Hetvabhasa

This text is a detailed comparative analysis of the concept of "Hetvabhasa" (fallacy of inference) across different Indian philosophical traditions, primarily focusing on Jain, Buddhist, and Nyaya (Brahmanical) schools, as presented by Sukhlal Sanghavi.

Here's a summary of the key points discussed:

1. Introduction and Divergent Views on the Number of Hetvabhasas:

• The book "Hetvabhasa" by Sukhlal Sanghavi explores the disagreements among logicians regarding the definition and classification of fallacies of inference.
• Akshapada (Nyaya school): Acknowledges and describes five types of hetvabhasas.
• Kanada (Vaisheshika school): His sutras explicitly mention three fallacies, but Prashastapada, while explaining the sutras, describes four.
• Prashastapada: Includes "Asiddha" (unproven), "Viruddha" (contradictory), and "Anaikantika" (non-exclusive) which are also found in Akshapada. He adds "Anadhyavasita" (undetermined).
• Bhasarvajna: Following both Akshapada and Kanada, describes six hetvabhasas, essentially combining the counts from both traditions.
• Dignaga (Buddhist school): The "Nyayapravesha," attributed to Dignaga, only includes "Asiddha," "Viruddha," and "Anaikantika."
• Later Buddhist logicians (like Dharmakirti): Followed Dignaga's classification.
• Shankhyaacharya Mathara: Also mentions only the three fallacies (Asiddha, Viruddha, Anaikantika), suggesting an original agreement between Shankhya and Kanada on this.

2. Jain Tradition's Stance:

• The Jain tradition generally aligns with the Vaisheshika, Shankhya, and Buddhist views, recognizing only three primary hetvabhasas: Asiddha, Viruddha, and Anaikantika.
• Siddhasena Divakara and Vadideva Suri: Describe only these three.
• Acharya Hemachandra: Follows this tradition. While he refutes some fallacies mentioned in the Nyayasutras (like Kalatyayapadishta), he does not refute Anadhyavasita mentioned by Prashastapada and Bhasarvajna.
• Internal Jain Disagreement:
  • Akalanka and his followers (Manikyandi, etc. Digambara Jains): Propose four hetvabhasas, adding a new one called "Akinchitkara" (ineffective). This fallacy is not found elsewhere.
  • Jayanta Bhatta (Nyaya school): In his "Nyayamjari," he introduces "Anyathasiddha" (otherwise proved), also known as "Aprayojaka" (irrelevant). While the words seem similar to Akinchitkara, their meanings are distinct. The text questions the origin of Akinchitkara, suggesting Akalanka might have based it on someone else's concept of Aprayojaka.
  • Vadideva Suri: Is noted for refuting the Akinchitkara fallacy.

3. The Nature of Disagreements:

• The primary disagreements are quantitative (how many fallacies) rather than qualitative (whether something is a fallacy or not).
• If a tradition considers something a fallacy, another tradition might absorb it into one of its recognized fallacies or classify it as another type of error (like Pakshabhasa - fallacy of the premise).

4. Detailed Discussion of Individual Hetvabhasas:

• Asiddha (Unproven):
  • The Nyayasutras call it "Sadhya-sama" (similar to the predicate). Unlike other texts that provide detailed classifications and examples, the Nyayasutras and its commentary offer only a general description.
  • Prashastapada and Nyayapravesha describe four types of Asiddha: Ubhayasiddha (unproven for both sides), Anyatarasiddha (unproven for one side), Tadvabhavasiddha (unproven due to the absence of its own nature), and Ashrayasiddha (unproven due to the unproven locus).
  • Dharmakirti: Elaborates on these four, providing two examples for Ashrayasiddha, thus further subdividing it.
  • Nyayasara: Lists fourteen types of Asiddha with examples.
  • Manikyandi: Follows Dharmakirti in describing Asiddha.
  • Acharya Hemachandra: His classification of Asiddha follows Nyayabindu and Parikshamukha, with examples mirroring Nyayasara.
  • Vadideva Suri: His general description of Asiddha is considered more refined than Hemachandra's.
• Viruddha (Contradictory):
  • Similar to Asiddha, the Nyayasutras and Prashastapada describe its general nature without detailed sub-classifications.
  • Nyayapravesha: Describes four types of Viruddha.
  • Dharmakirti: Reduces the types to two, including a potential third ("Ishtavidhatakrit" - one that obstructs the desired goal) which he assimilates into the main two.
  • Jayanta: Refutes "Dharmavisheshaviruddha" and "Dhammivisheshaviruddha" as specific types of Viruddha.
  • Nyayasara: Presents the most extensive and complex classification of Viruddha.
  • Acharya Hemachandra: Adopts the classification and reasoning from Nyayasara and Nyayamjari, allowing some Viruddhas to be referred to as either Asiddha or Viruddha.
• Anaikantika (Non-exclusive/Irregular):
  • Two main traditions regarding the name exist: Gautama (Nyaya) calls it "Savyabhichara" (wandering), while Kanada (Vaisheshika) calls it "Sandigdha" (doubtful).
  • The difference lies in what constitutes the determining factor:
    • Gautama's tradition: Considers the co-presence of the reason with both the predicate (sadhya) and its negation (sadhya-abhav) as the determining factor.
    • Kanada's tradition: Considers the generative of doubt as the determining factor.
  • This leads to differences in examples and classification. For instance, "Asadharana" (uncommon) and "Viruddha-avyabhichari" (contradictory non-wandering) cannot be Anaikantika in Gautama's view because they are not co-present with the negation of the predicate.
  • While the name "Sandigdha" fell out of use, the concept persisted.
  • Nyayapravesha: Uses the name "Anaikantika" but defines it based on the criterion of "generating doubt," similar to Kanada's tradition. It lists six types, all illustrating the generation of doubt.
  • Prashastapada: Also considers "generating doubt" as the criterion for Anaikantika. However, he refutes Asadharana and Viruddha-avyabhichari as Anaikantika because they do not generate doubt. He suggests classifying them as "Anadhyavasita" or "Viruddha-bheda" respectively.
  • Dharmakirti: Defends the position that Anaikantika generates doubt. He provides different examples for Asadharana to demonstrate its doubt-generating nature, thus supporting the Nyayapravesha's view. He also defends Viruddha-avyabhichari, reconciling it with Dignaga's system.
  • Jayanta: Supports Prashastapada's view that Asadharana and Viruddha-avyabhichari are not Anaikantika and also rejects "generating doubt" as the sole criterion.
  • Bhasarvajna: Presents eight examples of Anaikantika without mentioning the "generating doubt" criterion, indicating adherence to Gautama's tradition.
  • Jain tradition: Uses both names "Anaikantika" (Siddhasena) and "Sandigdha" (Akalanka). Manikyandi's formulation is a concise version of Dharmakirti's. Vadideva's general definition using "Sandigdhyate" is not considered essential. Prabhachandra, Vadideva, and Hemachandra all incorporate the eight types of Anaikantika described by Bhasarvajna into their classifications, often using the same examples.

In essence, the book delves into the historical evolution of the concept of logical fallacies, highlighting the nuanced debates and differing interpretations of fundamental logical terms across major Indian philosophical schools, with a particular focus on how the Jain tradition engaged with and contributed to these discussions.