Umasvati's Tattvārthasūtra, classifies Pramāṇa into Pratyaksha and Paroksha, with Paroksha further divided into Smriti (memory), Pratyabhijñāna (recognition), Tarka (reasoning), Anumāna (inference), and Āgama (scriptural testimony).
Although later commentators like Anantvirya and Vidyanandi did not fully accept memory and other cognitive faculties as strictly atīndriya pratyaksha (non-sensory direct knowledge), the framework established by Akalankadeva was unanimously accepted by subsequent Jain philosophers.

2. Āgama (Shruta) Pramāṇa: Testimony as a Means of Valid Knowledge:

In Jainism, Āgama Pramāṇa is known as Shabda Pramāṇa in other philosophical systems. Siddharshi was the first Jain acharya to use the term Shabda Pramāṇa in place of Āgama Pramāṇa.
The term Shruta Jñāna (knowledge from listening) is a unique contribution of Jainism. While there's no significant difference between Shruta Jñāna and Shabda Pramāṇa as both emphasize the importance of words, the concept of Shruta Jñāna is distinct in its Jain context.
Jain acharyas define Āgama Pramāṇa as the cognition arising from the word of an Āpta (an infallible authority). They also state that if other philosophers question how cognition derived from words can be Āgama, the response is that, by convention, the word itself is considered Āgama.
Manikyanaṁdi defines Āgama as knowledge arising from the words and signs of an Āpta.
Siddhasena Divakara defines Shabda Pramāṇa as sentences that are non-contradictory to the speaker's direct experience and intentions, and which originate from someone who grasps reality.
The core understanding is that Āgama Pramāṇa is the knowledge of a substance arising from the words of an Āpta. All Jain acharyas agree on this, but they have differing views on the nature of an Āpta.

3. The Nature of Āpta (The Infallible Authority):

Kundakunda defines an Āpta as a person who is free from all defects and possesses all virtues. Conversely, one who is not free from defects and lacks virtues is an Anāpta.
Padmaprabhamalladhari, commenting on Kundakunda, states that an Āpta is free from doubt, while an Anāpta is filled with doubt.
Samantabhadra asserts that an Āpta is one who has destroyed all defects, is omniscient (Sarvajña), and is the master of Āgama (knowledge of what is to be accepted and rejected). He lists eighteen specific defects that an Āpta is free from, including hunger, thirst, old age, disease, birth, death, fear, pride, attachment, aversion, delusion, worry, discontent, sleep, surprise, dispute, sadness, and sweat. Samantabhadra insists that an Āpta must possess at least one of these three qualities: defectlessness (Nirdoshita), omniscience (Sarvajñata), and mastery of Āgama (Āgāmeshita). In his view, only omniscient beings like Arhats and Tirthankaras qualify as Āptas because they possess all these qualities.
Akalankadeva also identifies Arhats as omniscient, asserting that others speak contrary to logic and scripture.
Hemachandracharya similarly defines the supreme being (Parameshvara) as Arhat, who is omniscient, has conquered defects like attachment, is revered in the three worlds, and speaks of things as they truly are.
The consensus is that an omniscient being is free from all defects and is the master of scripture, as omniscience is impossible without defectlessness, and mastery of scripture is impossible without omniscience. Therefore, Tirthankaras and Arhats are considered Āptas.
Samantabhadra enumerates eight epithets for an Āpta reflecting these qualities: Paramēṣṭhi (one who has attained the highest state), Paramajyoti (supreme light), Virāga (devoid of passions), Vimala (pure), Kṛtī (creator/skilled), Sarvajña (omniscient), Anādimadhyānta (without beginning, middle, or end), and Shāstā (preceptor of true principles).
Akalankadeva, in his Ashtashati, offers a broader definition of Āpta: one who is a reliable source (Avishṁvādak) in a particular domain is an Āpta in that domain, but not necessarily elsewhere. For Āptatva, knowledge of the subject and reliability are essential.
Vādidēvasūri and Haribhadra define an Āpta as one who knows the object they speak of accurately and communicates it precisely as they know it. Parents and Tirthankaras are given as examples.
Ratnaprabhacharya defines an Āpta as one from whom the intended meaning is grasped, or one who has eradicated defects like attachment. He also notes that someone who conveys knowledge of a distant object through writing, numbers, gestures, or remembrance can also be considered an Āpta. He further clarifies that those with defects speak of things in a distorted way, unlike Āptas.
Laghu Anantvirya adopts a broader definition similar to Akalankadeva, using the term Avanchaka (non-deceptive) instead of Avishṁvādak. One who is non-deceptive in a particular context is an Āpta in that context. Non-deceptiveness implies freedom from defects like attachment.
Bhavasena Trividya echoes Laghu Anantvirya's definition, adding the qualifier Yathābhi-jñatva (knowing the subject). An Āpta is one who knows a subject and is a truthful, non-deceptive person in that regard.
Yashovijaya defines an Āpta as one who knows an object as it is and is inclined towards beneficial teachings.

