Gyanvishayak Samasyaono Samanya Parichay

This document, "Gyanvishayak Samasyano Samanya Parichay" (General Introduction to Problems of Knowledge) by Nagin J. Shah, from the Z_Bharatiya_Tattva_gyan_001201.pdf publication, delves into the fundamental questions surrounding epistemology within Indian philosophical traditions. It explores how we acquire knowledge, the instruments used for gaining valid knowledge (prama), the criteria for its validity, and how we understand both knowledge and its validity.

The book systematically examines the definitions of prama (valid knowledge) as proposed by various Indian schools of thought:

• Vaisheshika (Kanada): Defines valid knowledge as that which is free from defects. The emphasis is on the defect-free nature of the causes of knowledge.
• Nyaya (Vatsyayana): Initially defines all cognitions as valid knowledge, but later refines this to emphasize that only those cognitions that present things as they truly are (i.e., correspond to reality) are valid. Vatsyayana highlights the importance of knowledge being arthavat (meaningful or having a referent).
• Vachaspati: Interprets arthavat as "avyabhichari" (non-erroneous) and defines valid knowledge as the absence of contradiction with the nature of the object.
• Later Naiyayikas: Follow Vachaspati, stating that valid knowledge is that which represents the object along with its true attributes. They also introduce the concept of arthakriyakaritva (efficacy in action) as a characteristic of valid knowledge, meaning knowledge that leads to successful practical activity is valid.
• Prabhakara (Mimamsa): Identifies "anubhuti" (experience) itself as the characteristic of valid knowledge.
• Bhatta Mimamsakas: Influenced by Buddhism, they accept agrahitagrahitva (the capacity to grasp the ungrasped or the novel) as an essential quality of valid knowledge. They argue that knowledge, even if valid, is useless if it merely repeats what is already known. This view is strongly opposed by the Naiyayikas, who argue that repeated encounters with objects, whether desirable or undesirable, are significant and not redundant. They also add akarana-jananyatva (being uncaused, or rather, not caused by another knowledge) to the definition.
• Buddhism (Dharmakirti): Defines valid knowledge as avisamvadita (non-contradiction), understood as the correspondence between knowledge and the resulting action. Dharmakirti's understanding is rooted in the practical aspect, where knowledge leads to successful action. He also emphasizes that valid knowledge must be agrahitagrahi (grasping the ungrasped). However, his adherence to momentariness leads to a problem in establishing this correspondence, which is resolved by considering the continuity of phenomena rather than individual moments.
• Jain Tradition (Siddhasena Divakara, Akalanka): Siddhasena Divakara presents valid knowledge as self and other-revealing. Akalanka accepts this but primarily defines valid knowledge by avisamvada (non-contradiction), which includes not being invalidated by other pramāṇas and internal consistency. He also introduces vyavasayatmakata (determinateness or decisiveness) and anadhigatatarthadhigantṛ (grasping the ungrasped) as essential qualities. Akalanka, while acknowledging Dharmakirti's influence, clarifies anadhigatatarthadhigantṛ to mean "determining the undetermined," especially in light of the multifaceted nature of reality. He also views practical knowledge in a relative light, considering it valid or invalid based on its correspondence with the object, thereby reconciling it with anekantavada (non-one-sidedness).

The text then discusses the instrument of valid knowledge (pramana karana):

• Nyaya: Considers the instrument of valid knowledge to be the means that directly causes it. There's a debate between those who emphasize the activity (vyapara) of the senses (e.g., sannikarsa) and those who consider the sense organ itself as the instrument. Jayanta Bhatta includes all causal factors (knower, known, senses, mind, etc.) as the totality of the instrument.
• Buddhism (Dharmakirti): Argues that only knowledge itself can be the instrument of valid knowledge because other factors like senses or sannikarsa are themselves unknowing. Knowledge is the most efficient cause of obtaining what is desired and avoiding what is to be shunned. He identifies the immediate preceding cognition as the instrument. He also later identifies the "likeness to the object" within knowledge (arthasarupya) as the instrument.
• Jain Tradition (Akalanka): Agrees with Dharmakirti that knowledge should be considered the instrument. For Akalanka, the cognitive quality of the soul (jnana guna) is the instrument, and its specific modes (like the knowledge of a pot) are the results (phala). This establishes a relation of identity-in-difference between the instrument and the result. He also incorporates the Nyaya-Vaisheshika style of viewing intermediate stages in the knowledge process as both instrument and result relative to different points.
• Samkhya: Identifies the chitta (mind-intellect) as the knower, and the modification of the chitta into the form of the object (chitta vritti) as knowledge. This modified chitta vritti, if it is non-doubtful, non-erroneous, and relates to an ungrasped object, is considered valid knowledge.

The text also tackles other crucial epistemological issues:

• How is knowledge known? (Jnana ka jnana kaise hota hai?):

  • Buddhists, Prabhakaras, Vedantins: Agree that knowledge is self-illuminating and self-aware.
  • Bhatta Mimamsakas: Believe knowledge is not self-aware and not directly apprehended. It is inferred from its effects, like the jñātatā (knownness) that arises in the object due to knowledge.
  • Naiyayikas: State that while knowledge is directly apprehensible, it is known through another cognition (mental apprehension or anuvyavasaya). The initial cognition of an object doesn't immediately reveal itself; it's only after this that the mind can apprehend the cognition itself.
  • Samkhya: Considers the modification of chitta (knowledge) to be known by the Purusha (self), who is the seer. Knowledge is not self-aware but Purusha-aware.
  • Akalanka: Criticizes the Nyaya view that knowledge requires another cognition to be known, arguing it leads to an infinite regress (ananyadosha).
  • General Consensus (excluding Samkhya, Bhatta Mimamsa, Nyaya): Most schools hold that knowledge is self-luminous (svapratyaksha), meaning all types of knowledge, regardless of their source, are directly apprehended in their own nature.

