Jain Anuman Ki Upalabdhiya - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary of the Jain text "Jain Anuman ki Upalabdhiya" by Darbarilal Kothiya, focusing on the achievements of Jain logic regarding inference:

The book "Jain Anuman ki Upalabdhiya" by Dr. Darbarilal Kothiya delves into the significant contributions and unique perspectives of Jain philosophy on the concept of inference (Anumana) within Indian logic. The author traces the historical development of inference, highlighting how Jain thinkers, from the outset, considered it a valid means of knowledge, even if they used different terms for it.

Historical Context and Early Developments:

Upanishadic Period: The text notes that during the Upanishadic era, there was an increasing emphasis on inference (Anumana) as a necessary and purposeful tool for knowledge, alongside scriptural testimony (Shruti). This is evidenced by phrases like "the soul is to be seen, heard, contemplated, and meditated upon," implying the use of reasoning and arguments.
Early Terminology: Inference was known by various names such as "Vakovakyam" (debate), "Anvikshiki" (logic), "Tarkavidya" (science of reasoning), and "Hetuvidya" (science of causes).
Jain Terminology: In early Jain literature, inference was referred to as "Hetuvada" (theory of causes) and considered a synonym for scriptural knowledge (Shruta). The author of Tattvartha Sutra mentioned it as "Abhinibodha." The core idea is that Jainism, like other schools, accepted inference as a valid pramana (means of knowledge) for determining reality, distinguishing it from perception (Pratyaksha) primarily by the former's clarity and the latter's indirectness.

Discussions on Inference by Other Indian Schools:

Vaisheshikas: Kanada is credited with the initial discussion on the components of inference, referring to it as "Laingika" (related to signs), emphasizing the "linga" (sign/middle term) as its primary element. He focused on the characteristics of signs and fallacious signs. His commentator, Prashastapada, later introduced the five-membered syllogism (Pratigya, Hetu, Udaharana, Upanaya, Nigamana).
Nyaya (Naiyayikas): Akshapada's Nyaya Sutras mark a more structured development of logic. Akshapada clearly used the term "Anumana" and elaborated on its causal factors, types, constituents, and fallacies. He also introduced auxiliary concepts like inference examination, debate, rhetoric, sophistry, equivocation, and logical fallacies, making inference useful for philosophical discourse. Later Nyaya scholars like Vatsyayana, Udyotakara, Vachaspati, Udayana, and Ganesha further refined it by introducing crucial concepts like Vyapti (invariable concomitance) and Paramarsha (reasoning based on vyapti and pakshadharmata). The Nyaya school became known as the "Darshana of Nyaya" due to its profound contributions to logic and inference.
Buddhists: Buddhist logicians like Asanga, Vasubandhu, Dignaga, and Dharmakirti offered a critical and distinctive perspective on inference, influencing later Indian logical thought. Their work removed logical impediments, facilitating free philosophical inquiry and giving greater prominence to inference across all schools.
Sankhya and Mimamsa: Sankhya scholars and Mimamsa thinkers also engaged with inference, acknowledging it as a valid means of knowledge alongside scriptural authority, though their focus was primarily on nature, soul, and ritualistic actions, respectively.

Key Achievements of Jain Logicians:

The text then systematically details the specific achievements and unique contributions of Jain logicians regarding inference:

Definition of Inference (Anumana Swarupa):
- Jain logicians, particularly Akalankadeva, provided a more complete definition of inference than their predecessors. Akalank's definition, "Lingatsadhyavinabhavaminibodhakalakshanat. Lingidhi: anumanaṃ tatphalaṃ hanadi buddhyah," explicitly includes the knowledge of the sign (lingajñāna) as the cause and the cognition of the signified (lingidhiḥ) as the inference itself. This definition also incorporated the result of inference (e.g., understanding what to avoid).
- Jain logicians emphasized that only a sign with a determined invariable concomitance (avinabhava) can lead to inference. The absence of this certainty renders the sign fallacious, even if it possesses other characteristics.
Inference as a Sub-Category of Indirect Knowledge (Puroksha Pramana):
- While other Indian schools considered inference an independent pramana, Jain logicians classified it as a type of Puroksha Pramana (indirect knowledge). This is because inference deals with indirect objects and is less clear than direct perception. This classification subsumes memory, recognition, reasoning, implication, possibility, absence, and word within the broader category of indirect knowledge.
Rejection of Arthapatti as a Separate Pramana:
- Jain thinkers did not accept Arthapatti (postulation or implication) as a separate pramana, as proposed by Mimamsa scholars like Prabhakara and Bhatt. They argued that Arthapatti, which infers a hidden fact from an apparent one (like inferring Devadatta eats at night because he is fat and doesn't eat during the day), is essentially a form of inference. Both rely on the principle of invariable concomitance (vyapti). The Jain view is that the inference is based on anyathanupapatti (non-difference from an alternative explanation), which is equivalent to vyapti.
The Single Characteristic of a Probans (Hetu):
- Jain logicians championed Avinabhava (invariable concomitance) as the sole essential characteristic of a valid probans (hetu). They found the multi-characteristic theories of the Nyaya (three- or five-part) and other schools to be either too broad or too narrow. This concept of avinabhava, also termed anyathanupapannatva, is presented as a significant Jain contribution.
Vyapti as the Sole Component of Inference:
- While other schools considered both Pakshadharmata (presence of the middle term in the minor term) and Vyapti as essential components of inference, Jain logicians argued that only Vyapti is necessary. They posited that inferences can be valid even without explicit pakshadharmata, as long as vyapti is established. Conversely, a probans might have pakshadharmata but still be fallacious if vyapti is absent.
Conception of Preceding, Succeeding, and Co-existing Probanses:
- Akalankadeva introduced the classification of probanses into Purvachara (preceding), Uttarachara (succeeding), and Sahachara (co-existing). These classifications, not found in earlier thought, represent a unique contribution by identifying the temporal and co-temporal relationships of the middle term to the major term.
Inference Usage Based on the Nature of the Propositum:
- Jain thinkers refined the structure of syllogistic inference by considering the nature of the subject matter being proved (pratipadhya).
  - For derived or well-understood propositions (vyutpanna), they considered only the Paksha (minor term) and Hetu (middle term) sufficient, deeming the example (udaharana) unnecessary, aligning with certain Buddhist and Naiyayika inferences.
  - For undetermined or less understood propositions (avyutpanna), they advocated for the inclusion of all five members of the syllogism: Paksha, Hetu, Udaharana, Upanaya, and Nigamana. This differentiated approach to syllogistic structure was a significant development.
Tarka as the Sole Means of Ascertaining Vyapti:
- While other schools recognized various means for establishing vyapti (like repeated observation of concomitance), Jain tradition firmly established Tarka (reasoning or dialectical argument) as the sole means of ascertaining vyapti. Akalankadeva is credited with robustly supporting and establishing Tarka's validity in this regard, predating some Western Indian logicians.
Tathopapatti and Anyathanupapatti:
- Jain texts uniquely present two types of vyapti usage: Tathopapatti and Anyathanupapatti. These are described as gnostic (knowledge-based) in nature, unlike other classifications of vyapti which are gnoseological (object-based). The text suggests that anyathanupapatti is the core of tathopapatti and the essential factor in establishing the relationship between the probans and the probandum.
Sadhya-abhas (Fallacy of the Probandum):
- Akalankadeva introduced the term Sadhya-abhas in place of Pratigya-abhas or Paksha-abhas (fallacy of the proposition). He argued that since the probans's relationship of concomitance is with the probandum (that which is to be proved) and not directly with the proposition itself, the fallacies of the probans should logically be termed fallacies of the probandum. Vidyānanda further supported this view. Akalank defined the probandum as that which is possible, intended, and well-known, and Sadhya-abhas as that which is impossible, unintended, or unknown.
Akincitkara Hetuabhas (Incapable Probans):
- Akalankadeva proposed a new category of fallacious probans called Akincitkara (incapable or useless). He argued that in essence, all fallacies stem from the absence of anyathanupapannatva (invariable concomitance), making the probans incapable of proving the thesis. The other commonly listed fallacies (like prasiddha, sandeha, viparyasa) are considered expansions or manifestations of this fundamental incapacity.
Balaprayoga-abhas (Fallacy of Imprudent Usage):
- Manikyanandi introduced the concept of Balaprayoga-abhas in the context of fallacies of inference. This refers to the improper or unwise application of syllogistic members, such as using fewer members than required for a less intelligent audience, using too many for a more intelligent one, or presenting them in the wrong order. This, too, is considered a significant Jain contribution to understanding the practical application of logical arguments.

In conclusion, the book "Jain Anuman ki Upalabdhiya" argues that Jain logicians made substantial and original contributions to the understanding of inference, refining its definition, identifying its core principles, and introducing novel classifications and concepts that enriched the landscape of Indian logical thought.