4. Types of Āgama Pramāṇa:

Based on the two types of Āptas (worldly and otherworldly), Āgama Pramāṇa is also divided into two:
- Laukika (Worldly): Knowledge derived from the words of worldly Āptas who are reliable and non-deceptive in their domain.
- Lokottara (Otherworldly): This category is further divided into:
  - Angapravishta: The sacred teachings directly uttered by Tirthankaras and compiled into sutras by Ganadharas. These include the twelve Angas (e.g., Ācārāṅga, Sūtakṛtāṅga, etc.).
  - Angabahya: Texts composed by acharyas of the Ganadhara lineage for the benefit of disciples, such as Daśavaikālika, Uttarādhyayana, etc. These are considered as authoritative as the Angapravishta texts, as they are based on them and are essentially in the form of sutras for the welfare of disciples with limited lifespan, strength, and intellect.

5. Availability of Āgama Texts:

There are differing views among Jain traditions regarding the availability of these ancient Agama texts:
- Śvetāmbara Murtipujaka: Believe that 45 Agamas (excluding Drishtivada) are still extant.
- Śvetāmbara Sthanakavasi: Consider 32 Agamas to be authoritative today.
- Digambara: Assert that the ancient twelve Angas and other scriptures are no longer available. However, they consider texts like Shatkhandagama, Kashayapahuda, and Kathabhanda, along with their commentaries like Dhavala and Jayadhavala, as authoritative, being based on the ancient Agamas.

6. The Nature of Shruta Jñāna (Scriptural Knowledge):

The term Shruta is derived from the Sanskrit root 'shr' meaning to hear. Pujyapada defines Shruta as that by which a described substance is heard when the covering karma of Shruta Jñānāvaraṇa is subdued.
While the etymological meaning of Shruta is "heard," in Jainism, it is primarily used as a technical term for a specific type of knowledge. Pujyapada states that although the word Shruta fundamentally refers to hearing, it has become conventionally established to mean a specific knowledge.
The meaning of Shruta is Shruta Jñāna (knowledge of what is heard), not just the act of hearing.
There is a debate whether Shruta refers to the knowledge or the words themselves. Jain philosophers argue that while the primary meaning is knowledge, the verbal aspect (Shabdātmak) is also considered Shruta by convention, especially since the Agamas are verbal texts.
Umasvati's definition of Shruta Jñāna is knowledge preceded by Mati Jñāna.
Most Jain philosophers after Umasvati, except Nemichandra Siddhantika, agree that Shruta Jñāna follows Mati Jñāna.
Jinbhadra Gani further clarifies this, defining Shruta Jñāna as knowledge that is word-following (Shabdānusāri) and capable of expressing self-manifesting meaning, acquired with the help of senses and mind.
Akalankadeva emphasizes the role of words, stating that Mati, Smriti, Chinta, Tarka, and Anumāna become Shruta Jñāna after the arrangement of words. He includes Upamāna, Arthāpatti, Abhāva, Sambhava, Aitihya, and Pratibhā as subsumed within Shruta after the formation of words.
Amritachandrasuri defines Shruta Jñāna as the cognition that follows Mati Jñāna and involves logical reasoning of clear meanings.
Madhavacharya adds that Shruta Jñāna is clear knowledge arising from Mati Jñāna after the obscuration of knowledge is removed or subdued.
Nemichandra Siddhantika offers a distinct definition: Shruta Jñāna is the knowledge of a subject different from the subject of Mati Jñāna. His reasoning likely stems from the distinction between scriptural knowledge and the initial sensory perception.
The text clarifies that while Shruta Jñāna requires the hearing of words (which is part of Mati Jñāna), it is not merely a product of Mati Jñāna. The subduing of Shruta Jñāna covering karma is essential. Mati Jñāna is an external cause, but the internal cause is the dispelling of karmic obstruction.
In essence, Shruta Jñāna is clear knowledge, capable of expressing its meaning, acquired with the help of mind and senses, following the dispelling of the Shruta Jñāna covering karma.