• How is the validity or invalidity of knowledge known?

  • Bhatta Mimamsakas: Validity is known intrinsically (svatah), while invalidity is known extrinsically (paratah) when it is contradicted by a stronger valid cognition.
  • Naiyayikas: Both validity and invalidity are known extrinsically, inferred from the success or failure of the action prompted by the knowledge.
  • Samkhya: The text notes that though direct evidence is lacking, the critiques of Samkhya suggest they believed both validity and invalidity are intrinsically known.
  • Dharmakirti: Knowledge itself is intrinsically known, but its validity is inferred from successful action. For unpracticed objects, validity is inferred.
  • Shantarakshita: For practiced objects, validity and invalidity are intrinsically known; for unpracticed objects, both are inferred from the success or failure of action.
  • Jain Tradition (Akalanka): Agrees with Dharmakirti that validity is inferred from successful action. Later Jain logicians align with Shantarakshita's view.

• The Number of Pramanas:

  • The text outlines the varying numbers of accepted pramāṇas across different schools:
    • Charvaka: Only perception (pratyaksha).
    • Buddhists & Vaisheshikas: Perception and inference (anumana).
    • Samkhyas: Perception, inference, and testimony (shabda).
    • Naiyayikas: Perception, inference, upamana (comparison), and testimony.
    • Prabhakara Mimamsakas: Add arthapatti (postulation).
    • Bhatta Mimamsakas & Vedantins: Add abhava (non-apprehension) as the sixth.
    • Puranikas: Add sambhava (probability) and aitihya (tradition).
  • The text notes that Jain logicians accept only two pramāṇas: direct (pratyaksha) and indirect (paroksha).

• Regulators of the Number of Pramanas:

  • Dignaga, Dharmakirti (Buddhists): The number of pramāṇas corresponds to the number of types of knowable objects: svalakshana (individual, momentary, unique characteristic) grasped by perception, and samanya lakshana (universal, generic characteristic) grasped by inference.
  • Mimamsakas: Consider types of knowable objects and types of causal factors.
  • Naiyayikas: Consider types of knowable objects, causal factors, and types of results.
  • Jain Logicians: Primarily consider the nature of the resulting valid cognition (prama jnana prakara) as the determinant. They identify two types of cognitions: clear (visada) and unclear (avisada), corresponding to direct and indirect knowledge.

• Inclusion of Pramanas (Pramantarbhava): The text discusses how schools that accept fewer pramāṇas integrate the ones they don't recognize into their accepted categories. For instance, Buddhists include testimony within inference and consider upamana as memory (which they deem invalid). Vaisheshikas include upamana, arthapatti, shabda, and abhava as sub-types of inference. Samkhyas include upamana in perception or testimony and arthapatti in inference, while abhava is seen as a form of perception. Naiyayikas place arthapatti in inference and abhava in perception.

• Pramana Sanglava (Overlap of Pramanas) and Pramana Vyavastha (Regulation of Pramanas):

  • Buddhists: Due to their momentariness theory, they deny the possibility of multiple pramāṇas operating on the same object or even multiple instances of the same pramāṇa. They maintain strict distinctions between the domains of perception (svalakshana) and inference (samanya lakshana).
  • Others (non-momentary view): Accept that multiple pramāṇas can cognize the same object.
    • Naiyayikas: Accept both overlap (sangraha) and regulation (vyavastha), allowing some objects to be known by all pramāṇas (e.g., soul, fire) and others by specific pramāṇas only (e.g., heaven by testimony, hand by perception).
    • Mimamsakas: Since they consider pramāṇas to be graspers of the ungrasped, they deny overlap, even if multiple pramāṇas apply to the same object, by emphasizing the primary object of inquiry for each pramāṇa.
    • Jains: Accept both overlap and regulation. Due to their theory of substance and modes, they recognize the momentary nature of modes (leading to non-overlap) and the enduring nature of substance (leading to overlap).

• Other Important Problems:

  • Nirvikalpaka (Indeterminate) vs. Savikalpaka (Determinate) Knowledge:
    • Buddhists: Accept only nirvikalpaka knowledge as perception.
    • Jains: Accept only savikalpaka knowledge as perception.
    • Nyaya-Vaisheshikas: Accept both as perception.
  • Problem of Vāsi-grahaṇa (Generalization/Induction): How do we derive universal truths from particular instances?
  • Problems related to Testimony (Shabda): Issues concerning the eternality of words, the meaning of words, the relationship between words and meaning (eternal or conventional), and how the meaning of sentences is understood.
  • The nature of Sentences: Discussion on whether the meaning of individual words conveys the sentence meaning, or if words themselves, through their inherent power (tātparya shakti), convey sentence meaning.

In essence, the text provides a structured overview of the critical questions in Indian epistemology, showcasing the diverse and sophisticated answers offered by different philosophical schools, with a particular focus on the Jain perspective. It highlights how these schools grappled with defining knowledge, its sources, its validity, and the intricacies of the cognitive process.