Is Inexplicability Otherwise Otherwise Inexplicable

This article, "Is 'Inexplicability Otherwise' Otherwise Inexplicable?" by Piotr Balcerowicz, traces a significant shift in Jaina epistemology, particularly in the concept of inference (anumana), which occurred around the 8th century CE.

Key Developments in Jaina Epistemology:

• The New Model of Inference: The 8th century saw the introduction of a new model of inference based on a reinterpretation of the "logical reason" (het). This logical reason is now defined by the concept of "inexplicability otherwise" (anyathanupapatti).
• Anyathanupapatti: This term, meaning "impossibility otherwise" or "not being explicable in any other way," became the sole defining characteristic of a correct logical reason. Its essence lies in its inseparable connection (avindbhava) with the inferable property (sadhya), which is understood through hypothetical reasoning (tarka).
• Innovation and Influence: The article suggests that this innovation might have originated with Pātrasvāmin, an earlier Jaina logician, as attested by later Jaina sources like Vādideva-sūri and by the Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita. Prominent Jaina thinkers who adopted and developed this idea include Siddhasena Mahāmati, Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda, and Māṇikyānandin.
• Rejection of Traditional Tri-lakṣaṇa: This new model challenged the prevailing Buddhist view (associated with Dignāga) that a valid logical reason must possess three characteristics (tri-lakṣaṇa). The Jaina proponents of anyathanupapatti argued that only one characteristic is necessary, simplifying the criteria for valid inference. They also questioned the absolute necessity of providing positive (anvaya) and negative (vyatireka) instances (drānta) for every inference, as some valid inferences might not have them.
• Influence from Mimāṁsā and Buddhism: Balcerowicz highlights that the term anyathanupapatti is not a Jaina invention but is also central to the Mimāṁsā concept of presumption (arthāpatti). He draws parallels between the Jaina and Mimāṁsā understanding of this term, particularly in how it allows for inferring the unseen based on the seen or heard because the situation would otherwise be inexplicable. The Jaina model also adopted the Buddhist notion of inseparable connection (avyabhicāra or avinābhāva).
• The Role of Tarka (Suppositional Knowledge): To establish the certainty of the avyabhicāra relation, especially when extrapolating from particular instances to general rules (the problem of induction), the Jainas introduced the concept of tarka (suppositional knowledge). This is described as a distinct cognitive criterion that helps ascertain the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) necessary for valid inference.
• Synthesis of Ideas: The article concludes that the Jaina model of inference represents a significant synthesis, combining the Mimāṁsā's anyathanupapatti, the Buddhist avyabhicāra, and the Naiyāyika's tarka. This created a more economical and logically rigorous system, moving towards a more formal logic by reducing the reliance on empirical exemplifications and shifting the burden of verification to tarka.
• Implications for Logic: This development is seen as an attempt to solve the "problem of induction" within Indian logic. By focusing on anyathanupapatti and avyabhicāra, the Jainas aimed to establish invariant rules that could guarantee the certainty of inferences, potentially paving the way for a more abstract and deductive approach to logic, less dependent on empirical instances.

In essence, Balcerowicz argues that the introduction of "inexplicability otherwise" as the core of Jaina inference marked a pivotal moment, leading to a more streamlined and conceptually rich epistemology that drew upon, yet distinctively synthesized, ideas from other Indian philosophical traditions.