7. Classifications of Shruta Jñana:

Jain acharyas have proposed various classifications for Shruta Jñāna. The most widely accepted are Angapravishta and Angabahya.
Āvaśyaka Niyukti mentions 14 types of Shruta Jñāna: Akshara, Saṁjñī, Samyak, Sādika, Saparyavasita, Gamika, Angapravishta, Anakshara, Asaṁśī, Asamyak, Anādika, Aparyavasita, Āgamika, and Angabahya.
Akalankadeva proposes three types: Pratyaksha-nimittaka, Anumāna-nimittaka, and Āgama-nimittaka.
Amritachandrasuri and Narendrasenacharya list twenty types based on nuances like Paryāya (modes).
Nemichandra Siddhantika also enumerates twenty types in his Gommatasāra Jīvakāṇḍa, including Paryāya, Akshara, Pada, Sanghāta, Pratipattika, Anuyoga, etc., and their combinations. These twenty types are accepted by both Digambara and Śvetāmbara traditions.
Akshara (Alphabetic) and Anakshara (Non-alphabetic) Shruta Jñāna: This is a significant classification.
- Anakshara: Knowledge acquired with the help of senses (other than hearing) and mind, preceded by Mati Jñāna. It is also called Liṅga Shruta Jñāna.
- Akshara: Knowledge acquired through Mati Jñāna arising from the sense of hearing. It is also called Shabda-ja Shruta Jñāna.
Akalankadeva offers a different perspective: when the knower understands through memory, reasoning, etc., it's Anakshara; when they communicate this knowledge to others, it becomes Akshara. However, the more prevalent definition distinguishes between knowledge derived from auditory perception (Akshara) and other sensory/mental perceptions (Anakshara).
The text notes that while knowledge is inherently formless (bhāva-rūpa), it is termed Akshara when it arises through letters. Knowledge not based on letters is Anakshara Shruta.
Śvetāmbara tradition holds that both Akshara and Anakshara Shruta are word-based, with Akshara Shruta arising from alphabetic words and Anakshara Shruta from non-alphabetic words.
Digambara tradition distinguishes Shabda-ja Shruta as Akshara and Liṅga-ja Shruta as Anakshara. They emphasize the primacy of words in Shruta Jñāna.

8. Authoritativeness (Prāmāṇya) of Shruta Jñana:

Jain philosophers refute the claims of materialists (Cārvāka) and Buddhists who deny the authoritativeness of Shruta Jñāna.
They argue that just as direct perceptual knowledge (Pratyaksha) is considered valid because it is consistent in knowing itself and its object, Shruta Jñāna is also valid due to its consistency.
Jain acharyas point out that other philosophical schools have their own scriptures and the knowledge gained from them is also Shruta Jñāna.
They emphasize that without Shruta Jñāna, there would be no distinction between the ignorant and the learned. Words are the primary means for conveying knowledge and progress.
The argument that if some Shruta Jñāna can be mistaken (like mistaking a shell for silver), then all Shruta Jñāna should be invalid, is countered by analogy: if mistaken perception (like seeing one moon as two) invalidates all perception, then all direct knowledge would be invalid. While acknowledging the possibility of Shrutābhāsa (fallacious scriptural knowledge), rejecting Shruta Jñāna entirely is deemed unreasonable.
Therefore, Shruta Jñāna is considered an independent and valid means of knowledge, essential for the functioning of the world and the transmission of knowledge across generations.

9. Significance of Shruta Jñana:

Shruta Jñāna is unique in being both knowledge and word-based. It is known by the knower and can be conveyed to others.
While Shabda Pramāṇa is synonymous with Shruta Jñāna, other pramāṇas like Upamāna, Arthāpatti, Abhāva, Aitihya, Sambhava, and Pratibhā are also subsumed within Shruta Jñāna when words are involved in their apprehension.
Through Shruta Jñāna, the knowledge of ancestors, Tirthankaras, Ganadharas, and their successors is transmitted. Different traditions refer to this as Shruta, Shruti, or Āgama.