Hetu Ke Prakar - Book Summary | JainGPT

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Hetu ke Prakar" by Sukhlal Sanghavi, focusing on its discussion of the types of hetu (reasoning or probans) in Jain logic:

Book Title: Hetu ke Prakar (Types of Hetu) Author: Sukhlal Sanghavi Publisher: Z_Darshan_aur_Chintan_Part_1_2_002661.pdf Catalog Link: https://jainqq.org/explore/229036/1

Summary:

This excerpt from Sukhlal Sanghavi's "Hetu ke Prakar" delves into the classification of hetu (reasoning or probans) within the Jain logical tradition. The author highlights that while earlier Jain texts, like those by Akalanka, mention types of hetu, a clear and distinct classification, especially in terms of proving or disproving, is primarily found in the works of Manikyanandi, Vidyānanda, Devasuri, and Ācārya Hemacandra.

The classification of hetu in Jain texts is largely influenced by the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras and Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu.

Vaiśeṣika Sūtras: These texts classify linga (a sign or probans) into five types: kārya (effect), kāraṇa (cause), saṃyogī (conjoint), samavāyī (inherent), and virodhī (opposed).
Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti): This work classifies linga into three types: svabhāva (natural characteristic), kārya (effect), and anupalambha (non-apprehension). The Nyāyabindu describes eleven types of anupalambha, all solely for the purpose of negation (niṣedha), with none described for affirmation (vidhi).

The author then discusses how Jain logicians built upon and modified these earlier classifications:

Akalanka and Manikyanandi: They accepted the anupalambha (non-apprehension) from Nyāyabindu but made significant improvements and additions. While Dharmakīrti used anupalambha solely for proving negation, Manikyanandi argued that anupalambha can be used to establish both affirmation and negation. Furthermore, Manikyanandi also considered upalambha (apprehension) as capable of proving both affirmation and negation.
Vidyānanda: Vidyānanda's classification is based on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras. The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras describe three types of linga: abhūta bhūtasya (what has not happened, of what has happened), bhūta abhūtasya (what has happened, of what has not happened), and bhūta-bhūtasya (what has happened, of what has happened). Vidyānanda expands this to four types by adding abhūta abhūtasya (what has not happened, of what has not happened). This broader classification aims to encompass all types of upalambha and anupalambha that can prove affirmation and negation. The author suggests that Vidyānanda's extensive inclusion might have drawn inspiration from other Jain logicians like Akalanka or even Buddhist logicians, beyond just the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras.
Devasuri: Devasuri appears to base his classification on the Parīkṣāmukha. However, he introduces improvements. While the Parīkṣāmukha describes six types of upalambha and three types of anupalambha for affirmation, Devasuri's Pramāṇanayatattvāloka describes six types of upalambha for affirmation and five types of anupalambha. For negation, the Parīkṣāmukha outlines six types of upalambha and seven types of anupalambha. In contrast, the Pramāṇanayatattvāloka details seven types of niṣedha-sādhaka upalambha (apprehension proving negation) and seven types of niṣedha-sādhaka anupalambha (non-apprehension proving negation).
Ācārya Hemacandra: Hemacandra's classification is based on both the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras and the Nyāyabindu, similar to Vidyānanda. However, a key difference is that in Hemacandra's classification, no anupalambha is described as proving affirmation. Like the Nyāyabindu, anupalambha is solely presented as proving negation.

Despite the variations in classification and the number of categories, the author concludes that the essential meaning or core principle across all these classifications is fundamentally the same.

The text also briefly mentions Vācaspati Miśra, who, according to Sanghavi, refuted not only the Buddhist classifications but also the one presented in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras.

In essence, this passage traces the development and refinement of the classification of logical probans (hetu) within Jainism, showing how Jain scholars engaged with and adapted ideas from earlier Indian philosophical schools, particularly Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist logic, to create their own nuanced systems for understanding how valid reasoning establishes or refutes propositions.