Gyannu Pramanya Swat Ke Parat

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Gyannu Pramanya Swat ke Parat" by Nagin J Shah, focusing on the core arguments about the validity of knowledge (pramanya) being intrinsic (swatah) or extrinsic (paratah):

The text delves into a fundamental debate within Indian philosophy, particularly concerning the source and justification of the validity (pramanya) of knowledge (jnana). The central question is whether knowledge is inherently valid or if its validity needs to be established by something external.

Key Schools of Thought and Their Positions:

• Mimamsakas (particularly Prabhakaras and Bhattas):

  • General Stance: The Mimamsakas generally believe that all knowledge is valid (pramana).
  • Prabhakaras: They are the most radical, asserting that invalid knowledge (apramana) is impossible. They define valid knowledge simply as knowledge that is not memory. Their explanation for seemingly erroneous perceptions like seeing a snake in a rope is that it's not a single erroneous cognition, but rather a combination of a direct cognition (which is always valid) and a memory. The confusion arises from failing to distinguish between the two and their objects. This explanation is considered unconvincing by other schools.
  • Bhattas: They modify the Mimamsaka stance by stating that all knowledge is valid until it is proven invalid. This means that even a mistaken perception is considered valid until it is contradicted by subsequent knowledge or by demonstrating a defect in the sensory organs. They argue that if knowledge were not provisionally valid, establishing the validity of any knowledge would be impossible due to infinite regress. The text critiques this by questioning whether such knowledge is truly valid or merely appears to be, suggesting the latter is "temporary validity," which is deemed deceitful.

• Nyaya-Vaisheshikas:

  • General Stance: They disagree with the Mimamsaka view that all knowledge is intrinsically valid. They maintain that both validity (pramanya) and invalidity (apramanya) are extrinsic (paratah). This means that for knowledge to be valid, it requires an external factor (like the correctness of the causal factors), and for it to be invalid, it also requires an external factor (like a defect in the causal factors).
  • Causal Argument: They argue that valid knowledge arises when the causes producing knowledge are free from defects, and invalid knowledge arises when these causes are defective.
  • The Role of Successful Action (Arthakriya): A crucial aspect of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika position is that successful action (arthakriya) is the ultimate test of knowledge's validity. If knowledge leads to successful practical outcomes, it is considered valid. This is a core argument against the Mimamsaka position. They assert that the very experience of successful action serves as the final confirmation of the knowledge's validity.

• Buddhists:

  • General Stance: Similar to the Nyaya-Vaisheshikas, Buddhist logicians also believe that both validity and invalidity are extrinsic. They define valid knowledge as that which leads to successful action.
  • Agreement on Successful Action: The text notes that despite disagreements between Nyaya-Vaisheshikas and Buddhists on other points, they converge on the idea that successful action is the ultimate criterion for knowledge's validity. They argue that if knowledge is to be validated by successful action, then that successful action itself must be valid, leading to a potential infinite regress, which they resolve by stating that the successful action, being self-validating through its very nature, confirms the preceding knowledge.

Key Debates and Arguments:

1. The Origin of Knowledge vs. The Knowledge of Knowledge: The debate is framed around two main issues:

   • Origin of Knowledge: Does the same cause that produces knowledge also produce its validity?
   • Knowledge of Knowledge: Does the process that makes us aware of knowledge also make us aware of its validity?

2. The "Self-Evident" Nature of Validity:

   • The Mimamsakas (particularly the Bhattas) are accused of conflating "knowledge" (jnana) with "valid knowledge" (pramana). They argue that if knowledge is valid, its validity is known intrinsically.
   • The Nyaya-Vaisheshikas and Buddhists argue that simply knowing that knowledge exists doesn't automatically mean it's valid. The validity needs to be established.

3. The Problem of Error (Apana):

   • The Prabhakaras' attempt to explain errors like seeing a snake in a rope by separating the cognition from memory is seen as a weak attempt to uphold their "all knowledge is valid" thesis.
   • The Bhattas' "valid until proven otherwise" approach is critiqued for its reliance on provisional validity.

4. The Role of Successful Action (Arthakriya):

   • This is presented as the most natural and widely accepted criterion for validity.
   • The Nyaya-Vaisheshikas and Buddhists champion this, arguing that if knowledge leads to successful actions (like drinking water that quenches thirst), its validity is established.
   • The Bhattas are criticized for not fully leveraging this principle against the "world is illusory" (jagat-mithyavada) proponents, while simultaneously using it against the logicians.

5. The Mimamsaka Argument on Defects (Dosh):

   • The core of the Mimamsaka (Bhatta) argument is that validity is intrinsic because it doesn't require anything extra. Invalidity, however, arises from defects, which are extrinsic.
   • The Nyaya-Vaisheshikas counter that the absence of defects (dosha-abhava) is also an extrinsic factor. They propose that validity arises from the presence of positive qualities (guna) in the causal factors, while invalidity arises from defects.
   • The text highlights the complex formulation of the Mimamsakas that "the absence of defect is the cause of validity," which is seen as an attempt to distinguish themselves from the Nyaya-Vaisheshikas but ultimately leads to logical contortions.

6. The "Knowledge of Knowledge" Debate:

   • Nyaya-Vaisheshikas: Argue that we know knowledge through introspection (anuvyavasaya) and its validity through inference based on successful action.
   • Bhattas: Believe that knowing knowledge automatically implies knowing its validity. They argue that invalidity is known through unsuccessful action. This is considered contradictory, as the logic for knowing validity intrinsically should also apply to knowing invalidity.

7. The Jain Perspective (Hemachandra):

   • Jain logicians adopt a nuanced approach, acknowledging elements of both intrinsic and extrinsic validity.
   • Intrinsic Validity: They suggest that knowledge is intrinsically valid if it is repeatedly experienced (like knowing one's own hand) or if it is the direct experience of successful action (like the satisfaction after drinking water that quenches thirst). In these cases, the validity is self-evident and doesn't require further testing. Inference (anumana) is also considered intrinsically valid as it arises from an unerring connection between the probans and the probandum.
   • Extrinsic Validity: For knowledge that is experienced for the first time and not yet confirmed by repeated action or clear success, its validity must be determined extrinsically. This external confirmation can come from:
     • Knowledge that supports the first knowledge.
     • Knowledge of successful action stemming from the first knowledge.
     • Knowledge of something invariably connected to the object of the first knowledge.
   • The Jain view tries to avoid the pitfall of infinite regress by stating that these confirming knowledges have their own intrinsic validity, thus breaking the chain of needing external validation for every step.

Conclusion:

The text thoroughly analyzes the intricate philosophical arguments surrounding the validity of knowledge. It critically examines the positions of various Indian schools, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. The central contention is that while the Mimamsakas lean heavily towards intrinsic validity and the Nyaya-Vaisheshikas and Buddhists towards extrinsic validity (often tested by successful action), the Jain perspective offers a synthesized view, proposing that validity can be both intrinsic (for repeated or self-evident experiences) and extrinsic (for novel or uncertain cognitions), ultimately aiming to resolve the logical complexities of the debate without falling into an infinite regress.