Jain Absolute

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text:

The Jain text, "Jain Absolute" by Hemant Shah, explores the often-held perception of Jainism as an atheistic religion, arguing that this view is a misunderstanding primarily confined to those deeply immersed in its philosophical doctrines. The author posits that the common Jain is largely unaffected by this "Godless" label and asserts that a closer examination of Jain philosophy, particularly the doctrine of Syadwad, reveals that Jainism is not, and cannot be, Godless.

Syadwad: The Core of Jain Dialectics and Implied Absolutism

The text introduces Syadwad as the central pillar of Jain dialectics and logic. Unlike ordinary logic, which adheres to a strict "either/or" principle (a proposition is either true or false, a thing either exists or does not), Syadwad embraces a more nuanced view. It proposes that a thing can possess multiple, even seemingly contradictory, characteristics simultaneously. This is rooted in the Jain understanding that every object in the world has infinite characteristics (anantdharmakam vastu).

The author explains that it's humanly impossible to grasp all of these infinite characteristics at once. We can only perceive certain aspects or perspectives of an object at any given time. These perceived aspects are always relative and conditional. Therefore, according to Syadwad, when we affirm a characteristic of an object, it is always "under a particular circumstance." If those circumstances change, the characteristic may no longer hold true. This leads to the concept of "conditional existence" or "relative existence."

To express this relative existence, Jainism uses the word "Syad," which in Sanskrit means "probability" or "perhaps." Instead of stating "the pot is," Jain logic would say "perhaps the pot is" (syad ghat asti). This acknowledges that our knowledge of the pot is limited to certain aspects and under specific conditions. The text highlights that human senses provide only relative knowledge, making absolute propositions untenable in Jain logic. Jainism recognizes seven relational propositions known as Naya or Saptabhangi Naya. For example, a pot exists as a form, but it is fundamentally made of clay. Thus, from the perspective of its form, the pot "is," but from the perspective of its material, it "is not." Syadwad would reconcile this by stating, "perhaps the pot is and is not."

Crucially, the author argues that the very concept of relativism necessitates an underlying absolutism. One cannot have "relative" without an "Absolute" to be relative to. The author believes that Jain philosophers, through their expounding of Syadwad's relativism, implicitly disclose or imply an Absolute, which in other philosophical traditions is often referred to as God.

The Doctrine of Souls in Liberation: Ontological Unity and a Latent God

The text then shifts to the Jain doctrine of souls (Jivas) in the state of liberation. It states that all liberated souls are intrinsically alike. They all possess infinite knowledge, infinite happiness, infinite power, and infinite bliss. While each soul remains a distinct entity, they share these ultimate characteristics.

The author contends that this shared possession of identical, infinite qualities implies an ontological unity among liberated souls. Any perceived differences are merely quantitative, not qualitative. The analogy of sugarcane is used: multiple pieces of sugarcane are still fundamentally sugarcane, with no qualitative difference. Similarly, even if souls have quantitative differences, their qualitative essence is identical.

The text challenges the idea that quantitative differences are real, suggesting that when difference is not qualitative, it is essentially no difference at all. This leads to the assertion that in the state of liberation, there is ultimately "no difference between one soul and other soul." All souls are "one." The author then poses the rhetorical question: "Can we not call this ONE, God?"

Conclusion: Jainism as Theistic, Not Atheistic

The author concludes that Jain philosophy, despite rejecting qualitative differences among souls and not presenting a creator God in the conventional sense, does contain a concept of God. This "God" is not immediately apparent but must be "brought out with effort." Jainism, the author argues, appears atheistic on the surface but is, in fact, theistic, containing a "latent God" (prachanna iswara). The rejection of numerical differences, which are considered nominal and not real, reinforces the idea of an underlying unity that can be understood as a form of divine absolute.