Indologica Taurinensia - Book Summary

This document is an academic paper by Piotr Balcerowicz published in Indologica Taurinensia, Volume XXIX, 2003, as part of the Proceedings of the XIth World Sanskrit Conference. The paper, titled "ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE NYĀYĀVATĀRA AND THE SAMMATI-TARKA-PRAKARANA," argues that these two Jain philosophical works were authored by two different individuals, separated by at least 150 years, despite a traditional attribution to a single author, Siddhasena Divākara.

Here's a comprehensive summary of the paper's arguments:

1. The Traditional Attribution and the Need for Re-evaluation:

The paper acknowledges the long-standing tradition of attributing both the Sammatitarka-prakarana (STP) and the Nyāyāvatāra (NA) to Siddhasena Divākara.
However, it highlights that scholars have raised doubts about this attribution, particularly concerning the Nyāyāvatāra and its structure (e.g., the number of verses).
Balcerowicz proposes to distinguish between two Siddhasenas: Siddhasena Divākara for the author of STP and Siddhasena Mahāmati for the author of NA.

2. Key Discrepancies Between STP and NA:

Language: STP is written in Prakrit, while NA is in Sanskrit. While not definitive, this is noted as a difference.
Stylistic Dissimilarity: The overall writing style also differs.
Subject Matter and Approach:
- NA: Primarily focuses on epistemology, specifically the validity of cognition (prāmānya), definitions of pramāņa (means of valid cognition), and their divisions. It closely follows the epistemological tradition of the Dignāga-Dharmakirti school (specifically, works like Nyāyabindu). NA's structure is rigid, with definitions followed by explanations and exemplifications. It uses Sanskrit terminology and is generally understandable even without deep prior knowledge of Jainism, suggesting a broader philosophical context.
- STP: Derives its content entirely from the Jain tradition. It delves into detailed expositions of anekānta-vāda (theory of manifoldness of reality), including nay as (standpoints) and nikṣepas (categories), and the sapta-bhangī (seven-fold predication). It also discusses cognitive faculties (upayoga) and ontological, ethical, and soteriological questions specific to Jainism. STP uses canonical Jain terminology and assumes the reader is familiar with Jain doctrines, making it difficult for non-Jains to comprehend.
Intellectual Backgrounds: The differing content and vocabulary suggest entirely different intellectual backgrounds for the two works.

3. Specific Points of Divergence:

Cognitive Faculties (Upayoga) vs. Pramāṇa:
- STP: Discusses upayoga (cognitive faculties) extensively, distinguishing between jñāna (cognition) and darśana (insight/conation) based on their grasp of the particular and the general, respectively. This distinction is linked to the Jain ontological viewpoints (dravyārthika and paryāyārthika). The paper notes that STP's understanding of darśana might differ from standard Buddhist conceptions and that its author might have flourished before Dignāga and Dharmakirti due to a lack of engagement with their critiques.
- NA: Does not mention upayoga or darśana. It focuses solely on pramāņa and divides it into pratyakṣa (perception) and parokṣa (indirect cognition). NA's definition of pratyakṣa aligns with the general Indian epistemological tradition of sensory perception, unlike some Jain traditions that considered it supra-sensory. It also mentions kevala (absolute cognition) as a special kind of pratyakṣa, but without the elaborate philosophical discussion found in STP.
Polemics against Buddhist Logicians: NA contains direct or indirect polemics against Dignāga and Dharmakirti (e.g., regarding the validity of inference). This strongly suggests NA was written after Dharmakirti. STP, conversely, appears to lack awareness of such critiques, suggesting an earlier date.
The Nature of Pratyakṣa:
- NA: Defines pratyakṣa in line with sensory perception, even allowing for a metaphorical understanding of "perception for others" (parārtha-pratyakṣa).
- STP: While using the term darśana, it's debated how closely it maps to NA's pratyakṣa. The paper highlights that STP's darśana is linked to grasping the "general," which could be interpreted in ways that might be problematic for Buddhist logicians, but the author of STP seems unaware of these potential issues.
The Role of Testimony (Śābda):
- NA: Considers verbal cognition (śābda) as a type of parokṣa. It also controversially proposes parārtha-pratyakṣa (perception for others), implying verbal utterances can directly trigger perception.
- STP: Seems to suggest that objects conveyed through testimony are not grasped directly, contradicting NA's stance.
Attitude towards Tradition:
- NA: Is innovative, deviating from established Jain tradition in its pramāņa classification and definitions. It relies on logical arguments rather than scriptural authority.
- STP: Demonstrates an "Agamic approach," striving to remain faithful to Jain scriptures and authority, even when addressing doctrinal ambiguities.
The Concept of Sapta-bhangī: This is a central concept in STP, but it is entirely absent in NA.
The Kevala Stage: STP emphasizes the unity of jñāna and darśana at the stage of kevala (absolute cognition), a point of contention within Jainism. NA simply states kevala as a type of pratyakṣa without this detailed discussion of the unity of faculties.

4. Critiques of Previous Scholarship:

Balcerowicz critiques Bansidhar Bhatt's (2000) arguments for dating NA after Prajñākara/Dharmottara. He points out Bhatt's conflation of Dignāga's Nyāyapraveśa and Dharmottara's commentary, and argues that NA's similarities with Buddhist logic do not automatically place it after later commentaries, but rather indicate influence.
He also refutes Bhatt's claim that NA 27 (on kevala) is an interpolation, arguing that the concept of kevala is crucial for Jain ontology, epistemology, and soteriology, and its placement in NA is logical. He also challenges Bhatt's metrical analysis for discarding NA 27 while retaining NA 26.

5. Dating and Chronology: Based on the above arguments, Balcerowicz proposes a tentative chronology:

Siddhasena Divākara (STP): c. 450-500 CE
Dignāga: c. 480-540 CE
Dharmakirti: c. 600-660 CE
Pātrasvāmin: c. 660-720 CE
Umveka Bhatta: c. 700-750 CE
Siddhasena Mahāmati (NA): c. 720-780 CE
Prajñākaragupta: c. 800 CE
Haribhadra-sūri: c. 800 CE

Conclusion: Balcerowicz concludes that the significant differences in philosophical content, methodology, engagement with prior philosophical traditions (especially Buddhist logic), and textual presuppositions strongly support the thesis that the Nyāyāvatāra and the Sammatitarka-prakarana are the products of two distinct authors, Siddhasena Mahāmati and Siddhasena Divākara, respectively. The paper meticulously details these differences, providing a strong case for differentiating the two works and their authors.